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PREFACE 
M i c h a e l  Thompson 
I IA SA 
These three essays are the fruits of a little Winter Study, 
in December 1981, which enabled Mary Douglas and James Douglas 
(both of Northwestern University, Illinois, USA) to visit the 
System and Decision Sciences area at IIASA, there to collaborate 
on an interdisciplinary (or, more properly, non-disciplinary) 
task. 'Institutional bias' was the provisional title for what 
we had in mind and our aim was to try to wrap some cultural and 
political context around the paradoxes of social choice. 
The Western liberal tradition holds rationality and individ- 
uality in high regard. It has to; otherwise it would not be 
liberal, nor would it cohere long enough to become a tradition. 
But too high a regard for reason may exaggerate the part played 
by conscious design in the conduct of human affairs, and too high 
a regard for the individual may exaggerate both his ability to 
identify the things that he values and his scope to arrange them 
in an order of his own choosing. The unity of these essays lies 
in their common critical theme; all three, in their different 
ways, take issue with the liberal tradition. 
James Douglas' point of departure is the recognition that 
actual political systems coped very effectively with the paradoxes 
of social choice long before Condorcet and Arrow revealed that 
those paradoxes existed. Since they could not have been con- 
sciously designed to do this, these systems must have evolved. 
The lowly dung beetle, as it decides whether to try to find a 
new and untenanted cow-pat or to stick with the ever crustier 
one that it has, follows a personal strategy so subtle as to 
require integral calculus in its solution. Could it be that we 
are no better equipped to design our political institutions than 
is the dung beetle up to doing 'A level' mathematics? Trial and 
error--success and failure over countless generations--we conclude, 
is what has led the individual dung beetle to the so-sensible 
strategy that it shares with every other dung beetle.* The 
rational-choice theorist, if he could bring himself to study 
so distasteful a subject, would have to conclude that, with 
such a lack of variation in the preference orderings of cow- 
pats as we go from one individual to another, there is some 
form of dictatorship operating within the dung beetles' social 
system. Of course, in the dung beetle case, the lack of indi- 
viduality--the dictatorship--is about as extreme as it could 
possibly be and it would be foolish to pretend that it provides 
a more valid model of human social life than does the theory of 
rational choice. No, our aim is not to jump to the dung beetle's 
extreme but, rather, to ask: 'extreme from what?' The answer 
has to be: 'from a situation in which, because the individual 
preference orderings are so gloriously varied that no parrallel- 
isms--no little clumpings or mutual alignments--can exist, there 
can be no dictatorship'. We would argue that such a situation, 
though intellectually intriguing, has nothing to do with the 
description of the life of man in society ... apart, that is, 
from saying that it is not like that. 
J. 
The "invisible dictators"' that the rational-choice theorist 
conjures up in response to the parallelisms--the departures 
from individual perfection--that he continually bumps up against 
are, collectively, an old friend of the anthropologist. They 
are culture. The only trouble is that invisible dictators are 
plural and culture is singular. To resolve this paradox we begin 
by defining our extreme at the opposite pole to that defined by 
* 
Apart, one presumes, from the occasional mutant. I have 
slightly simplified the dung beetle's social life and it is, in 
fact, only the male that follows this strategy. Females, when 
they set out in search of fresh cow-pats, follow the richest 
scent and, at tne moment that scent suddenly vanishes, they drop 
to the ground. Males station themselves a short distance upwind 
of their cow-pats and, in consequence, those males that manage 
things so as to spend as much time as possible beside new and 
strong-smelling cow-pats and as little time as possible on the 
wing uetween them are the ones most likely to pass on their genes 
to future generations. 
?~nvisible because, in the dung beetle case, the ethologist 
will assure him that there is no evidence of social stratification 
--no Generalissimo Beetle--within this social system. The same 
is often true of parallelisms within human social systems. The 
individual whose preference ordering happens to correspond to 
the best social choice in such a system of constrained individual- 
ism often turns out to be no more or less influential than his 
fellows. Sometimes this social choice is not even taken up by 
any individual. The dictatorship--the source of constraint on 
the full flowering of individualism--does not lie within those 
who are constrained; it is as if some ethereal being, somewhere 
behind them, is pulling the strings. 
the theory of rational choice. Instead of the fine independence 
of the individual we take as our model the dung beetle. 'To 
what extent, and in what ways, does our behavior distance us from 
it?' we ask, rather than 'to what extent does our behavior fall 
short of the individualist ideal?'. But are not these differences, 
like a knot in a length of string, simply different ways of 
measuring the same thing? No, because there is no continuum-- 
no measuring scale--between these two extremes. Total dictator- 
ship is attainable; perfect individuality is not. We can measure 
our divergence from the attainable but not from the unattainable, 
and the attempt to do the latter we label 'the individualist 
fallacy ' . 
The dung beetle has, over the generations, adapted so as to 
take advantage of the adoptive possibilities of an environment 
within which certain laws (such as the progressive drying out of 
cow-pats) hold inexorable sway. In much the same way, actual 
political systems have evolved to take advantage of an environ- 
ment wherein Arrow's impossibility theorem holds away. But what 
is particularly interesting is that, though all these systems 
cope with the paradoxes of social choice, they do not all cope 
with them in the same way. Mary Douglas comes in at this point 
and, venturing into the untrodden terrain that lies between 
cultural anthropology and organization theory, sketches out a 
three-fold typology of socially viable organizations, each one 
of which stabilizes itself with the aid of its appropriate and 
distinctive cultural bias. So it is culture--man's self-reflexive 
ability--that distances him from the dung beetle. At the same 
time, this idea of cultural biases stabilizing their appropriate 
social organizations ('departures from individual perfection' 
from the rational-choice viewpoint) allows us to reconcile a 
plurality of invisible dictators with a singular culture. 
The final essay explores the way in which these two levels-- 
the cultural biases that always intervene to prevent the attain- 
ment of perfect individuality and the political systems that 
cope with the paradoxes of social choice--fit together. Cultural 
biases, it argues, are in perpetual contention. One organiza- 
tional form may, for a time, gain dominance but it can never 
permanently eliminate the others. Within this flux certain con- 
junctions of cultural biases (and of their associated organiza- 
tions) are stabilizable (or, at any rate, change only in slow 
time) and these persistent regularities we label 'political 
regimes . 
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HOW A C T U A L  P O L I T I C A L  S Y S T E M S  
C O P E  W I T H  T H E  P A R A D O X E S  O F  
S O C I A L  C H O I C E  
J a m e s  D o u g l a s  
N o r t h w e s t e r n  U n i v e r s i t y  
Governmen t  i s  a method of making d e c i s i o n s  f o r  and on beha l f  of a  
c o l l e c t i v i t y ,  the na t ion .  Two wel l  worn propos i t ions  seem t o  l i e  at the  hea r t  
of  ou r  Western concept of i d e a l i s e d  democratic government. The f i r s t  is t h a t  
t he  r igh tness  of a  dec i s ion  is  judged by t h e  r e s u l t a n t  good t o  the  members of 
t h e  community. Economis t s  c a l l  t h i s  c o l l e c t i v e  good a "public  (o r  s o c i a l )  
u t i l i t y  ( o r  we l fa re )  funct ion".  But we a r e  cons tan t ly  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  same 
b a s i c  i d e a  when we s p e a k  of  " t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t " ,  " t h e  good of t h e  
community", " the n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t "  and s o  on and s o  f o r t h .  It i s  h a r d l y  
p o s s i b l e  t o  r e a d  a  p o l i t i c a l '  speech without encountering t h i s  not ion i n  one 
form o r  a n o t h e r .  T h i s  f i r s t  p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  what we mean by 
government  - f o r  t h e  people. The second propos i t ion  i s  t h a t  the  judges of t he  
g o o d  of  t h e  p e o p l e  a r e  t h e  peop le  themse lves .  T h i s  is  what we mean by 
government 3 the  people. This ,  too,  is  c lose ly  l inked t o  an economic notion: 
t h a t  t h e  "good" or  " u t i l i t y "  i s  what people choose o r  "prefer ."  " U t i l i t y "  and 
"preferences" o f t en  become almost in te rchangeable  terms. Any sugges t ion  t h a t  
t h e  p u b l i c  good s h o u l d  be de te rmined  by anything o r  anybody o the r  than the  
c i t i z e n s  themselves somehow seems undemocratic t o  t h e  Western ea r .  C e r t a i n l y  
i f  a  view of t h e  p u b l i c  good imposed on s o c i e t y  by an e x t e r n a l  fo rce  can be 
shown t o  be c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of t h e  m a j o r i t y  of t h e  c i t i z e n s  
themselves, we have no h e s i t a t i o n  i n  descr ib ing  such a  system as t y r ann ica l  o r  
despot ic .  
The Western i d e a l  of democracy si ts  a s t r i d e  these  two propos i t ions .  I f  
democracy were defined o n l y  a s  government  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e  - maximizing t h e  
s o c i a l  wel fa re  func t ion  - a benevolent despotism would be democractic even 
though it lacked e l e c t i o n s ,  par l iaments  and a l l  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of democracy. A t  t h e  same time I s h a l l  argue i n  t h i s  paper t h a t  
government by t h e  people - t he  mere aggrega t ion  of t h e  preferences  of c i t i z e n s  
- i s  an  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d e f i n i t i o n  i f  only because preference  aggregat ion runs 
i n t o  i n s u r m o u n t a b l e  l o g i c a l  and t e c h n i c a l  p rob lems .  Thus g o v e r n m e n t a l  
- s y s t e m s ,  c o n s c i o u s l y  o r  u n c o n s c i o u s l y ,  have t o  work out some way e i t h e r  of 
l i m i t i n g  the  choices  presented  t o  t h e  pub l i c  o r  t a k e  account of f a c t o r s  o t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of c i t i z e n s .  I s h a l l  a r g u e  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  devices  
adopted f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  a r e  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e i r  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e s .  I n  s h o r t  t he  i d e a l  of 
democracy involves some impos i t ion  of government f o r  t h e  people on government 
-
2 t h e  p e o p l e ,  t h e  e x a c t  b a l a n c e  of which is d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  system's 
h i s t o r i c a l  evolu t ion .  
The l anguage  of Western democracy f r equen t ly  mixes toge ther  preferences  
and i n t e r e s t s ,  i n d i v i d u a l  v o l i t i o n s  and t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good. While  a  g r e a t  
d e a l  of t h e  mach ine ry  of d e m o c r a t i c  government i s  d i r e c t e d  a t  e l i c i t i n g  
preferences  - e l e c t i o n s ,  lobbying, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of i n t e r e s t s ,  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  
e t c .  - t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which government by t h e  p e o p l e  depends on ind iv idua l  
v o l i t i o n s  is  obscured by our  use of c o l l e c t i v e  nouns and a d j e c t i v e s .  When we 
s p e a k  of t h e  " g e n e r a l  w i l l "  o r  " the w i l l  of t he  people," we a r e  g u i l t y  of a  
c o l l e c t i v i s t  f a l l a c y ,  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  t h e  " p u b l i c , "  t h e  " p e o p l e , "  t h e  
" e l e c t o r a t e , "  t h e  "community" ( o r  whatever c o l l e c t i v e  noun we a r e  using)  can 
be sa id  t o  have a  w i l l  i n  t h e  same way a s  an i n d i v i d u a l  can be sa id  t o  have  a  
w i l l .  W i t h o u t  g e t t i n g  t o o  f a r  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  r e g a r d i n g  
s u b j e c t i v e l y  assessed and o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s ,  we should note  t h a t  u n l i k e  t h e  
l a n g u a g e  o f  v o l i t i o n s ,  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  i n t e r e s t s  may a v o i d  t h e  
c o l l e c t i v i s t  f a l l a c y .  There is a  sense  i n  which a  c o l l e c t i v i t y  can be s a i d  t o  
have  an  i n t e r e s t .  The confusion seems t o  go back, at  l e a s t ,  t o  Rousseau ( o r ,  
a t  l e a s t ,  t o  h i s  i n t e r p r e t e r s )  and  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
" d i c t a t o r i a l "  o r  " t o t a l i t a r i a n "  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  S o c i a l  Contract .  This  
use  of language confuses two d i f f e r e n t  concept ions of t h e  s t a t e :  t h e  P l a t o n i c  
concept ions of t h e  s t a t e  whose i n t e r e s t s  and whose laws  c a n  be r a t i o n a l l y  
deduced  from the  i d e a l  concept ion of t he  s t a t e ,  and t h e  Benthamite conception 
of the  n a t i o n a l  community as a mere a g g r e g a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s .  T e n s i o n  
between t h e s e  two c o n c e p t s  of t h e  p u b l i c  good permeates Western democratic 
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
R i g h t  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  of t he  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  P r i n c i p l e s  of Morals and 
L e g i s l a t i o n ,  J e r e m y  Ben tham a s k s  t h i s  q u e s t i o n :  "The community i s  a  
f i c t i t i o u s  body, composed of i n d i v i d u a l s  who a r e  considered as c o n s t i t u t i n g  
i ts  members. The i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  c o m u n i t y  t h e n  i s  wha t?"  -- and p r o v i d e s  
t h i s  answer:  "The sum of t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of the  s e v e r a l  members who compose 
i t  ."I And he then,  of course ,  goes on t o  work out  t h i s  answer by developing as 
t he  c e n t r a l  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  both morals and l e g i s l a t i o n ,  " the  g r e a t e s t  happiness  
of  t h e  g r e a t e s t  number". We now know t h a t  t h i s  is f a r  too simple and naive a  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  problem of a g g r e g a t i n g  t h e  "sum of t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  
s e v e r a l  members who compose" t h e  n a t i o n a l  community. 
The problem a r i s e s  when, w i t h  Pa re to  r a t h e r  than  Bentham, we d e c i d e  t h a t  
t h e  o n l y  p r a c t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  of t he  i n t e r e s t s  of t hese  " seve ra l  members" is 
t h e i r  own preferences .  One consequence of avoiding any o t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  is  t h e  
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of making in te r -personal  comparisons of u t i l i t y  . So long a s  t h e  
good is de te rmined  o n l y  by i n d i v i d u a l  c h o i c e s ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  of two 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  choices  can obviously only be judged by r e f e r ence  t o  some 
e x t e r n a l  c r i t e r i o n .  I n  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  two-person s t a t e ,  i f  A and  B make 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  c h o i c e s ,  t h e  s t a t e  can p r e f e r  A's choice  t o  B's choice only by 
r e f e r ence  t o  some c r i t e r i o n  o t h e r  than  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of i t s  two c i t i z e n s ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  c o u l d ,  of course ,  be no nmre than an agreed dec i s ion  
r u l e  f o r  dea l ing  wi th  such a  s ta lemate .  Furthermore, s i n c e  w e  c a n n o t  g e t  i n  
t o  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  minds ,  w e  can  n e v e r  r e a l l y  compare one  man's good w i t h  
another 's .  So convent iona l  ( o r  more p r e c i s e l y ,  P a r e t i a n )  economics  h a s  i n  
g e n e r a l  g i v e n  up t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  c a r d i n a l  u t i l i t y  and c o n f i n e s  i t s e l f  t o  
o r d i n a l  u t i l i t y .  
The f a l l a c i e s  of t he  h e d o n i s t i c  c a l c u l u s  were explored much e a r l i e r ,  but  
t he  real depth charge under t h e  whole n o t i o n  of  a g g r e g a t i n g  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  
d e t o n a t e d  i n  1951 by Kenneth  Arrow i n  S o c i a l  Choice and I n d i v i d u a l  ~ a l u e s . ~  
H e  showed t h a t  " i f  w e  exclude the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n t e r p e r s o n a l  comparisons of 
u t i l i t y ,  then  t h e  only methods of p a s s i n g  f rom i n d i v i d u a l  t a s t e s  t o  s o c i a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s  which w i l l  be s a t i s f a c t o r y  and which w i l l  be def ined  f o r  a wide 
range  of sets of i n d i v i d u a l  o rder ing6  a r e  e i t h e r  imposed o r  d i ~ t a t o r i a l . " ~  
Arrow p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  a  r a t i o n a l  method of  a r r i v i n g  a t  a  s o c i a l  o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  preference  should s a t i s f y  t he se  fou r  condi t ions :  
1. U n r e s t r i c t e d  choice.  Whatever  t h e  o r d e r  i n  which each member of a  
c o l l e c t i v i t y  (o f  t h r e e  o r  more members) p l a c e s  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  
amongst  t h r e e  o r  more a l t e r n a t i v e s  (always assuming each i n d i v i d u a l  
o r d e r i n g  i s ,  of  c o u r s e ,  l o g i c a l  and  t r a n s i t i v e ) ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  
p o s s i b l e  t o  aggrega te  them. 
2. I f  every member o f  t h e  c o l l e c t i v i t y  p r e f e r s  one  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  
another ,  t h e  s o c i a l  p r e f e r ence  s h o u l d  do s o  t o o .  T h i s  is  u s u a l l y  
c a l l e d  t he  P a r e t o  p r i n c i p l e .  
3. The preference  o f  one i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i v i t y  s h o u l d  no t  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  become t h e  s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e  r e g a r d l e s s  of  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Arrow c a l l s  t h i s  
"non-dictatorship" . 
4. Independence of i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  This  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  
s o c i a l  o rder ing  of a  given s e t  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  depend o n l y  on t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  members' p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g 8  of t h o s e  a 1  t e r n a t i v e s .  
Amongst o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  e x c l u d e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l  comparisons of u t i l i t y .  
Arrow's proof c o n s i s t s  of demonstrating t h e  s u r p r i s i n g  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  
f o u r  a p p a r e n t l y  commonsensical condi t ions  a r e  mutually incompatible.  I n  t h i s  
p a p e r ,  I c o n s i d e r  t h i s  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  a s  p l a c i p g  c o n s t r a i n t s  on  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of e l i c i t i n g  s o c i a l  p references  from ind iv idua l  preferences  and 
w i l l  show how a c t u a l  p o l i t i c a l  systems evade t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  i m p l i c i t  i n  t hese  
fou r  condi t ions  of r a t i o n a l i t y  . 
P o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  a t  f i r s t  d i s m i s s e d  Arrow's  
I m p o s s i b i l i t y  Theorem a s  a  minor  d i f f i c u l t y  - p e r h a p s  assuming t h a t  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  o n l y  a r o s e  w i t h  e x o t i c  o r  unusual d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of preferences - 
b u t  soon a f t e r ,  an  ex tens ive  l i t e r a t u r e  developed.5 Some of t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  
was d i r e c t e d  a t  f i n d i n g  ways a round  t h e  I m p o s s i b i l i t y  Theorem e i t h e r  by 
q u e s t i o n i n g  Arrow's def f n i t i o n  of r a t i o n a l i t y  ( i nc lud ing  t h e  four  condi t ions  
l i s t e d  above )  o r  by impos ing  c e r t a i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o r  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  
preferences  t o  be aggregated. Much of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  is a l s o  concerned to  use  
Arrow's theorem t o  p r e d i c a t e  something about t h e  way d e m o c r a t i c  sys t ems  w i l l  
o p e r a t e .  T h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  has  emphasized the  importance of agenda s e t t i n g  i n  
democratic p r a c t i c e  - t h e  way i n  which, a s  Wi l l i am R i k e r  p u t s  i t ,  d e c i s i o n s  
a r e  "subjec t  t o  t h e  t r i c k s  and acc iden t s  of t h e  way q u e s t i o n s  a r e  posed  and 
t h e  way a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  o f f e red  and el iminated."6 The agenda s e t t i n g  U n e  of 
argument a l s o  po in t s  t o  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of non-decisions - t h e  way i n  which  
outcomes can  be i n f l u e n c e d  by keeping an i s s u e  away from t h e  decieion-making 
machinery of government. It should be emphasised t h a t  what Arrow's theorem 
p r o v e s  i s  t h a t  i t  is  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  devise  an aggrega t ion  device t h a t  can be 
s u r e  of producing a  s o c i a l  p reference  under h i s  fou r  cond i t i ons  of r a t i o n a l i t y  
n o t  t h a t  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e v i s e  an  a g g r e g a t i o n  d e v i c e  t h a t  w i l l  ever  
produce a  s o c i a l  p reference .  For some purposes i t  is enough t h a t  a  c o l l e c t i v e  
s o c i a l  p reference  may be produced but f o r  o the r  purposes,  inc luding  e l e c t i o n s ,  
t he  mere p o s s i b i l i t y  of f a i l u r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  condemn t h e  d e v i c e .  I n  t h e  
l a t t e r  c a s e s ,  t h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n  is  t o  i n f r i n g e  one o r  more of Arrow's four  
condi t ions .  Curiously enough democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s  appear t o  have o p e r a t e d  
i n  s u c h  a  way a s  t o  a v o i d  t h e  p i t f a l l s  of aggregat ions by i n f r i n g i n g  one o r  
more of Arrow's cond i t i ons  long before  t h e  r a t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  process  
were understood. 
R e s t r i c t i n g  Choice 
We now know t h a t  p a r t  of Arrow's paradox was f o r e s e e n  two c e n t u r i e s  
e a r l i e r  by the  French mathematician and p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r i s t ,  Condorcet.  Arrow 
h i m s e l f  i n  1951 seems a t  f i r s t  t o  have been unaware of Condorcet's vo t ing  
paradox. Frenchmen r e f e r  t o  t h i s  a s  t h e  "Condorcet e f f e c t "  o r  t h e  pa radox  of 
" l ' i n t r o u v a b l e  e l u " .  It is only when Arrow reformulated h i s  theorem i n  1963 
i n  t h e  second e d i t i o n ,  t h a t  he  added a c h a p t e r  acknowledging  Condorcet's 
con t r ibu t ion  which he had previous ly  a s s imi l a t ed  only i n d i r e c t l y  t h rough  t h e  
work of t h e  Aus t r a l i an  E. J. Nanson. Condorcet had shown t h a t  with more than 
two a l t e r n a t i v e s  and more than two v o t e r s ,  i t  was p o s s i b l e  t o  g e t  a  c i r c u l a r  
m a j o r i t y  such t h a t  no a l t e r n a t i v e  would s a t i s f y  a  major i ty  of t he  e l e c t o r a t e .  
A majo r i ty  could p r e f e r  A t o  B,  and B t o  C ,  b u t  C t o  A. The a d v o c a t e s  of 
e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m  i n  B r i t a i n  a r e  fond  of po in t ing  out t h a t  s i n c e  no B r i t i s h  
government s i n c e  t h e  war has  r ece ived  a m a j o r i t y  of t h e  v o t e s  c a s t ,  w e  c a n  
assume t h a t  t h e r e  were always more vo te r s  d i s s a t i s f i e d  than s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e  
government chosen by t h e  e l e o t o r a l  system.9 m a t  they don't point  ou t  is t h a t  
SO long a s  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  o r  more p a r t i e s ,  no e l e c t o r a l  system can i n s u r e  t h e  
-
c h o i c e  of a  government  which w i l l  s a t i s f y  more v o t e r s  than a r e  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  c h o i c e .  The c h a n c e s  of c i r c u l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s  a r i s i n g  w i l l  v a r y  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  number of m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  up f o r  opt ion.  
William Riker has shown t h a t  by t h e  time f i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  i n  p l a y ,  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of c i r c u l a r  preferences  a r i s i n g  is nea r ly  
The s e t  of preference  o rde r ing  t h a t  l e a d s  t o  c i r c u l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s  is a n  
i m p o r t a n t  member of t h e  r a n g e  of s e t s  of o r d e r i n g s  t h a t  Arrow requ i r e s  a  
r a t i o n a l  a g g r e g a t i o n  d e v i c e  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  r e s o l v e .  C l e a r l y  i f  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  two, n e i t h e r  Condorcet's nor Arrow's paradoxes 
w i l l  a r i s e .  And t h i s  is  p r e c i s e l y  what any two p a r t y  s y s t e m  t e n d s  t o  
a c h i e v e .  I n  B r i t i s h  e l e c t i o n s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  is achieved  by the tendency of 
p l u r a l i t y  vot ing  t o  over represent  t h e  major p a r t i e s .  David B u t l e r  t e l l s  u s  
t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  s y s t e m  of p l u r a l i t y  vot ing  ( o r ,  a s  i t  is sometimes c a l l e d ,  
"f i rs t -past- the-post"  system) was developed sometime i n  t h e  1 3 t h  c e n t u r y .  I 
d o u b t  whe the r  any psepho log i s t s  who might have been around a t  t h e  time could 
have reached the  degree of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
v o t i n g  sys t ems  a c h i e v e d  by e i t h e r  Condorcet  or  Arrow. Yet the system they 
adopted very n e a t l y  bypasses one of t he  major c o n s t r a i n t s .  l1 
The same is t r u e ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  of t h e  sys t ems  d e v i s e d  f o r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n s ,  b o t h  i n  F r a n c e  and t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  The means by which they 
achieve the  o b j e c t i v e  d i f f e r  from those  of t h e  B r i t i s h  s y s t e m  and f rom e a c h  
o t h e r .  The American s y s t e m  a c h i e v e s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  by t h e  primary system 
n e a r l y  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  o n e  e a c h  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  a n d  
Democra t i c  p a r t i e s ,  and t h e  French system by two b a l l o t s ,  the  f i r s t  of which 
e l imina te s  the  weaker runners .  We need  t o  n o t e  t h a t  none of t h e s e  s y s t e m s  
s o l v e s  t h e  problem; t h e y  mere ly  h i d e  i t .  I t  i s  s t i l l  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  i f  
Americans o r  Frenchmen had u n r e s t r i c t e d  range of choice ,  t h e r e  migh t  w e l l  be 
more Frenchmen who p re fe r r ed  someone e l s e  than P r e s i d e n t  Mit terand than t h e r e  
were who p r e f e r r e d  him t o  anyone else, and s i m i l a r l y  w i t h  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan. 
We have  a l r e a d y  s e e n  t h a t  even  on t h e  l i m i t e d  range o f f e r ed  by the  B r i t i s h  
e l e c t o r a l  system, t h e r e  a r e  more v o t e r s  f o r  whom t h e  winning p a r t y  i s  n o t  t h e  
f i r s t  choice than t h e r e  a r e  f o r  whom it  is. 
We s h o u l d  a l s o  n o t i c e  t h a t  none of  t h e  s y s t e m s  a c t u a l l y  s u c c e e d s  
c o m p l e t e l y  i n  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  t o  a b inary  choice  and t h i s  may be 
q u i t e  an important  c o n s t i t u e n t  of t h e  system's power t o  confer  l eg i t imacy .  It 
manages t o  h ide  what it is doing: - "you can't say  t h a t  t he  system r e s t r i c t e d  
the choice  t o  Reagan o r  C a r t e r ;  look a t  Anderson". 
Two p a r t y  systems and the  l i k e  a r e  a way of avoiding c y c l i c a l  p re fe rences  
by breaking the decis ion-making process  i n t o  a ser ies  of p a i r - w i s e  c h o i c e s .  
T h i s  does  not a c t u a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  a t r u e  aggrega t ion  of i n d i v i d u a l  p re fe rences  
bu t  it avoids  t h e  p o s s i b l i t y  of an i n c o n c l u s i v e  r e s u l t  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  ( f o r  
example, f a i l i n g  t o  choose any one a s  p r e s i d e n t ) .  It i s  sometimes argued t h a t  
two-party systems and pair-wise choice r e f l e c t s  a fundamenta l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of human th ink ing  which is  unable t o  choose between =re than two a l t e r n a t i v e s  
o r  two tendenc ies .  I f  t h i s  were so ,  which I doubt,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  i m p l i c i t  
i n  Arrow's t heo rem would be avoided not  by the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms, such a s  
e l e c t o r a l  laws, bu t  by an i n h e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of human thought p r o c e s s e s .  
However, even  when t h e r e  a r e  many a l t e r n a t i v e s  amongst which to  choose, our 
h a b i t u a l ,  perhaps i n s t i n c t i v e ,  ways of d i s cus s ing  and th ink ing  about p o l i t i c s ,  
c a n d i d a t e s  and i s s u e s  may y e t  s u c c e e d  i n  e v a d i n g  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s .  Duncan 
B l a c k ,  l2 f o r  example ,  h a s  shown t h a t  a s i n g l e  peaked d i s t r i b u t i o n  can be 
aggregated and  t h e  h a b i t  o f  l i n i n g  u p - c a n d i d a t e s ,  p a r t i e s  o r  i s s u e s  on a 
l e f  t - r i g h t  s p e c t r u m  is a way of ach iev ing  such a s i n g l e  peaked d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
Here t he  c o n s t r a i n t s  i m p l i c i t  i n  Arrow's theorem a r e  avoided not  by e l e c t o r a l  
law, but by our h a b i t u a l ,  perhaps i n s t i n c t i v e ,  ways of d i scuss ing  and th inking  
about p o l i t i c s ,  candida tes  and i s sues .  
Arrow's theorem shows t h a t  e l e c t o r a l  systems a r e  imperfect  methods of 
e l i c i t i n g  s o c i a l  p references  and t h a t  a p e r f e c t  system not only does not e x i s t  
b u t  canno t  ex is t .  Actua l  e l e c t o r a l  systems can work only by r e s t r i c t i n g  the  
r a n g e  of  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  be a g g r e g a t e d .  To u s e  an a n a l o g y  Arrow h i m s e l f  
employs ,  we can th ink  of an e l e c t o r a l  system a s  a machine i n t o  which c i t i z e n s  
feed t h e i r  p references  a t  one end and which spews out  a s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e  a t  
t h e  o t h e r  end. Whereas t h e  impossible pe r f ec t  aggregat ion device could take  
i n  any order ing  of p r e f e r e n c e s ,  r e a l  a c t u a l  a g g r e g a t i o n  d e v i c e s  r e f u s e  t o  
accept  those order ings  which they a r e  incapable of processing.  
Perhaps because the  l i m i t s  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f ,  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o i c e  were  
n o t  a p p r e c i a t e d  u n t i l  r e l a t i v e l y  l a t e ,  a good d e a l  of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  government s t i  11 h a n k e r s  a f t e r  a s y s  tem of government t h a t  
would m i r r o r  t he  views of t he  e l e c t o r a t e  and submit governmental dec i s ions  t o  
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  assembly t h a t  provided a microcosm of t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  i n  which 
the  f u l l  range of op in ions  held by v o t e r s  is  represented .  Thus, f o r  example ,  
Vernon Bogdanor l3 writes of "a l i b e r a l  conception of r ep re sen ta t ion  according 
t o  which t h e  t a s k  of t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o p i n i o n s  of  
e l e c t o r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  community i n  which they l i v e ,  as i n  t h e  p l u r a l i t y  
system, or  t h e i r  pa r ty  a l l e g i a n c e ,  a s  i n  t h e  l i s t  systems. According t o  t h i s  
concept ion,  an e l e c t o r  is not properly represented  un le s s  t h e r e  is a member of 
the  l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  speak f o r  him." Ce r t a in ly  w i t h  a l e g i s l a t u r e  of s e v e r a l  
hundred  members, i t  s h o u l d  be poss ib l e  t o  devise  a system t h a t  would ensure 
t h a t  a g r e a t e r  range of t h e  opinions of v o t e r s  is  expressed  t h a n  i s  t h e  c a s e  
i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  House of Commons a t  p resent .  But does r ep re sen ta t ion  merely 
imply t h a t  a wider range of opinions should be voiced? I f  s o ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
i s  a t t a i n a b l e .  However, i f  our concept of r ep re sen ta t ion  involves more than 
the  mere express ion  of d ivergent  opinions and impl ies  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  made 
should r ep re sen t  t h e  balance of d ivergent  op in ions ,  then we a r e  up aga ins t  t he  
l o g i c a l  l i m i t s  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o i c e .  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  a  s y s t e m  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  government  s h o u l d  be t o  f i n d  t he  most s a t i s f a c t o r y  ( o r  l e a s t  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y )  method of  c i r c u m v e n t i n g  t h e s e  l i m i t s .  A t  i t s  c r u d e s t ,  we 
migh t  a s k  which of Arrow's fou r  cond i t i ons  of r a t i o n a l i t y  we should g ive  up. 
More s u b t l y ,  w e  m i g h t  a s k  what  s t r a t e g y  f o r  e v a d i n g  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o u r  
c o n d i t i o n s  s h o u l d  w e  adopt.  The two condi t ions  most l i k e l y  f o r  t h i s  purpose 
a r e  t he  cond i t i ons  of " u n r e s t r i c t e d  choice" and " i n d e p e n d e n c e  of i r r e l e v a n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  I h a v e  a l r e a d y  s u g g e s t e d  some ways i n  which a c t u a l  systems 
evade these  cond i t i ons  and w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  problem l a t e r  i n  t h i s  paper. 
The l o g i c a l  l i m i t s  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  choices  seem t o  me 
much more c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  " g o v e r n m e n t  by t h e  p e o p l e "  t h a n  
mathematical ly  ingenious formulae f o r  r e f l e c t i n g  i n  an e l e c t e d  chamber a  wider 
range of t he  op in ions  of vo t e r s .  I f  'by r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  we mean a  method o f  
g e t t i n g  g o v e r n m e n t a l  d e c i s i o n s  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  prefe rences  of c i t i z e n s ,  it is 
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  impede t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  t h a t  s h o u l d  h a v e  o u r  f i r s t  
a t t e n t i o n .  Whether  t h e  e v a s i o n  of one o r  more of t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  is b e s t  
c a r r i e d  ou t  a t  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  l e v e l ,  w i t h i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  by v i r t u e  of t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m ,  o r  i n  t h e  e l e c t e d  chamber is  a n  i m p o r t a n t  ques t i on  but  
l o g i c a l l y  t he  second not  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p .  
Howeve r ,  b e f o r e  examin ing  i n  more d e t a i l  t h e  ways a c t u a l  p o l i t i c a l  
systems g e t  round the  c o n s t r a i n t s  i m p l i c i t  i n  Arrow's theorem, I have t o  po in t  
t o  o n e  way i n  w h i c h ,  q u i t e  a p a r t  from t h e  i n h e r e n t  l o g i c a l  l i m i t s  t o  
c o l l e c t i v e  choice,  t h e  system of e l e c t o r a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  o - f f i c e  f a i l s  t o  
provide  a s  much informat ion  about c i t i z e n s '  p r e f e r ences  a s  would be d e s i r a b l e .  
L e t  me t a k e  a n  i s s u e  wh ich  I c o n s i d e r  c r u c i a l  t o  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y .  
C a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m s  e n c o u n t e r  a  p roblem which h a s  been d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  
" impossible  t r i a d " .  The pub l i c  would l i k e  an economic s y s t e m  t h a t  a c h i e v e d  
t h r e e  g o a l s :  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t ,  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y ,  and f r e e  c o l l e c t i v e  
bargaining.  I n  t he  p re sen t  s t a t e  of economic knowledge, i t  seems t h a t  t h e s e  
t h r e e  g o a l s  canno t  be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a c h i e v e d .  By s a c r i f i c i n g  one w e  can 
achieve the  o the r  two: - by s a c r i f i c i n g  f r e e  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  we c o u l d  
a c h i e v e  f u l l  employment and p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y ;  by s a c r i f i c i n g  f u l l  employment, 
we c o u l d  combine p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  and f r e e  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g ;  and by 
s a c r i f i c i n g  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y ,  we could,  a t  l e a s t  i n  a  c losed economy, achieve 
f u l l  employment wi th  complete freedom of c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  by i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  money supply and hang the  i n f l a t i o n a r y  consequences. There is nothing i n  
t he  inherent  l o g i c  of aggrega t ion  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p a r t y  s y s t e m  o f f e r i n g  t h e  
e l e c t o r a t e  these  choices .  Conservat ives ,  f o r  example, could say t h a t  we w i l l  
s a c r i f i c e  f u l l  employment so a s  t o  achieve p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  without i n t e r f e r i n g  
w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g ;  t h e  SDP c o u l d  s a y  we w i l l  s a c r i f i c e  f r e e  
c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining - have a  r e a l l y  tough incomes p o l i c y  - t o  i n s u r e  f u l l  
e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y ;  and t h e  Labor  p a r t y  c o u l d  s a y  w e  w i l l  
s a c r i f i c e  p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  t o  e n a b l e  f u l l  employment t o  be 
m a i n t a i n e d  d e s p i t e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  wage s e t t l e m e n t s .  A s  f a r  a s  I know, no 
p o l i t i c a l  sys t em a c t u a l l y  works t h a t  way. Even i f  t he  p a r t i e s  adopted these  
p o l i t i c a l l y  u n r e a l i s t i c  p o s i t i o n s ,  t h e r e  would s t i l l  be a  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  
r e s u l t  would be a  c i r c u l a r  p re fe rence ,  s ince  we have a  t r i a d :  t h e  major i ty  
might p r e f e r  unemployment t o  i n f l a t i o n ,  i n f l a t i o n  t o  incomes p o l i c y ,  b u t  
incomes p o l i c y  t o  unemployment. Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  example is 
extreme. I have pos tu l a t ed  o v e r s i m p l i f i e d  p o l a r  s t e r e o t y p e s  of p o l i c y  f o r  
s i m p l i c i t y  of expos i t ion .  Real po l icy  proposals  wou1.d be more e c l e c t i c ,  a  b i t  
of i n f l a t i o n ,  a  b i t  of unemployment, and a  b i t  o f  incomes p o l i c y .  The r e a l  
c r i t i c i s m  of t he  system, however, is t h a t  it gives  t he  policy-makers v i r t u a l l y  
no guidance as t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  w e i g h t  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  p l a c e s  on t h e  t h r e e  
a p p a r e n t l y  i n c o m p a t i b l e  d e s i d e r a t a  and it f a i l s  t o  inform t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  of 
any i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  i ts  choices .  
Tex tbooks  on t h e  r o l e  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  emphasize not only t h e i r  r o l e  
as packaging organs,  o f f e r i n g  bundles of op t ions  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ' s  c h o i c e ,  
b u t  a l s o  an  e d u c a t i o n a l  r o l e ,  i n f o r m i n g  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  of v i a b l e  and 
c o n s i s t e n t  sets of op t ions .  However, t h e  mechanics of i n t e r -pa r ty  compet i t ion  
m i l i t a t e s  a g a i n s t  t h i s  e d u c a t i o n a l  r o l e .  The p a r t i e s  have no i n c e n t i v e  t o  
conf ront  the  e l e c t o r a t e  wi th  t h e  hard choices  which t h e  r e s p o n s i v e  t h e o r y  of  
democracy would r e q u i r e  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  t o  make. In s t ead  and i n e v i t a b l y ,  t h e  
p a r t i e s  sof t -pedal  t h e  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t s  of w h a t e v e r  b u n d l e  of o p t i o n s  t h e y  
p re sen t  f o r  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  t o  embrace. The mone ta r i s t s  play down t h e  l e v e l  of 
n a t i o n a l  unemployment r equ i r ed  t o  reach  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t a t e  of  
t r a d e  union o rgan iza t ion ;  t h e  advocates  of incomes p o l i c y  play down t h e  degree 
of r e g i m e n t a t i o n  and t h e  l o s s  of  f l e x i b i l i t y  s u c h  p o l i c y  would i n v o l v e ;  
p o l i t i c i a n s  a d o p t i n g  t h e  p o l i c i e s  of t h e  New Cambridge school  a r e  r e t i c e n t  
about how much i n f l a t i o n  they  a r e  prepared t o  t o l e r a t e  and t h e  consequences of 
a  s i e g e  economy. Advoca t e s  of t h e  a d v e r s a r i a l  system sometimes argue that 
a d v e r s a r i a l  p o l i t i c s  do c l a r i f y  i s s u e s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  po l i cy  o r  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  soft -pedal  i ts  shortcoming, t h e i r  opponents 
have  an  i n c e n t i v e  t o  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  weaknesses  i n  t h a t  p o s i t i o n .  I n  my 
e x p e r i e n c e ,  a d v e r s a r i a l  p o l i t i c s  r a r e l y  succeeds i n  c l a r i f y i n g  i s s u e s  t o  t h e  
po in t  where t he  pros  and c o n s  c a n  be o b j e c t i v e l y  a s s e s s e d .  The c h o i c e  o f  
p o l i c i e s  n e a r l y  a l w a y s  i n v o l v e s  t r a d i n g  o f f  a  mix of goods and bads between 
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The i d e a  of a  trade-off seems t o  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
communicate  i n  p o l i t i c a l  r h e t o r i c .  The proponents argue t h a t  t he  e f f e c t s  a r e  
wholly good; t h e  opponents a rgue  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  a r e  wholly bad. 
Nor is  i t  only t h e  impera t ives  of i n t e r -pa r ty  competi t ion t h a t  m i l i t a t e s  
a g a i n s t  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  informed and educated e l e c t o r a t e  t o  make t h e  c h o i c e s  
wh ich  a  p u r e l y  r e s p o n s i v e  t h e o r y  of democracy would r e q u i r e .  Given  t h e  
tremendous development and soph i s t i ca t ion  of modern economics,  i t  i s  s u r e l y  
u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  assume t h a t  a v o t e r  whose e x p e r t i s e  l i e s  i n  some t o t a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n  would be a b l e  t o  make an informed judgement between t h e  
t h e o r i e s  of P r o f e s s o r  Mi l ton  Friedman, S i r  John  Hicks, or  Professor Wynne 
Godley. 
Considerations Beyond Cit izens '  Preference 
The Burkean t h e o r y  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  r e c o g n i z e s  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  and 
pos tu la tes  tha t  voters  w i l l  devolve onto rep resen ta t ives  the  t a sk  of assessing 
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  b e t t e r  t h a n  they can do so themselves.14 How a r e  voters  to  
judge t h e i r  r ep resen ta t ives?  The answer i s  b a s i c a l l y  q u i t e  simple - "by t h e i r  
f r u i t s  you s h a l l  know them". And so  we g e t  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  " o u t p u t s  of 
government model," which I suspect provides a s  accura te  a d e s c r i p t i o n  a s  any 
of how d e m o c r a t i c  regimes i n  f a c t  operate. The e l e c t o r a t e  i n  voting gives a 
ve rd ic t  on how s a t i s f i e d  o r  d i s s a t i s f i e d  t h e y  a r e  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  
incumbent's performance i n  off ice.15 By now we have moved q u i t e  f a r  from'the 
idea of c i t izen ' s  preferences a s  choices between a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  
t h e  management of socie ty .  The e f f e c t i v e  choice i s  p l a c e t  o r  non-placet, with 
non-placet carrying l i t t l e  more than the  impl ica t ion  " l e t  the o ther  l o t  have a 
t ry"  without any very c l e a r l y  formulated idea  of what th6  "other l o t "  means i n  
terms ~f s p e c i f i c  po l i c i e s .  
Burkean representa t ion  i s  g e t t i n g  away from another of Arrow's condit ions 
f o r  the r a t i o n a l  a g g r e g a t i o n  of p r e f e r e n c e s ;  " independence  of i r r e l e v a n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  The Burkean r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  does no t  respond on ly  t o  t h e  
preference ordering8 of h i s  cons t i tuen t s .  He introduces h i s  own judgments of 
what is r i g h t  and good f o r  h i s  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  The idea t h a t  the p o l i t i c a l  
sys tem shou ld  respond o n l y  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  ( c h o i c e s  o r  o p i n i o n s )  of  
c i t i z e n s  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 19th Century l i b e r a l  idea. Condorcet i n  h i s  Essay, 
from which we obtain the  notion of c i r c u l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  was n o t ,  i n  f a c t ,  
v e r y  conce rned  w i t h  p r e f e r e n c e s  o r  t h e  problem of aggrega t ing  preferences .  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  which t h e  t i t l e  of h i s  essay  r e f e r s  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a  
d e c i s i o n  based  on a  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  b e i n g  t r u e  o r  c o r r e c t .  R e  t r e a t s  jury 
v e r d i c t s  of g u i l t y  o r  no t  g u i l t y  i n  t h e  same framework as d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  
p o l i c i e s  o r  l a w s .  I n  common w i t h  most of t h e  ph i losophers  of h i s  t i m e ,  he 
assumed t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  an o b j e c t i v e  r a t i o n a l  sense  i n  which l a w s  and p o l i c i e s  
could be c o r r e c t  o r  f a l s e .  Perhaps,  as some have argued,  he der ived t h i s  from 
a concept of n a t u r a l  l a w .  
Almost two c e n t u r i e s  later, Lindblom i n  P o l i t i c s  and Markets16 r e t u r n s  t o  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tween  a  v i s i o n  o r  i d e a l i z e d  model of po l i cy  a s  a c o r r e c t  
deduct ion from the  i d e a l  n a t u r e  of s o c i e t y  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of  P l a t o ,  Rousseau 
and H e g e l ,  and p o l i c y  a s  a r e s o l u t i o n  of c o n f l i c t i n g  po l i cy  choices  ( a s  w e l l  
a s  the  r e s u l t  of p a r t i a l  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s )  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of  A r i s t o t l e ,  
Hobbes and Kant .  The former he c a l l s  "Model 1." To accept  it is  t o  be l i eve  
t h a t  a n  e l i t e  c a n  know how s o c i e t y  s h o u l d  be o r g a n i z e d .  The c o r r e c t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  p o l i c y  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  of f a c t  not  p re fe rence .  The latter he 
c a l l s  "Model 2 . "  I n  Model 2 t h e r e  is  no comprehensive t h e o r y  of s o c i e t y  and 
no  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  knowing t h e  s o c i a l  optimum i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of c i t i z e n s '  
p re fe rences .  It is i n  e f f e c t  a  model  l a r g e l y  a g n o s t i c  of  man's c o g n i t i v e  
c a p a c i t i e s .  A t  most t h e r e  may be p a r t i a l  t h e o r i e s  such as economic t h e o r i e s  
about t h e  causes  of unemployment and i n f l a t i o n ,  but they a r e  b o t h  i n c o m p l e t e  
and  o f t e n  i n c o n c l u s i v e .  There is ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  no f i rm  body of knowledge from 
which c o r r e c t  p o l i c i e s  may be deduced .  Hence, M o d e l  2 h a s  t o  r e l y  on  
c i t i z e n s '  v o l i t i o n s .  S o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  takes  t h e  p lace  of deduct ion from t h e  
i d e a l  model. Lindblom quotes  Robert  Dahl's s t a t emen t ,  " t he  key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of  democracy i s  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of i t s  
c i t i z e n s "  (my emphasis) a s  t y p i c a l  of t he  Model 2 outlook.  As c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of Model 1, he quotes  a  Sov ie t  planner  a rguing  t h a t ,  "Given c o r r e c t  economic 
po l i cy ,  i n  a  s o c i a l i s t  s o c i e t y ,  t h e r e  a r e  and can be no group of workers whose 
m a t e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  l i e  i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  t he  o b j e c t i v e l y  n e c e s s a r y  p l anned  
managemen t  of t h e  economy. " More t h a n  Wes te rn  s y s  terns, S o v i e t  s y s t e m s  
a p p r o x i m a t e  t o  M o d e l  1. W e s t e r n  d e m o c r a c i e s ,  o r  a s  h e  c a l l s  t h e m ,  
po lya rch i e s ,  approximate t o  Model 2. 
Lindblom r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  t he se  a r e  i d e a l  models and not  a c t u a l  systems. 
He recognizes  t h a t  even the  most d o c t r i n a i r e  of Sovie t  systems can no t  t o t a l l y  
i g n o r e  t h e  v o l i t i o n s  of c i t i z e n s  nor can Western po lyarch ies  t o t a l l y  ignore  
a l l  s c i e n t i f i c  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s .  L i n d b l o m  d r a w s  some i n t e r e s t i n g  a n d  
provoca t ive  conc lus ions  from t h i s  c o n t r a s t  between t h e  two models i n t o  which I 
do not  propose t o  e n t e r  now. 
I would only po in t  out  t h a t  Model 1 i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i c t a t o r i a l  i n  t h e  
very p r e c i s e  s e n s e  i n  which  Arrow d e f i n e s  t h a t  t e r m .  The S o v i e t  p l a n n e r  
q u o t e d  by Lindblom is  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  saying t h a t  h i s  p re fe rences  must be t h e  
s o c i a l  p re fe rences  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of  a l l  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
T h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  r a t i o n a l  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  w h i c h  h e  r e j e c t s  i s  r a t h e r  
"independence of i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  The test he a p p l i e s  is c o n f o r m i t y  
w i t h  t h e  s y n o p t i c  v i s i o n  of s o c i e t y  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  p h r a s e  " o b j e c t i v e l y  
n e c e s s a r y  p l a n n e d  management of  t h e  economy"  a n d  w h i c h  f o r  h im  t a k e s  
p r e c e d e n c e  o v e r  any p r e f e r e n c e s  which may be e x p r e s s e d  by members of t he  
d i f f e r e n t  groups of workers concerned. Moreover, i n  p r a c t i c e  , t h i s  s y n o p t i c  
v i s i o n  and t h e  p o l i c i e s  deduced  f rom i t  w i l l  be d e r i v e d  from a consensus 
amongst t he  e l i t e  of i ts  s o c i e t y .  
My p r e s e n t  c o n c e r n  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  which Western po lyarch ies  
combine elements of Model 1 and Model 2.  Lindblom a l lows  i n  Model 2 l o t s  of 
room f o r  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  provided only t h a t  i t  is meshed i n t o  and i n  a  sense  
subord ina te  t o  t he  p o l i t i c a l  e lements ,  t h a t  is ,  t he  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of ends  on 
the  b a s i s  of v o l i t i o n s .  Analysis  h e l p s  d e t e r n i n e  t he  most a p p r o p r i a t e  means 
i n  Model 2. Y e t  t h e r e  seems t o  me t o  be a d i s t i n c t  s i m i l a r i t y  between the  way 
an economist d e t e r m i n e s  f rom a  c o r p u s  of economic  d o c t r i n e  t h e  " c o r r e c t "  
economic p o l i c y  f o r  a  g iven  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e  way a  Sovie t  planner  determines 
from h i s  corpus of d o c t r i n e  t h e  c o r r e c t  po l icy  f o r  a  s o c i a l i s t  society.17 One 
i s  a t  a  h i g h e r  l e v e l  of  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  b u t  i n  b o t h  t h e  
r e f e r ence  po in t  is a  body of d o c t r i n e  r a t h e r  than  t h e  v o l i t i o n s  o r  p r e f e r ences  
of c i t i z e n s .  
The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and B r i t a i n  r ep re sen t  two somewhat d i s t i n c t  approaches 
t o  t he  problem of mixing po l i cy  a n a l y s i s  wi th  t h e  s ea rch  f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  
accep tab l e  s o l u t i o n .  Nei ther  s t a r t s  wi th  a  synop t i c  model of how soc i e ty  a s  a  
whole should be organized.  I n  both,  a n a l y s i s  r e l a t e s  o n l y  t o  p a r t i a l ,  a s  i t  
were, c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d ,  a s p e c t s  of t h e  p u b l i c  good. Nobody, ou t s ide  t h e  
extreme d o c t r i n a i r e  f r i n g e s ,  a t t empt s  t o  deduce from t h e i r  c o n c e p t i o n  of  t h e  
i d e a l  s o c i e t y  how t o  cope wi th  juveni le  delinquency o r  how fo re ign  po l i cy  i n  
the  Middle Eas t  should be managed o r  even, t o  any g r e a t  e x t e n t ,  how economic 
p o l i c y  should  be formulated.  But i n  each of t he se  a r e a s ,  po l icy  has ,  t o  some 
e x t e n t ,  t o  be evolved by an a n a l y t i c  p rocess  from a  corpus of d o c t r i n e  der ived  
f r o m  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y ,  peno logy ,  a  model of t h e  s y s t e m  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  o r  what-have-you. Moreover ,  t h e r e  h a s  t o  be some c o n s i s t e n c y  
between d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  of pol icy.  
I n  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  two r o l e s  -- t h e  r e s p o n s i v e  r o l e  of t h e  p o l i t i c i a n  
r ep re sen t ing  the  v o l i t i o n s  of t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ,  and t h e  a n a l y t i c  r o l e  of t h e  
permanent  o f f i c i a l s  d e v e l o p i n g  c o r r e c t ,  sound p o l i c y  from t h e  app rop r i a t e  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  corpus of knowledge, i n  t h e  l i g h t  of  p r a c t i c a l  ends  and v a l u e s  
given by t h e  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the  people -- a r e  t o  q u i t e  some e x t e n t  
kept  s e p a r a t e  and e n t r u s t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  bodies  of o f f i c i a l s .  I do n o t  w i sh  
t o  e x a g g e r a t e  t h i s  and s u g g e s t  t h a t  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s  know nothing of t h e  
technology of t h e  p o l i c i e s  they  admin i s t e r ,  nor t h a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  can remain 
t o t a l l y  o b l i v i o u s  t o  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Nonetheless ,  I t h i n k  i t  is 
t r u e  t h a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  tend t o  s e e  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s '  main r o l e  as t e l l i n g  
them what t h e  p u b l i c  won't put up with,  and p o l i t i c i a n s  tend t o  regard c i v i l  
s e r v a n t s  as . t e c h n i c i a n s  who c a n  a d v i s e  t h e m  on how t o  a c h i e v e  t h e i r  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h a t  is t o  say ,  t he  ob j e c t i v e s  they.  be l i eve  t o  correspond with t h e  
v o l i t i o n s  of t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  Ce r t a in ly  it  is t he  c a s e  t h a t  t o  a n  e x t e n t  
unmatched anywhere e l s e  i n  t he  West, the  h igher  c i v i l  s e rvan t s  i n  B r i t a i n  a r e  
segregated from t h e  p a r t i s a n  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  v o t e s .  They a r e  a  p r i e s t l y  
c a s t e ,  n o r m a l l y  commit ted  t o  a  l l f e t i m e  ca ree r  i n  t h e  pub l i c  s e r v i c e s ,  f r e e  
from p a r t i s a n  l i n k s  and r e l a t i v e l y  i n s u l a t e d ,  so f a r  a s  t h e i r  ca ree r  prospec ts  
and t h e i r  s t a t u s  a r e  concerned, from t h e  in f luence  of p o l i t i c i a n s .  Recently 
Mrs. T h a t c h e r  an2  h e r  team of T r e a s u r y  m i n i s t e r s  came i n t o  o f f i c e  w i t h  
u n u s u a l l y  s t r o n g  c o n v i c t i o n s  on m a t t e r s  of economic d o c t r i n e .  S i r  Leo 
P l i a t z k y ,  a  r e t i r e d  T r e a s u r y  c i v i l  s e r v a n t ,  i n  a p u b l i c  speech  r e c e n t l y  
commented t h a t  t h i s  had l ed  t o  a  breakdown of communications between m i n i s t e r s  
and  o f f i c i a l s  which he deplored.18 The imp l i ca t ion  was c l e a r l y  t h a t  economic 
t h e o r i e s  were  n o t  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n p u t  w h i c h  m i n i s t e r s  were e x p e c t e d  t o  
c o n t r i b u t e  independent ly of t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s .  
The B r i t i s h  system d e r i v e s  some of i ts  i n t e g r i t y  and homogeneity from t h e  
d o c t r i n e s  of par l iamentary sovere ignty  and c o l l e c t i v e  cabine t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
The under ly ing  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  of t h e  government  is  a c o n s i s t e n t  
whole.  The d e c i s i o n s  made i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f ,  s a y ,  w e l f a r e  p o l i c y  must not 
c o n f l i c t  wi th  dec i s ions  made i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f ,  s a y ,  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  The 
d o c t r i n e  of c o l l e c t i v e  cab ine t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  tends  t o  en fo rce  t h i s  by making 
each Cabinet m i n i s t e r  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  dec i s ions  of every Cabinet min i s t e r .  
The Chancellor of t h e  Excheque r ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y ,  c a n n o t  
s h r u g  o f f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  dec i s ions  made by t h e  Sec re t a ry  of S t a t e  f o r  
H e a l t h  and S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  wel fare  pol icy ,  nor v i c e  versa.  
--
The c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  Cabinet is underpinned by an e l a b o r a t e  
system of Cabinet committees and i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l  o f f i c i a l  committees t o  
e n s u r e  consensus  amongst the d i f f e r e n t  agencies of government. Moreover al l  
a r e  responsible t o  Parliament, the  u l t i m a t e  s o v e r e i g n ,  so  t h a t ,  u n l i k e  t h e  
American system of separa t ion  of powers, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of the d i f f e r e n t  
departments cannot u l t ima te ly  be separated. Before the  u l t i m a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  
of P a r l i a m e n t ,  government p o l i c y  stands or  f a l l s  a s  a  whole. The policy of 
the  Crown, of H e r  Majesty's Government, has a  c e r t a i n  u n i t y ,  and because  i t  
has a  c e r t a i n  uni ty ,  f inds  it  r a the r  more d i f f i c u l t  than some other  systems t o  
bend t o  l o c a l  and s e c t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  
The Uni ted  S t a t e s  a l s o  has a  permanent career  c i v i l  serv ice ,  but i t  is 
much l e s s  of an independen t  p r i e s t l y  c a s t e .  A f a i r l y  wide swathe of t h e  
h i g h e r  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  appointed. I n  Br i t a in ,  c i v i l  servants  
undoubtedly accept the  d i r e c t i v e s  of t h e i r  m i n i s t e r s ,  and s i n c e r e l y  seek t o  
i n t e r p r e t  and make sense of t h e i r  ministers '  pol icy .  But unl ike  the  American 
system, an incoming a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c a n n o t .  b r i n g  w i t h  i t ,  e x c e p t  t o  a  v e r y  
l i m i t e d  e x t e n t ,  i t s  own body of t e c h n i c a l  a d v i s o r s .  Apart  from t h e  
m i n i s t e r i a l  team i t s e l f ,  who a r e  a l l  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s  a n s w e r a b l e  t o  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  an incoming B r i t i s h  government can b r i n g  with i t  a t  most some 
dozen or  so  technica l  advisors  t r a ined  i n  the d i s c i p l i n e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e i r  
p o l i c y .  An incoming American administrat ion brings with it severa l  thousand 
t ~ c h n i c a l  advisors  occupying many of the  senior  pos ts i n  the  administrat ion.  
Quite apa r t  from t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  s t y l e  and compos i t ion  of t h e  
bureaucracy ,  t h e r e  a r e  major c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  
admin i s t r a t ive  s t y l e  of  government. I n  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  impact  of e l e c t o r a l  
p o l i t i c s  i s  somewhat spasmodic. It is  strong i n  the  immediate v i c i n i t y  of a  
General Elec t ion  but f o r  some time a f t e r  a  Genera l  E l e c t i o n  has  r e t u r n e d  a  
government w i t h  a  s i z e a b l e  ma jo r i ty ,  the  process of government can continue 
f o r  a  time r e l a t i v e l y  ( a s  compared t o  t h e  U.S. ) she l t e red  from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
of e l e c t o r a l  popular i ty  o r  unpopularity. I n  the U.S., on the other  hand, the 
impact of e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s  is more continuous. There is hard ly  a t ime  when 
t h e  d i v e r s e  members of one o r  o the r  of t h e  branches and l e v e l s  of government 
a r e  not  acu te ly  conscious t h a t  they f a c e  t h e  cha l lenge  of re -e lec t ion .  Nor i s  
t h a t  o n l y  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  frequency and v a r i e t y  of e l e c t i o n s .  It is, t o  an 
even g r e a t e r  e x t e n t ,  t he  r e s u l t  of a decen t r a l i zed  s t y l e  of po l i cy  making with 
c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  d i v i d e d  between d i f f e r e n t  b r a n c h e s  of 
government, between r i v a l  agencies ,  between f e d e r a l  and s t  a t e  government and 
between s t a t e  and l o c a l  government. I n  consequence, a s e p a r a t e  c o a l i t i o n  of 
i n t e r e s t s  has t o  be b u i l t  up behind every major po l i cy ,  and thus  each  a r e a  of 
p o l i c y ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  s i n g l e  centered convention of B r i t i s h  government, 
becomes the  r e s u l t  of what Lindblom desc r ibes  a s  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n .  
I n  a n o t h e r  pape r  i n  t h i s  symposium, Michael Thompson d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  
UK's c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e  f o r  handl ing r i s k  and i ts  b i a s  towards consensus  f rom 
t h e  US s t a t u t o r y  s t y l e  f o r  h a n d l i n g  r i s k  and i t s  b i a s  towards a d v e r s a r i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  C e r t a i n l y  wi th in  t h e  context  of t h e  r e l evan t  i n s p e c t o r a t e s  i n  
t h e  two c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  which he p l a c e s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  t h i s  is f a i r l y  w e l l  
e s t a b l i s h e d  and c o u l d ,  i n d e e d ,  be somewhat more g e n e r a l i s e d .  Ashby and 
Anderson ,  f o r  example ,  make a somewhat s i m i l a r  po in t  regarding t h e  B r i t i s h  
Alka l i  In spec to ra t e  r i g h t  back t o  t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  of t h e  19th  c e n t u r y .  They 
q u o t e  a 1 9 t h  c e n t u r y  i n s p e c t o r  w r i t i n g ,  "There a r e  two modes of inspec t ion .  
One is by a susp ic ious  opponent des i rous  of f i nd ing  e v i l  and ready t o  make t h e  
most of i t .  The o t h e r  is t h a t  of t h e  f r i e n d l y  advisor  who t r e a t s  those  whom 
h e  v i s i t s  a s  gen t l emen  d e s i r o u s  of doing right."19 The in spec to r  opted f o r  
the l a t t e r  mode. 
The c o n s e n s u a l  s t y l e  i n  B r i t a i n  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e 2 0  and, of course ,  t h e  i n s p e c t o r a t e s  a r e  p r imar i ly  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The B r i t i s h  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  t o  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t  deduce  
p o l i c i e s  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  by an a n a l y t i c  process  from an accepted body of 
doctr ine.  Because agreement on the  ob jec t ive  is c r u c i a l  and because knowledge 
of t h e  d o c t r i n e  i s  shared amongst the e l i t e ,  t h i s  m d e  of operat ion tends t o  
encourage - indeed it depends on - forming an e l i t e  consensus .  . I f  we t u r n  
from the adminis t ra t ive  s t y l e  of the c i v i l  serv ice  t o  the p o l i t i c s  of p a r t i e s ,  
then the adversa r i a l  convention is q u i t e  as s t rong  i n  B r i t a i n  a s  i n  America. 
I a n  Brad ley ,  r ev iewing  the  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  and the  d i f f i c u l t y  of 
e s t ab l i sh ing  new p a r t i e s  comments t h a t  " t h e  overwhelming message" of t h e  
experience of those who have sought t o  break away from the  two p a r t i e s  "is the  
s t r e n g t h  of t h e  a d v e r s a r i a l  two-party system. " 21 Although the two-party 
sys tem i s  concerned above  a l l  w i t h  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  o f f i c e ,  t h i s  
a d v e r s a r i a l  c h a r a c t e r  appl ies  not only t o  the contes t  f o r  o f f i c e  but a l s o  t o  
those i s sues  tha t  a r e  s a l i e n t  points  of controversy between t h e  p a r t i e s  such 
a s ,  f o r  example, t r a d e  union and i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  policy s ince  the  l a t e  
1960's. I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, Thompson's co ro l l a ry  of adversa r i a l  p o l i t i c s ,  a 
s t a t u t o r y  r a t h e r  t h a n  a c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e ,  a l s o  app l i e s - -as  witness the  
succession of s t a t u t e s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t r a d e  un ions  and i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  
introduced a s  Conservative and Labor governments a l t e rna ted  i n  o f f i ce .  
I know v e r y  l i t t l e  abou t  t h e  German sys tem,  b u t  I s u s p e c t  t h a t  t o  a 
g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  e i t h e r  t h e  UK o r  t h e  US, t h e  German Federa l  Republic 
depends on consensus. The s e p a r a t i o n  of powers between t h e  Lander and t h e  
F e d e r a l  government and between the Bundestag and the  Bundesrat seems to me t o  
make it d i f f i c u l t ,  except possibly i n  those a reas  of p o l i c y  r e s e r v e d  f o r  t h e  
f e d e r a l  l e v e l ,  to develop any policy t h a t  does not have a t  l e a s t  a measure of 
b ipa r t i san  consent i f  not support.  I suspect t h a t  t h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  a sys tem 
t h a t  i s  h i g h l y  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  l o c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  but a s  I say,  the Weat 
German system is the one I know l e a s t  about. 
The F r e n c h  s y s t e m ,  I t h i n k ,  is  t h e  one t h a t  comes c l o s e s t  t o  t h e  
technocrat ic  model. Not o n l y  does t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h e  F i f t h  Repub l i c  
c r e a t e  an  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s t r o n g  p r e s i d e n t ,  but t he  p re s iden t  i s  advised and 
served by an excep t iona l ly  homogeneoue a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e l i t e .  T h i s  does  n o t  
mean t h a t  F r a n c e  i s  a  Model 1 system i n  the  i d e o l o g i c a l  sense. Despi te  t h e  
constant  r h e t o r i c a l  emphasis on t h e  supremacy of t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  o r  even 
D e G a u l l e O s  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  r ep re sen t s  t he  w i l l  of t he  people,  I do 
not d e t e c t  i n  French government t he  s o r t  of comprehensive theory  about s o c i e t y  
which  Lindblom c o n s i d e r s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of Model 1. But wi th in  each a rea  of 
po l icy ,  t he  s c a l e s  seem me t o  be f a r  more w e i g h t e d  t h a n  i n  B r i t a i n  o r  t h e  
United S t a t e s  i n  favor  of c o r r e c t  s o l u t i o n s  r a t h e r  than s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  r e f l e c t  
the v o l i t i o n s  of t he  a f f e c t e d  c i t i z e n s .  
Wi th in  t h e  Western  p o l y a r c h i e s  t h e r e  is  a  cons tan t  t ens ion  between the  
benevolent p r i n c i p l e  i m p l i c i t  i n  t he  phrase "government f o r  the  people"  which 
we might  l o o s e l y  d e f i n e  a s  "do r i g h t  by the  publ ic  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of whether 
they want it o r  n o t n  and t h e  r e s p o n s i v e  p r i n c i p l e  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  p h r a s e  
"government  by t h e  p e o p l e "  which  we might  l o o s e l y  d e f i n e  as "do what the  
p u b l i c  want i r r e s p e c t i v e  of whe the r  i t  i s  r i g h t  o r  n o t . "  The  W e s t e r n  
p o l y a r c h i e s  c o n s t a n t l y  s t r i v e  towards  a more r e s p o n s i v e  system seeking t o  
i nc rease  the  range of those  who p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  decis ion-making f u n c t i o n s  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  The  i d e a l  o f  t h e  t o t a l l y  r e s p o n s i v e  sys t em i n  which 
governmental dec i s ions  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  p r e f e r e n c e s  of t h e  mass of 
c i t i z e n s  is  l o g i c a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e ,  b u t  l o n g  b e f o r e  t h e  l o g i c a l  l i m i t s  a r e  
reached, t he  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t s  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of e r e c t i n g  c h a n n e l s  
f o r  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  of p r e f e r e n c e s  t h e m s e l v e s  c r e a t e  paradoxes. Thus, f o r  
example, t h e  B r i t i s h  Labor P a r t y  i n  seeking t o  i nc rease  the  range of those who 
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  dec i s ion -mak ing  f u n c t i o n s  of government is c u r r e n t l y  i n  
g r a v e  d a n g e r  of d e v i s i n g  a  s y s t e m  t h a t  may more a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  of t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  minute f r a c t i o n  of the  populat ion comprising 
the  a c t i v e  membership of t h e i r  p a r t y  but  a l s o  producing p o l i c i e s  a b h o r r e n t  t o  
t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  The  American Democra t i c  P a r t y  
e n c o u n t e r e d  somewhat s i m i l a r  p r o b l e m s  i n  s e e k i n g  g r e a t e r  i n t r a - p a r t y  
d e m o c r a c y .  The  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p  s y s t e m  - a n o t h e r  method of e l i c i t i n g  
p r e f e r e n c e s  - is a l s o  s u b j e c t  t o  b i a s  due t o  t h e  u n e q u a l  p r o p e n s i t y  o f  
c i  5 i z e n s  t o  o r g a n i s e  and t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  resources  d i f f e r e n t  pressure  
groups can command. 
The main f o c u s  of t h i s  symposium is  on c u l t u r a l  b i a s .  How do these  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  l i n k  t o  t h a t  t o p i c ?  E l k i n s  and  Simeon d e f i n e  " p o l i t i c a l  
c u l t u r e "  a s  " c o n s i s t i n g  of a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  wor ld"  and 
e l a h r a t e  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  by saying " p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ,  t h e n ,  is  a  s h o r t h a n d  
e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  'mind s e t '  which has the  e f f e c t  of l i m i t i n g  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
l e s s  than the f u l l  range of  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e h a v i o r s ,  p rob lems  and s o l u t i o n s  
which a r e  l o g i c a l l y  possible ."  22 
My t h e m e  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s  c a n  be  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  they adopt f o r  evading one o r  more 
of the  fou r  condi t ions  of r a t i o n a l i t y  Arrow p o s t u l a t e s  f o r  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
m e t h o d  o f  a r r i v i n g  a t  a  s o c i a l  o r  c o l l e c t i v e  p r e f e r e n c e  by a g g r e g a t i n g  
ind iv idua l  preferences .  There is c l e a r l y  a  v a r i e t y  of d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  a r e  l o g i c a l l y  poss ib l e  and my content ion  is t h a t  c u l t u r a l  b i a s  determines 
the  choice wi th in  t h i s  v a r i e t y .  
The main c o n t r a s t  drawn by Michael Thompson i n  h i s  paper is between the  
~ o ~ s e n s u a l - c o n s u l t a t i v e  t e n d e n c y  o f  B r i t  i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  
a d v e r s a r y - s t a t u t o r y  t e n d e n c y  of  American government .  A s  I show l a t e r ,  
consensus and t h e  a d v e r s a r y  s y s t e m  a r e  methods of e v a d i n g  two of Arrow's 
c o n d i t i o n s .  The c o n n e c t i o n  betwen a  c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e  and the  search f o r  
consensus seems obvious enough. Consul ta t ion  is necessary t o  reach c o n s e n s u s  
and  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  a g r e e d  c o n s e n s u s  on e n d s ,  " t h e  gentlemen des i rous  of 
d o i n g  r i g h t " ,  a c t s  a s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  d e t a i l e d  r e g u l a t i o n s  
regard ing  means. The connect ion between an a d v e r s a r i a l  tendency and s t a t u t o r y  
r egu la t ion  may be less obvious. The r e s o l u t i o n  of an a d v e r s a r i a l  c o n f l i c t  
a l m o s t  i n e v i t a b l y  pa r t akes  of the na ture  of a t r e a t y  each c lause  of which is 
important t o  one or o the r  of t he  con tes t an t s .  Moreover, i f  c o n f l i c t  is not t o  
break out again some a u t h o r i t y  has t o  be invoked t o  enforce  the  t r ea ty .  These 
two requirements a r e  met by embodying t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  a 
s t a t u t e  e m b o d y i n g  d e t a i l e d  r e g u l a t i o n  e n f o r c e d  by law. The i m p l i c i t  
assumption i n  t h i s  method is t h a t  the a d v e r s a r i a l  c o n f l i c t  u n l e s s  checked by 
t h e  f o r c e  o f  law i s  bound t o  c o n t i n u e .  The i m p l i c i t  a s sumpt ion  of t h e  
consensual method is t h a t  an agreed end h a s  been a c c e p t e d  ( even  i f  o n l y  i n  
d e f e r e n c e  to  the a u t h o r i t y  of law) and those involved can be expected t o  work 
out  s ens ib ly  the  means t o  t h a t  end. The a d v e r s a r i a l  system c r e a t e s  t h e  need 
f o r  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n  and ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  s i n c e  means a r e  i n e v i t a b l y  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n  t h e n  i t s e l f  c r e a t e s  an  a d v e r s a r i a l  
atmosphere. From another  poin t  of view, we can view the B r i t i s h  e l e c t o r a t e  as 
prepared t o  de legate  t o  "experts" ,  as Thompson p o i n t s  o u t  l a t e r  i n  t h e  same 
a r t i c l e ,  t h e  t a s k  of a c h i e v i n g  t h e  ends  t h e y  have s p e c i f i e d  whereas  t h e  
American e l e c t o r a t e  is not  prepared t o  de lega te  t o  t h e  sane extent .  
T h e  t w o  m o d e s  o f  o p e r a t i o n  i d e n t i f i e d  by  T h o m p s o n ,  t h e  
consensual-consul tat ive of t h e  UK and the  adve r sa r i a l - s t a tu to ry  of t h e  US can  
b o t h  be seen  as methods of evading one o r  o the r  of Arrow's fou r  condit ions of 
r a t i o n a l i t y .  The a d v e r s a r i a l  system is a p a r t i c u l a r  type of pair-wise choice. 
It r e s t r i c t s  the choice t o  two a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The adve r sa r i e s  l i n e  up pro and 
con a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o v i s i o n  - s a y ,  t h a t  smoke e m i t t e d  from a power s t a t i o n  
s h o u l d  n o t  exceed x mill igrams of sulphur per l i t e r .  A s  Alfred MacKay poin ts  
out any pair-wise choice prevents  s o c i a l  aggregat ion of any p r e f e r e n c e s  o t h e r  
t h a n  t h o s e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  q u e s t i o n  - s a y ,  a t h i r d  
a l t e r n a t i v e :  a method with a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s .  
Ae MacKay e x p r e s s e s  i t  "No f a c t  a b o u t  a l l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  a s e t t i n g  can be 
d e r i v e d  f r o m  f a c t s  a b o u t  p a i r s  of a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  23 Thus u l t i m a t e l y  i t  
i n f r i n g e s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of u n r e s t r i c t e d  c h o i c e .  C o n v e r s e l y  c o n s e n s u s  
i n f r i n g e s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of " independence  of i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s "  by 
p l ac ing  a  va lue  on unanimity independent of expressed preferebces .  
Government p o l i c y  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  a  seamless web. Economic po l i cy  cannot 
r e a l l y  be considered independent ly  of f o r e i g n  pol icy .  The a u t a r c h i c  economic 
p o l i c y  a d v o c a t e d  by t h e  new C a m b r i d g e  s c h o o l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  c a r r i e s  
imp l i ca t i ons  f o r  i s o l a t i o n i s m  i n  f o r e i g n  pol icy .  Welfare p o l i c y  and  d e f e n s e  
po l i cy  i n t e r a c t .  As does  e d u c a t i o n  p o l i c y  and p o l i c y  r e l a t i n g  t o  law and 
o r d e r .  And s o  on a n d  s o  f o r t h .  By t h e  t i m e  t h e  f u l l  l o g i c a l  tree of 
i n t e r a c t i o n s  between d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c y  f i e l d s  i s  worked o u t ,  t h e  number of  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  be a g g r e g a t e d  i n t o  a  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o i c e  i s  v a s t ,  and f a r  
exceeds t h e  f i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a f t e r  which c i r c u l a r  p r e f e r e n c e s  become h i g h l y  
p r o b a b l e .  The Amer ican  t e n d e n c y  i s  t o  b r e a k  down p o l i c i e s  i n t o  d i s c r e t e  
elements each of which can be s u b m i t t e d  t o  a p a i r - w i s e  c h o i c e  i g n o r i n g  t h e  
i n t  e r - p o l i c y  c o n n e c t  i ons .  The B r i t i s h  tendency, though f a r  from achiev ing  a 
completely i n t e g r a t e d ,  l o g i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  f i e l d  of  p o l i c y  o v e r  t h e  whole  
area of government  p o l i c y ,  i s  on t h e  c o n t r a r y  t o  s eek  cons is tency  between 
p o l i c i e s  f o l l o w i n g  f u r t h e r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of p o l i c y  i n  o n e  f i e l d  f o r  
a n o t h e r ,  t h u s  coming c l o s e r  t o  t h e  i d e a l  of c o n s i d e r i n g  f a c t s  a b o u t  a l l  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
Why s h o u l d  t h e  U K ,  a p a r t  from t h e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p a r t i s a n  i s s u e s ,  be more 
i n c l i n e d  t h a n  t h e  US t o  a d o p t  a  c o n s e n s u a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  a d v e r s i a r i a l  
a p p r o a c h ?  I t  i s  e a s y  enough t o  f i n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  explana t ions .  Once the  
a d v e r s a r i a l  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m  h a s  c r e a t e d  a  government ,  t h e  two f a c t o r s  of 
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  s o v e r e i g n t y  and p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e  mean t h a t  t h e r e  is not much 
po in t  i n  going on f i g h t i n g  a t  the  e l e c t o r a l  l e v e l  - a t  l e a s t  when no  G e n e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  is  imminent .  It i s  much b e t t e r  t o  a c c e p t  government  po l i cy  and 
d i scus s  its a p p l i c a t i o n  w i t h  o f f i c i a l s .  The u n i t a r y  s y s t e m  of government  
makes i s s u e s  i n  which t h e  d o l e  popula t ion  has an i n t e r e s t  s a l i e n t  and renders  
i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  make s a l i e n t  a predominantly l o c a l  i s sue  such as the s i t i n g  of 
t h e  l i q u i d  energy gas  terminal a t  Mossmorran. The non-partisan character  of 
c i v i l  servants  i s o l a t e s  them somewhat from t h e  a d v e r s a r i a l  c h a r a c t e r  t h e y  
would a c q u i r e  i f  they  were pa r t i san  p o l i t i c a l  appointments. Conversely, the  
US has a multi-centered system of government. The doct r ine  of the  s e p a r a t i o n  
of powers makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e s e n t  an in tegra ted  pol icy  f o r  the whole 
f i e l d  of government s ince  no s i n g l e  body of o f f i c i a l s  is r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a l l  
a s p e c t s  of  p o l i c y .  The U.S. makes much more f r e q u e n t  use  of r e f e r e n d a  
enabling voters  t o  express through reso lu t ions  on t h e  b a l l o t  paper  views on 
l o c a l  and s t a t e - w i d e  i ssues .  Moreover, i n  the U.S., many more o f f i c i a l s  a r e  
d i r e c t l y  e lec ted  than i n  t h e  UK, rendering them and t h e  p o l i c i e s  t h e y  s t a n d  
f o r  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  a d v e r s a r i a l  system. Yet, of course, these  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d i f ferences  do not expla in  why the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  were set up i n  t h i s  way i n  the  
f i r s t  place. 
I n  t h e i r  c l a s s i c ,  The C i v i c  Cul ture ,  Almond and Verba 24 emphasize the  
congruence  between i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  i n  s t a b l e  
democra t i c  sys tems.  T h e i r s  i s  an i n t e r - a c t i v e  model i n  which p o l i t i c a l  
c u l t u r e  i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  inf luences  the  p o l i t i c a l  cul ture.  The process has been going on 
f o r  centur ies .  A s  noted above, the p l u r a l i t y  voting system can be t raced back 
t o  the  13th century when both the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
c u l t u r e  were c e r t a i n l y  very d i f f e r e n t .  The voting system has influenced the  
s t r u c t u r e  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  but the  way the  s t r u c t u r e  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  has  been 
influenced is a f fec ted  by the  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  which i n  turn  is influenced by 
the way the  s t r u c t u r e  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  has developed. 
I n  a passage which Thompson's analys is  of a t t i t u d e s  t o  au thor i ty  r e c a l l s ,  
Almond and Verba argue t h a t  i n  the  s t a b l e  democracies of t h e  US and t h e  UK, 
t h e r e  i s  not  only a gap between the  bel ief  of c i t i z e n s  about t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  government and t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a c t  s o  a s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
government but  t h a t  t h i s  gap is c r u c i a l  t o  the  s t a b i l i t y  of the  system. The 
c i t i z e n  i n  a  s t a b l e  democracy b e l i e v e s  he can  i n f l u e n c e  government - has  a  
high "subject ive perception of competence" - but i s  r e l a t i v e l y  unl ike ly  t o ' u s e  
t h a t  i n f l u e n c e  p a r t l y  because  most of t h e  t i m e  p o l i t i c s  i s  n o t  a l l  t h a t  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  most of t h e  people .  Thus " t h e  compara t ive  i n f r e q u e n c y  of 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  i t s  r e l a t i v e  lack of impor tance  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
and t h e  o b j e c t i v e  weakness of the ordinary man allow governmental e l i t e s  t o  
a c t . "  *5 To some e x t e n t  t h e  i d e a  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  government i s  a  
democratic myth. But " for  the  democratic 'myth' t o  be an e f f e c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e ,  i t  cannot  be pure  myth." The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  ac t ion  must be there  t o  
keep t h e  governmenta l  e l i t e s  i n  check and t h e  governmenta l  e l i t e s  mus t  
themse lves  s h a r e  b e l i e f  i n  the  myth so t h a t  they see the  c i t izens '  inf luence  
a s  legi t imate .  Since the  l a t e  1950°s, when Almond and Verba did most of t h e i r  
f i e l d w o r k ,  condit ions i n  both the US and the UK have somewhat changed. David 
Kavanaugh and Alan Abramovitz have recent ly  documented these changes f o r  Great 
B r i t a i n  and t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  26 N o n e t h e l e s s ,  many of t h e  
psychological a t t i t u d e s  p icked  up by Almond and Verba and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e e n  t h e i r  i n c i d e n c e  i n  t h e  US and t h e  UK remain.  What subsequent  
a r t i c l e s  i n  t h i s  symposium do is t o  l i n k  these  a t t i t u d e s  t o  d i f ferences  i n  the  
s t r u c t u r e  of society.  
One could  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  Western p o l y a r c h i e s  have gone too f a r  i n  the  
pursu i t  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p a r t l y  a s  a  r e s u l t  of i g n o r i n g  t h e  l i m i t s  on t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of aggregating the  preferences of c i t i zens .  In  support of t h i s  
contention,  one could quote the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  crea ted  f o r  democratic systems by 
t h e  emergence of s ing le  i s sue  p o l i t i c s .  However, i n  conclusion, I would l i k e  
t o  en te r  a  caveat about the  whole approach reviewed i n  t h i s  paper  of v iewing 
t h e  democra t i c  p r o c e s s  a s  a  means of a g g r e g a t i n g  preferences of c i t i zens .  
I n e v i t a b l y  t h i s  approach and indeed  Arrow's Theorem, h a v e  t o  t a k e  t h e  
preferences of c i t i z e n s  not as immutable but a t  l e a s t  a s  exogeneous var iables ,  
pa r t  of the given. In  p r a c t i c e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  not only respond t o  t h e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  and o p i n i o n s  of c i t i z e n s  but  a l s o  i n f l u e n c e  them. It is t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of opinions and preferences changing as  a r e s u l t  of the  democratic 
d i a l o g u e  t h a t  p e r m i t s  consensus  t o  emerge. J a n e  Mansbridge i n  Beyond 
A d v e r s a r y  ~ e m o c r a c ~ ~ ~  has  r e c e n t l y  g i v e n  us an  ex t remely  s c h o l a r l y  and 
c a r e f u l l y  thought  o u t  a n a l y s i s  of the r e l a t i v e  s t r eng ths  and weaknesses and 
the place i n  the h i s t o r y  of democratic thought of two c o n c e p t s  of democracy 
which she terms "adversary democracy" i n  which i saues  are resolved by majority 
vote and "uni tary  democracy" i n  which i s sues  are resolved by t h e  emergence of 
consensus  - s u p p o r t i n g  her argument by her f indings  regarding the operat ions 
of two s m a l l  d e m o c r a t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  o p e r a t e  on a u n a n i m i t y  r u l e .  
C l e a r l y  c o n s e n s u s  cannot  always be reached and t h e  p r i n c i p l e  cannot  be 
u n i v e r s a l l y  a p p l i e d .  Moreover, t o o  much emphasis  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
chang ing  o p i n i o n s  would r a i s e  t h e  1984 s p e c t r e  of Orwell's thought police.  
Nonetheless, I f ind  myself convinced by Mansbridge's argument t h a t  modern 
d e m o c r a t i c  though t  has  p l a c e d  t o o  much emphasis on adversary r e l a t i o n s  and 
neglected the consensual s t rand i n  democratic thinking.  Consensus, of course,  
i n f r i n g e s  one of Arrow's condit ions.  Since Arrow's proof is formally va l id  we 
have t o  s a c r i f i c e  i n  any c a s e  one of h i s  c o n d i t i o n s .  I f  w e  have t o  pu t  a 
value on something o ther  than t h e  revealed preferences of c i t i z e n s ,  unanimity , 
t h e  d e s i r e  t o  be a l l  of one mind, s eems  t o  be something on which w e  could w e l l  
place a pos i t ive  value. 
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P E R C E I V I N G  LOW P R O B A B I L I T Y  
EVENTS 
M a r y  D o u g l a s  
N o r t h w e s t e r n  U n i v e r s i t y  
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
An i ssue  i n  r i s k  percept ion s tud ies  i s  whether and how i n d i v i d u a l s  
can perceive 1  ow probabi 1  i t y  events. f.nJ It i s  a  p e c u l i a r  i ssue which 
o n l y  a r i s e s  because such events a r e  recognized t o  be on ou r  hor izon 
r i g h t  now - so e v i d e n t l y ,  some people can perceive them. Those who do 
the  pe rce i v ing  r e l y  on an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  advanced and arcane technology 
of assessment. So t h e  quest ion  i s  how i n d i v i d u a l s  who are  n o t  competent 
i n  t h a t  technology may come t o  accept warnings about such dangers and 
endow t h e  warnings wSth c r e d i b i l i t y .  The answer w i l l  be t o  expand the  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  contex t  of percept ion.  Humans a re  s o c i a l  animals and we 
use s o c i a l  as w e l l  as s p a t i a l ,  temporal and b o d i l y  reference schemes. 
The approach I am us ing  focuses on how phys ica l  d i sas te rs  ge t  systema- 
t i c a l  l y  used i n  t h e  micro-pol i t i c s  o f  soc ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The processes 
o f  blame and exonerdt ion a re  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  problem. 
I n  t r i b a l  s o c i e t i e s  t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  a  l i v e l y  expecta t ion  t h a t  unspeak- 
ab le  ho r ro rs  w i l l  be t r i g g e r e d  by low p r o b a b i l i t y  events o r  t h a t  r a r e  
i n d i v i d u a l s  may w ie ld  ca tas t roph ic  e v i l  powers. So t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  con- 
s i d e r  low p r o b a b i l i t y  d i sas te rs  i s  no t  beyond human ken. I s h a l l  s t a r t  
w i t h  the  a l leged f i n d i n g  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  have d i f f i c u l t y  t h i n k i n g  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y  a t  a l l .  Quest ioning some o f  t he  charge against  i n d i v i -  
duals and conceding some of i t ,  I s h a l l  develop an anthropo log ica l  1  i n e  
of thought which suggests t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  always t r a n s f e r  t he  re levan t  
p a r t  of t h e i r  dec is ion  making t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  which they  l i v e .  
This  statement has an o ld- fashioned r i n g  about i t. Indeed, 
i t  i s  a  long t ime  ago s ince  i t  was sa id  by Simon and March t h a t  " the  
o rgan iza t i ona l  and s o c i a l  environment i n  which the  decisionmaker f i n d s  
h imse l f  determines what consequences he w i l l  a n t i c i p a t e ,  what ones he 
w i l l  not ;  what a1 t e m i v e s  he w i l l  consider ,  what ones he w i l l  ignore.  
I n  a  theory o f  o rgan iza t ion ,  these va r iab les  cannot be t rea ted  as 
unexplained, independent f a c t o r s ,  bu t  must themselves be determined 
and expla ined by t h e  theory"  f .n.2 
A l l  t he  language i n  which Simon I s  theory  o f  bounded r a t i o n a l  i t y  
has been expressed i s  e n t i r e l y  sympathetic t o  my argument. The 
r a t i o n a l  chooser 's  d e f i n i t i o n  of a  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t  t o  be taken as 
g iven:  t h e  s e l e c t i v e  elements are t h e  outcomes o f  psychological  and 
s o c i o l o g i c a l  processes, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  chooser 's own a c t i v i t i e s  and 
t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  o thers  i n  h i s  environment. Yet, i n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  
apparent ly  comnon s t a r t i n g  po in t ,  I w i l l  argue t h a t  quest ions about 
human percept ion o f  d i s a s t e r  have never y e t  been d i r e c t l y  addressed 
t o  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which b l i n k e r  and 
focus t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l  agent. I t h e r e f o r e  suggest t h a t  t he  
major p a r t  o f  t he  i n q u i r y  about r a t i o n a l  choice i s  app l i ed  t o  the  
wrong u n i t s ,  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  ins tead o f  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The miss ing  
p iece i n  t h e  puzzle i s  t h e  way t h a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  mob i l i ze  moral 
concern t o  engage t h e i r  members' sustained support.  None o f  the  
t ypo log i z ing  t h a t  I have scanned t o  f i n d  a  l i n k  between t h e  anthro- 
p o l o g i s t s  and t h e  o rgan iza t i on  t h e o r i s t s '  work g ives systematic 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h i s  process. My feeb le  forays i n t o  t h i s  h i g h l y  
developed and c e n t r a l  f i e l d  o f  western s o c i a l  thought requ i res  some 
apologies. But  I hope t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of my i n e p t i t u d e ,  t h e  descr ip -  
t i o n s  o f  my search w i l l  provoke others t o  address themselves more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  t h e  quest ion  o f  which k ind  o f  o rgan iza t i on  i s  bes t  
equipped t o  a l e r t  i t s  members t o  low p r o b a b i l i t y ,  h igh  consequence 
r i s k s .  
Think ing Probabi l  i s t i c a l  l y  
U n t i l  r e c e n t l y  i t  was w ide l y  agreed among psycho log is ts  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  have d i f f i c u l t y  i n  g i v i n g  r a t i o n a l  answers t o  problems. 
The t rend  t h a t  came near t o  c a l l  i n g  us a1 1  i r r a t i o n a l  has been stemned 
by a  recent  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  can never be demonstrated. 
Jonathan Cohen argues t h a t  t h e  cond i t i ons  f o r  r a t i o n a l i t y  a re  so 
f l e x i b l e  t h a t  by i nvok ing  t h e  f u l l  a r r a y  o f  assumptions from which an 
i n d i v i d u a l  s t a r t s  and t h e  f u l l  a r ray  o f  motives and goals t o  which he 
subscribes, any dec i s ion  ( b u t  one) can be exempted from the  charge 
f . n .  
o f  i r r a t i o n a l  i ty. f h e  argument i s  complex b u t  e s s e n t i a l l y  i t  ex- 
pects r a t i o n a l  thought  t o  be exerc ised through two k inds o f  competence, 
one a  un i ve rsa l  pan-human competence i n  1 og ica l  opera t ions  (avo id ing  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  and expect ing  coherence and consis tency)  and the  o the r  
a  c u l t u r a l l y  acqui red competence i n  recogniz ing,  assembling and s o r t i n g  
p a r t i c u l a r  elements. Cohen dubbs t h e  combination ' i n t u i t i o n ' .  Since 
the  i n p u t  from c u l t u r e  can never be determined, t h e r e  i s  no way o f  
prov ing any choice o r  dec i s ion  t o  be i r r a t i o n a l .  Before t h i s  r a t h e r  
weak v i n d i c a t i o n  o f  our  r a t i o n a l  i t y  was declared, r i s k  percept ion  
had a l ready tempered i t s  terminology and we had been hear ing n o t  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  i r r a t i o n a l ,  b u t  t h a t  they  are weak i n  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
f.n.4 th ink ing .  Th is  weakness may exp la in  why we do n o t  take reasonable 
precaut ions i n  t he  face  o f  low probab i l  i t y  , h igh  consequence r i s k s  
which the  exper ts  revea l  t o  us. 
But  when we look  a t  what understanding probab i l i sm requ i res ,  i t  
does n o t  sound so d i f f i c u l t .  Apparent ly,  we o n l y  need t o  grasp th ree  
p r i n c i p l e s :  randomness, s t a t i s t i c a l  independence and sampling v a r i a -  
f.n.5 b i l i t y .  Furthermore, when we consider  any techn ica l  a c t i v i t y  
whatever, we f i n d  t h a t  any of us i s  capable o f  us ing  a l l  t h r e e  p r i n -  
c i p l e s .  Th is  i s  w i t h o u t  regard  t o  formal school ing: any t r i b e  o f  
hunters o r  f i s h e r s  o r  any pro fess ion  of farmers o r  s a i l o r s  use t h e i r  
grasp of p robab i l i sm t o  assess t h e i r  ma te r i a l s ,  t h e  p red i c ted  behavior 
of f i s h  o r  sheep o r  t i d e s  o r  weather. They know a l l  about random 
v a r i a t i o n  i n  t he  accuracy of t h e i r  instruments, they  d is regard  i n f e r -  
ences from t o o  small sample s i z e  and w i thou t  knowing s t a t i s t i c s  they 
know a l o t  about t he  p r a c t i c a l  equ iva len t  o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  independence. 
I f  they  d i d  not,  they  would n o t  be craftsmen o r  nav iga tors  o r  merchants. 
Since s c i e n t i s t s  who e x p l i c i t l y  use p r o b a b i l i t y  theory a l s o  f a i l  
i n  these t e s t s  t h a t  f l o o r  l e s s  fo rmal ly  t r a i n e d  subjects,  f *n *6de  need t o  look  
more c l o s e l y  a t  t h e  quest ions i n  t he  psychology experiments. When we 
do so, we suspect t h a t  they a l l  r e l a t e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d  of exper- 
t i s e ,  t h a t  of p r o b a b i l i t y  theory  as such. I n  o the r  words the  c u l t u r a l l y  
learned i n t u i t i o n s  which guide our  judgment f o r  any o f  our f i e l d s  o f  
competence, teach us enough probabi 1 i s t i c  p r i n c i p l e s  bu t  they  are  h e a v i l y  
c u l t u r e  bound. We are  a l l  l o s t  when we venture beyond the  scope o f  our  
c u l t u r a l l y - g i v e n  i n t u i t i o n s  and presumably the  t e c h n i c a l l y  competent 
p r o b a b i l i s t  would be equa l l y  l o s t  if asked t o  p r e d i c t  ou ts ide  h i s  s k i l l e d  
i n t u i t i o n s .  
Though t h i s  may prove t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  are  n o t  weak i n  t h i n k i n g  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y ,  i t  leaves the  general p o s i t i o n  unchanged. The 
issue of perce iv ing  low p r o b a b i l i t y ,  h igh  consequence r i s k s  concerns 
inexper t  perceivers.  I f  people can on ly  t h i n k  p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y  from 
a p o s i t i o n  of exper t  competence and i f  there  i s  no way f o r  a l l  o r  any 
of us becoming exper ts  i n  weaponry o r  nuclear  power, the problem o f  
how we are  t o  make a p o l i t i c a l  judgment o f  such r i s k s  i s  s t i l l  the  same. 
The dilemna a r i s e s  because our western t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h i n k i n g  about 
judgment and choice leaves c u l t u r a l  in f luences out  of account. The up- 
shot o f  much anthropo log ica l  research on c u l t u r a l  b ias  suggests t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  do n o t  t r y  t o  make independent choices, e s p e c i a l l y  about 
b i g  p o l i t i c a l  issues. When faced w i t h  es t imat ing  p r o b a b i l i t y  and 
c r e d i b i l i t y ,  they come al ready primed w i t h  c u l t u r a l l y  learned assump- 
t i o n s  and weight ings. One could say t h a t  they have been f a b r i c a t i n g  
t h e i r  p re jud ices  as p a r t  of t he  work o f  designing t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
They have s e t  up t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as dec is ion  processors which shut 
ou t  some opt ions and p u t  o thers  i n  favorab le  l i g h t .  I n d i v i d u a l s  make 
the  bas ic  choices between j o i n i n g  and n o t  j o i n i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  kinds. They then engage i n  continuous moni to r ing  of t he  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  machinery. The b i g  choices reach them i n  the  form o f  
quest ions whether t o  r e i n f o r c e  a u t h o r i t y  o r  t o  subvert  it. Whether t o  
b lock  o r  t o  enable ac t ion .  
I f  we want t o  understand r a t i o n a l  behavior, we should exanline t h i s  
moni to r ing  process. It cons is ts  o f  apply ing two kinds o f  t e s t s  t o  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t ruc tu re .  One i s  the  matching o f  promises t o  performance. 
For instance, we are promised t h a t  our jobs are safe, then someone 
gets f i red ;  a re  we t o  t r u s t  the  f i r m ' s  guarantees o f  s e c u r i t y  o r  no t?  
The o the r  t e s t  i s  app l i ed  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n :  i s  
t h e i r  l o g i c  s t rong? What a re  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ?  Are 
the  r u l e s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ?  How coherent i s  t he  whole system of r u l e s  by 
which t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  works? Mishaps, mis for tunes  and t h r e a t s  and d isas-  
t e r s  provoke the  endless chal lenges and c o g i t a t i o n  about t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i f e .  It i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see t h a t  t h i s  mon i to r -  
i n g  process es tab l i shes  f o r  any i n s t i t u t i o n  some agreed norms fo r  
f.n.7 
acceptable and unacceptable r i s k  over a l l  precedents. But then, 
t he  unprecedented event w i l l  never have been brought i n t o  i t s  purview. 
So t h e  quest ion about pe rce i v ing  very low frequency events seems t o  be 
j u s t  as unanswerable, even if we take i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  i n  percept ion 
i n t o  account. However, I am going t o  argue, from experience as an anthropo 
l o g i s t  i n  c e n t r a l  A f r i ca ,  t h a t  sonlc forms of o rgan iza t i on  a re  adapted t o  
recogn iz ing  low p r o b a b i l i t y  dangers. My problem o f  e x p o s i t i o n  i s  t o  t r a n  
scend l o c a l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  case. So I w i l l  t u r n  f o r  
he lp  t o  o rgan iza t ion  theory  t o  f i n d  a general ana lys i s  o f  k inds  of organi  
za t ions ,  b u t  f i r s t  l e t  me e x p l a i n  f u r t h e r  t he  k i n d  o f  lead t h a t  comes from 
research on pe rce i v ing  danger i n  A f r i c a n  soc ie t i es .  
3. Perce iv ing  Danger 
f .n.8 
The c e n t r a l  method o f  i n q u i r y  i s  t o  f as ten  a t t e n t i o n  on misfor tunes.  
The under ly ing  assumption i s  t h a t  any major mishap i n  an organ iza t ion  
sparks an i n t e r n a l  b a t t e r y  o f  quest ions about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I f  t h e  
organ iza t ion  has been es tab l ished long enough t o  have taken a p a r t i c u l a r  
form, the  quest ions a r e  n o t  going t o  be random. S t i l l  l e s s  w i l l  
t h e  answers seem c r e d i b l e  unless they r e i n f o r c e  the  members ' concerns 
about t h e  form o f  the  o rgan iza t i on  they  l i v e  i n .  For example, i f  
people i n  an o rgan iza t i on  d i s l i k e  the  way t h a t  t o p  a u t h o r i t y  has been 
exercised, i t  w i l l  be c r e d i b l e  t h a t  t he  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  acc idents 
be pinned a t  t h e  top; i n  t he  course o f  being made answerable, t he  
harshness and a r b i t r a r y  weight  o f  a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  be i n v e s t i g a t e d  and 
c r i t i c i z e d .  O r  f o r  a  reverse  d i r e c t i o n  o f  concern, i f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  
members i n  an o rgan iza t i on  are  wor r ied  about t h e  d i s r u p t i v e  behavior  o f  
t h e i r  j u n i o r  members and f e a r f u l  o f  a  poss ib le  chal lenge t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y ,  then minor  and major  mis for tunes  w i l l  seem very  p l a u s i b l y  
t o  have been caused by t h e  young Turks. The b a t t e r y  o f  i n q u i r i e s  f o l -  
lowing on misfortunes represents the  normal exe rc i se  of i n d i v i d u a l  
r a t i o n a l  thought:  t h e  focus being on i n s t i t u t i o n a l  norms and values, 
everyone i s  a c u t e l y  concerned t o  hear t he  excuses and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  harm t h a t  has happened and t o  pass judgment. g u t  they  are  
n o t  merely i n q u i r i n g  d ispass ionate ly .  They b r i n g  t o  t h e  t e s t s  o f  
l o g i c a l  coherence a l l  t h e i r  c u l t u r a l l y  loaded i n t u i t i o n s  about what 
the  i d e a l  o rgan iza t i on  ought t o  be, i n f l uenced  by  t h e i r  memory o f  pas t  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  and precedents. Whether t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  has been 
developing i n  one d i r e c t i o n  o r  i n  another,  t he  search f o r  a  cu lpab le  
agent w i l l  be biased accord ing ly .  Th i s  i s  how man-made and n a t u r a l  
d i sas te rs  become enmeshed w i t h  t h e  micro-pol i t i c s  of i n s t i t u t i o n s .  wocesses 
of blame p inn ing  o r  exonerat ing from blame st rengthen t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  t he  
organ iza t ion  and are  a c t u a l l y  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  it. 
To ' f o l l o w  t h e  argument, f i r s t  purge from t h e  mind any assumption 
t h a t  i t  i s  easy t o  s e t  up an o rgan iza t i on  and make i t  endure over t ime; 
remember a u t h o r i t y  i s  always f r a g i l e  and power always he1 d  p reca r ious l y .  
The smal le r  t he  o rgan iza t i on  and t h e  l e s s  the  c a p i t a l  investment i n  it, 
t h e  harder  t h e  cond i t i ons  f o r  s t a b i l i t y .  I f  we should come across an 
i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  which power i s  seen t o  f l o w  smoothly through l e g i t i m a t e  
channels, ins tead of t a k i n g  i t  f o r  granted we should marvel and ask how 
such s t a b i l i t y  has been achieved. I n  such a  case, watch t o  see how 
these people a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  m is fo r tune  and how they con- 
t r o l  envy and the  spread o f  alarm and mutual blaming. 
Th is  type of i n q u i r y  i s  f a m i l i a r  t o  an thropo log is ts .  
Yet i t  i s  n o t  app l i ed  t o  o rgan iza t ions  i n  modern i n d u s t r i a l  soc ie t y .  I n  
t e x t  books, on pol i t i c a l  o r  economic organ iza t ion ,  t h e  var ious  appeals t o  
danger a re  n o t  considered sys temat i ca l l y  as one o f  t h e  r e g u l a r  s o l u t i o n s  
f o r  r e g u l a r l y  r e c u r r i n g  problems. H is to r i ans ,  t o  be sure, c i t e  cases 
o f  statesmen beleaguered by t h e i r  l o c a l  r i v a l s  who save t h e i r  own sk ins  
by sounding t h e  t o c s i n  f o r  fo re ign  alarums. But they  a re  t r e a t e d  as 
no t  q u i t e  honest o r  a t  l e a s t  as unusual p loys,  whereas I would main ta in  
they are  t h e  normal s t r a t e g y  o f  s t a t e c r a f t .  It i s  as i f  t h e  Renaissance 
o r  t h e  War o f  Independence o r  some o the r  huge d i v i d e  too  obvious t o  name 
separates t h e  modern mind from t h e  myst ic  mental i t y  o f  pre-moderns. 
But  I main ta in  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  f a l s e  assumption on which modern ideas o f  
modernity a re  m is lead ing l y  based. The task  f o r  t h i s  essay i s  t o  reduce t h a t  
apparent d i v i d e .  B i g  quest ions about percept ion o f  r i s k  can o n l y  be 
t rea ted  t r i v i a l l y  i n  d e f a u l t  o f  some theory  about t h e  deploynent o f  t h r e a t s  
of danger i n  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  regimes. 
4. Latent  Powers 
The k inds o f  i n q u i r y  i n t o  d i s a s t e r  w i l l  va ry  according t o  t h e  k inds 
o f  l e g i t i m a t e d  a u t h o r i t y  being sought. Each d i s t i n c t i v e  k ind  o f  regime f .n.9 
w i l l  invoke a  d i s t i n c t i v e  s e t  o f  a c t i v e  powers i n  t h e  un iverse  t o  do th ree  
th ings ,  one cogn i t i ve ,  t o  exp la in  d i sas te rs ,  one p o l i t i c a l  , t o  j u s t i f y  
a l leg iances ,  one system main ta in ing ,  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i v e  work- 
i ngs  o f  t h e  regime. 
I w i l l  assume t h a t  a  regime w i l l  o n l y  su rv i ve  by the  moral comrnit- 
ment o f  i t s  members. Th i s  usage g ives  t h e  word a  spec ia l  sense. As a  
f i r s t  step, I need t o  take  extreme cases so as t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  d i f f e r e n t  
types o f  regimes f o r  a  we l l -cont ras ted  comparison. The main exerc ise  i s  
t o  examine the  r h e t o r i c  o f  explanat ions, persuasions and excuses i n  so f a r  
as i t  susta ins the  p o l i t i c a l  regime by appeal t o  a c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  the  
universe. The comparison has t o  be general and abs t rac t  enough t o  encompass 
together,wi t h i n  the  typology, regimes reported by anthropo log is ts  and those 
conceived by p o l i c y  ana lys ts  and organ iza t ion  t h e o r i s t s .  
The f i r s t  example o f  a d i s t i n c t i v e  regime r e s t s  upon the  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom t o  negot ia te .  That i s  t he  compet i t i ve  i n d i v i d u a l  i s t  
soc ie ty  described f o r  c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c s  i n  New Guinea which corresnones 
f .nlO t o  the  desc r ip t i on  of t he  market place i n  socio-economic ana1,yses. I f  
t h i s  k ind  o f  regime i s  t o  surv ive  the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  m i s f o r t u n e , , i t  
must uphold the  i n d i v i d u a l s '  freedom t o  cont rac t .  Explanation tends t o  
appeal t o  personal resources t h a t  a re  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a successful person. 
L e t  me c lass  them a l l  under the  head o f  f e t i s h  power, us ing the  t e n  
broadly t o  cover the  power t h a t  a l i v i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  may c la im  t o  use 
f o r  con t ro l  1 i n g  mysterious powers o r  agencies, whether the  power be 
purchased o r  g i f t e d  by an a l l y  o r  a charisma innate  i n  the  person's 
own s e l f .  
Each ac tor ,  pursuing h i s  p r i v a t e  ends, i s  b u s i l y  making o r  break- 
i n g  up c o a l i t i o n s :  unsuccessful operat ions ge t  d r i ven  down and ou t  o f  
t he  market, a few b i g  ones emerge fo r  a b r i e f  per iod-  o f  g lo ry .  Such a 
soc ie ty  cont inues i n  being on ly  i f  everyone. i s  comnit ted t o  i t s  under- 
l y i n g  p r i n c i p l e s .  When they i n q u i r e  i n t o  the  causes of a grave mishap, 
no one w i l l  l e t  i t  be sa id  t h a t  r e f u s a l  t o  abide by anc ient  t r a d i t i o n  
was i t s  cause. No one i s  going t o  accept a coroner 's  v e r d i c t  which 
imp l ies  t h a t  dar ing  innovat ion,  new forms o f  brokerage o r  f r e e  nego t i -  
a t i o n  has a t t r a c t e d  punishment. Some more mora l l y  f l e x i b l e  p r i n c i p l e  
i s  needed. What I am here c a l l i n g  f e t i s h  power supports t h e  successful 
leader  and permi ts  something l i k e  a f ree market i n  leadersh ip ;  so i t  
admirably s u i t s  t he  regime. 
I n  the  course of a t t r a c t i n g  a l l i e s  o r  i n t i m i d a t i n g  r i v a l s ,  i n d i -  
v i dua ls  i n  t h i s  regime w i l l  have been boast ing o f  t h e i r  powerful sponsors, 
personal t a l e n t s  and sec re t  resources, o thers  w i l l  have been assessing 
t h e i r  c la ims and choosing a1 ignments accord ing ly .  When a mis for tune 
needs t o  be explained, p l a u s i b l e  reasons a re  ready. If t h e  leader  argues 
t h a t  h i s  r i v a l  has more charisma, more powerful sponsoring demons o r  
s t ronger  magic technology, h i s  own charisma w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  be diminished. 
A theory  o f  personal resources works t o  main ta in  t h e  f l u i d i t y  of t h i s  k i n d  
o f  soc ie t y  because i t  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  changes i n  a l l ignment  t h a t  everyone 
f . n p  i s  always making. an t i ng  t o  leave Y who i s  a weak a l l y  and t o  j o i n  X 
who i s  c u r r e n t l y  successful, they  can j u s t i f y  t he  swi tch  of a l l eg iance  
because X has obv iocs l y  g o t  b igger  b a t t a l i o n s ,  b e t t e r  secrets,  b igger  
guardian s p i r i t s  o r  l u c k  working f o r  him; and when X s t a r t s  t o  f a i l ,  
t he  same theory  a1 lows h i s  supporters t o  d r i f t  away, seeing t h a t  h i s  
technology has run  down, h i s  demon has deserted him o r  h i s  1 uck has run  
out .  Th i s  may sound l i k e  a worry ing k i n d  o f  s o c i e t y  t o  be l i v i n g  i n ,  
bu t  i t  i s  more worry ing f o r  t he  prominent leaders  than t h e  o thers .  The 
man who c o n t r o l s  t h e  b igges t  f e t i s h  power has been c la im ing  t o  be the  
b igges t  source.  of danger on t h e  hor izon.  Since everyone knows who he 
i s  and s ince  he wants r e c r u i t s ,  anyone can j o i n  h i s  s ide  and earn h i s  
p ro tec t i on .  I f  he does n o t  d e l i v e r  h i s  promises, they  can w a i t  u n t i l  
some new d i s a s t e r  can be made a crusading p o i n t  f o r  another leader  t o  
chal lenge h i s  f e t i s h  power. By c r e d i t i o g  f i c k l e  f e t i s h  power w i t h  
causing i t s  major phys ica l  dangers, t he  s o c i e t y  can main ta in  i t s e l f  
as a f ree and open system, l i k e  Napoleon's army, n o t  w i t h  a genera l ' s  
baton i n  everyknapsack, b u t  w i t h  h igh  expectat ions o f  personal mobi 1 i ty, 
l a r g e  s o c i a l  rewards and s o c i a l  o b l i v i o n  f o r  those who f a i l .  
By c o n t r a s t  a more s t a b l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  supported by people who 
e i t h e r  p i n  blame f o r  mis for tunes  on p o l i t i c a l l y  disapproved elements 
o r  p i n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on the  v i c t i m  so t h a t  blaming i s  checked. No 
one would be seen t o  be doing t h e  ad jud i ca t i ng :  t he  exp lanat ion  o f  mis- 
haps would uphold a u t h o r i t y  d i f f u s e l y  and ob l i que l y ,  thanks t o  a t a c i t  
consensus t h a t  i t  i s  t o  be protected.  The graver  mishaps w i l l  be 
classed as a r a d i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  from some h igher  than human a u t h o r i t y  
o r  as a s e l f - i n v i t e d  punishment: X d ied  because o f  h i s  contempt o f  
ru les ,  Y had t h i s  acc ident  because he spread subversive rumors . I n  
t he  i dea l  system no one needs t o  s t i c k  h i s  own neck ou t  by pe rsona l l y  g i v -  
i n g  judgment aga ins t  contempt o r  subversion: t he  damage w i l l  be seen 
t o  have been caused by an i n v i s i b l e  agent imbued w i t h  moral concern 
a n d a r m e d w i t h e n o u g h  p o w e r t o v i n d i c a t e  thecommuni ty .  It i s  obvious 
how a row of p u n i t i v e  ancestors i s  an e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  
i n a  s o c i e t y o f  a t r a d i t i o n - l o v i n g  kfnd. When a d i s a s t e r b e f a l l s ,  i t  
i s  p l a u s i b l e  i n  such a regime t o  c la im  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  had entered 
forbidden t e r r i t o r y  o r  breached an anc ien t  r u l e  and so had brought h i s  
t roub les  on himself .  That t h e  ancestors are by d e f i n i t i o n  dead makes 
i t  more c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  convinc ing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  what t hey  
1 i ke w i l l  be one t h a t  comands t h e  w ides t  consensual support.  
These two k inds of explanat ions are  mu tua l l y  exc lus i ve  i n  so f a r  
as n e i t h e r  one can be used t o  sunport t he  o the r  reqime. It i s  
poss ib le  t o  c h a r a c t e r i  z e  two exc lus i ve  sets o f  explanat ions 
t h a t  appeal q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t l y  t o  u l t i m a t e  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  t he  un iverse  
and t h a t  guide the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a t t r i b u t i o n s  o f  danger i n  d i a m e t r i c a l l y  
opposed ways. Since none of t h i s  w i l l  seem very prob lemat ica l  t o  t h e  
western s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t ,  I can perhaps take  t h e  oppor tun i t y  o f  p o i n t -  
i n g  o u t  t h e  c e n t r a l  de f ic iency  o f  so-ca l led  a t t r i b u t i o n  theory  i n  t h a t  
i t  t r i e s  t o  e x p l a i n  i n d i v i d u a l  a t t r i b u t i o n s  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t o  o thers  
w i thou t  sys temat i ca l l y  i nco rpo ra t i ng  the  b i a s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t ruc tu res  
i n  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  scheme. f .n.12 
The d r i f t  o f  my argument so f a r  i s  t h a t  everyone t h i n k s  proba- 
b i l i s t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  o f  t h e i r  normal competence and ac ts  accord- 
i n g l y .  But  such f i e l d s  o f  competence tend t o  be c i rcumscr ibed and do 
no t  p rov ide  a  model f o r  apprec ia t ing  how people t h i n k  o f  o the r  k inds 
o f  grave r i s k s  ou ts ide  t h e i r  normal competence, e s p e c i a l l y  those which 
i nvo l ve  complex s o c i a l  judgments o f  value. Such l ike  b i g  decis ions I 
argue, are no t  analyzed and assessed d ispass ionate ly  on t h e i r  m e r i t s  by 
i n d i v i d u a l s .  Rather t he  onus o f  choice i s  s h i f t e d  away from p a r t i c u l a r  
issues t o  a  choice between k inds o f  soc ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Physical 
d i sas te rs  a re  keenly s tud ied  i n  every community deserv ing t h e  name 
and occasion i s  taken t o  score t h e  performance o f  comnunity i n s t i t u -  
t i o n s :  blame f a l l s  i n  such a  way as t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  l o c a l  comnunity 
i d e a l .  Far from being s tead i  l y  analyzed, from t h e  s t a r t  danger i s  
roped i n t o  t h e  work o f  showing up v i l l a i n s  o r  ma in ta in ing  morale. 
As Robert Merton sa id  o f  a  r a i n  ceremony, i t s  man i fes t  f u n c t i o n  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  requirement o f  changing meteor ic  cond i t i ons ,  b u t  i t  
may have t h e  l a t e n t  e f f e c t  o f  r e i n f o r c i n g  group ident i ty . f 'n '+he 
man i fes t  i n t e n t i o n  o f  any i n q u i r y  about d i s a s t e r  i s  t o  l i m i t  f u t u r e  
dangers, b u t  i t  a lso  has l a t e n t  f unc t i ons  f o r  t h e  soc ia l  u n i t ,  which 
need t o  be understood. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between l a t e n t  and mani fes t  seems a t  f i r s t  t o  
o f fe r  a  handhold f o r  t h e  quest ion a t  issue.  A f te r  a l l ,  I am a l l o c a t i n g  
percept ions o f  danger among the  unintended consequences which r e g u l a r l y  
f o l l o w  when the  soc ia l  u n i t  adopts a  c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  regime. I 
could rephrase the  d iscuss ion  o f  ancestors and f e t i s h e s  as b e l i e f s  
l a t e n t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  k inds o f  man i fes t  o rgan iza t i ona l  ob jec t i ves .  Th is  
might  be a way t o  present  my case. My task  i s  t o  expose d i f f e r e n t  types 
o f  unintended consequences which c o n t r o l  percept ion  and t o  c l a s s i f y  
them according t o  the  types o f  o f f i c i a l  l y  recognized i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
forms from which they  emanate. The simple c o n t r a s t  of market w i t h  
bureaucracy i s  merely a s t a r t .  How t o  make a r e l e v a n t  typo logy  of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms i s  the  problem. 
5 .  The Two Kinds o f  Organizat ion 
Though ex t ravagan t l y  r i c h  i n  t y p o l o g i z i n g  exerc ises,  o rgan iza t i on  
theory i s  poor i n  explanat ions o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b l indness.  The ac tua l  
typo log ies  t h a t  emerge i n  a well-developed way are  s u r p r i s i n g l y  few. By 
typo1 ogy I mean something r a t h e r  more e l  aborate than comparison devel oped 
along a s ing le  dimension, (such as the  famous s h i f t  from s ta tus  t o  c o n t r a c t ) .  
A number o f  i n c i p i e n t  t ypo log ies  fragment and ge t  l o s t .  For example, one 
popular c o n t r a s t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  l a r g e  f rom small o rgan iza t ions ,  imp ly ing  
a l s o  t h a t  the  l a r g e  a re  complex and the  small a re  simple. Th i s  never 
develops very  f a r ,  because the  smal l  o rgan iza t ions  q u i c k l y  g e t  discarded 
from t h e  exerc ise.  Indeed, o rgan iza t i on  theory  seems unduly obsessed 
by the  idea t h a t  problems are created by increase i n  scale.  The p re jud i ce  
may be enhanced by the  f a c t  t h a t  use fu l  o rgan iza t ions  employ dec is ion  
ana lys ts  as consu l tan ts ,  and subsequently small o rgan iza t ions  may seem 
t o  have few problems. It i s  assumed t h a t  complexi ty  i s  a f u n c t i o n  of 
scale increase i n  sca le  leads t o  devo lu t ion ,  c e n t r a l  i z a t i o n  , 
compartmental i z a t i  on, and these 1 ead t o  over1 oaded channels and prob- 
l ema t i ca l  comnunications. Indeed i t  s u r e l y  does. But  i n  t he  experience 
of anthropology, some very  small o rgan iza t ions  can have ve ry  grave problems 
that lead to factions, fission and fizzling out, while others equally small, 
survive with a high degree of internal complexity, devolution and compart- 
mentalization. I get the impression that the importance of scale has 
been much exaggerated. 
Principles of sociological classification derived from Max Weber provide 
slightly overlapping typologies. First, the contrast between charismatic 
leadership and routinized procedures, based on the distinctive roles 
of prophet and priest, has haunted so much of western social thought. 
But is it the leader who has charisma, or is it thrust upon the leader 
in certain kinds of political regimes? The charismatic leader fits 
closely to the anthropologist's descriptions of rule by competing big 
men (who tend to have recourse to fetish power in some form or another). 
The routinized society has some affinity with the traditionalism of 
the ancestor cults. This contrast of leadership styles would be useful 
to my present purpose if the literature on charisma (whether on party 
leaders or on personal ity cults) did not treat the leaders too much apart 
from the analysis of political regimes f.n.15 
The other classificatory principle developed by Weber which domin- 
ates our thinking about society, gives the contrast between market 
(dominated by means-end rational ity) and bureaucratic rational ity , 
(dominated by procedural rules and hierarchical values) . Whereas routiniza- 
tion tends to lead to bureaucracy, charisma tends to float outside of 
- 
both market and bureaucracy and we have the illusion of three types 
Whereas if charisma studies were well-integrated with interest-group 
studies it might we1 1 appear that we only have two types sti 1 1  , bureaucracy 
on the one hand, with its routinization, and market on the other, 
certain phases of which develop scope for charismatic leaders to build 
fragile coalitions , bring them up to climax and predictable collapse. 
Perhaps two s t r o n g l y  cont ras ted  types are enough f o r  most t heo r i z ing .  
Perhaps s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  i s  l i k e  t h a t  and two i s  t he  sum 0.f a l l  t h e r e  
r e a l l y  i s .  Perhaps i t  i s  hub r i s  t o  look f o r  more complex typo log ies  
t h a t  w i l l  he lp  t o  b r i dge  the  regimes t h a t  an thropo log is tss tudy  and those 
s tud ied  by o rgan iza t i on  t h e o r i s t s .  It i s  easy t o  cons t ruc t  t he  
imag ina t ive  l i n k  between the  i n d i v i d u a l  opera t ing  i n  t he  market w i t h  
a l l  i t s  myster ious a d v e r t i z i n g  and sales gimmicks and powerful  t r ade  
secrets, and the  k ind  of s o c i e t y  t h a t  expects a l l  i t s  e f f e c t i v e  operators 
t o  be us ing  f e t i s h  powers aga ins t  each o the r .  It i s  e q u a l l y  easy t o  
r e l a t e  bureaucracy t o  s o c i e t i e s  observing ancestor c u l t s .  Bureaucracy 
i s  o r i e n t a t e d  towards i t s  own v i s i o n  o f  l i f e ,  expressed i n  i t s  t r a d i t i o n s  
and i n  t h e  procedures which enshrine them. The ancestors are  n o t  on l y  
ad jud i ca t i ng  inst ruments between r i v a l  f a c t i o n s .  They represent  a  whole 
vers ion  o f  the  beginning o f  t ime and how the  universe s ta r ted ,  how they 
emerged and c o n s t i t u t e d  the  segments o f  human soc ie ty .  They stand f o r  
a  synopt ic  v i s i o n  o f  o rder  and j u s t i c e  which t h e i r  c u l t  makes ac tua l  
f o r  t h e i r  descendants. I n  i t s  o rgan iza t i on  o f  segments bureaucracy 
fabr ica tes  b u f f e r s  which a1 low members o f  t he  o rgan iza t i on  t o  ove r r i de  
o r  fo rge t  t h e i  r personal d i f f e rences  . The market t h r i v e s  on con f ron ta t i on ,  
bureaucracy p lays  i t  down. Bureaucrat ic  procedures i n s u l a t e  members from 
outs ide  p o l i t i c a l  fo rces .  One unintended consequence o f  s e t t i n g  up a  
successful  bureaucracy t h a t  i s  s t rong enough t o  endure over t i m e ' s  j o l t s  
and scares i s  t h a t  i t s  v iewpoint  tends t o  be i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
outcomes. f ' n ' 6 ~ n  the  o the r  s ide,  market, being focused on i n d i v i d u a l  
p r o f i t s ,  i s  myopic t o  l a r g e r  e f f e c t s .  Bureaucracy i s  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  
warnings o f  dangers i t  has n o t  met already; market foresees danger on l y  
from t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  perspect ive.  Ne i ther  i s  a. form o f  o rgan iza t ion  t h a t  
can t r a i n  i t s  members t o  be s e n s i t i v e  t o  low p r o b a b i l i t y ,  h igh  consequence 
events. The two k inds  o f  hor izon are  bo th  r e s t r i c t e d .  The market regime 
i s  hopeful  about t h e  u l t i m a t e  successful  working ou t  o f  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  
p r i n c i p l e s .  Bureaucracy i s  hopeful  about t h e  power o f  human reasoning. 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  hopefulness b l u n t s  concern f o r  d i s t a n t  d isas ters .  
Though these two types a re  t h e  r e c u r r i n g  f a v o r i t e  contas ts  i n  
western s o c i a l  thought,  t hey  a re  n o t  always used c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  no r  i s  
t he  1  i n k  between i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and associated mode o f  thought 
made c l e a r .  Sometimes no l i n k  i s  made, sometimes t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t o r s  
a re  worked hard, sometimes a  psychological  b ias  i s  imp l ied .  For my 
task  o f  r e l a t i n g  t h e  k inds  o f  percept ion t o  k inds  o f  o rgan iza t ion ,  these 
two grand types s imply stand around, as backdrop t o  genera l i za t i ons  
made i n  o rgan iza t i on  theory  and p o l i t i c a l  ana lys is .  
One major  except ion needs t o  be noted. That i s  Gabr ie l  Almond's 
and Sidney verba ' sf .nJJioneering study o f  t h e  c i v i c  c u l t u r e ,  i t s  i n f l  u- 
ence on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ,  and t h e  consequences o f  t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n s  
fo r  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of democratic soc ie t y .  Here, c e r t a i n l y ,  t ypo log ies  
abound. P o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  i s  taken t o  be based i n i t i a l l y  on f o u r  
va r i ab les :  1)how much the  p o l i t i c a l  system i s  perceived by t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
as a  general ob jec t .  2 )  what knowledge he has on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and 
r o l e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  and the  upward f l ows  o f  p o l i c y  making. 
3)  what knowledge he has o f  p o l i c y  enforcement as i t s  downward f l ows  
impinge upon h i s  1  i f e .  4 )  what a r e  t h e  norms o f  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  these processes t h a t  he acknowledges. From t h i s  t h r e e  types o f  
p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  emerge. Negative answers on a l l  these issues g ives  
the  paroch ia l  type o f  p o l i t i c a l  involvement; o n l y  knowing the  system 
as a  general p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t  and h imse l f  as a  p o i n t  on which p o l i c y  i m -  
pinges g ives  the  sub jec t  type o f  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e ;  t h e  t h i r d  type 
i s  t h e  case of t he  p a r t i c i p a n t  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e s  i n  which the  c i t i z e n  
has a  good knowledge o f  t he  general p o l i t i c a l  powers, i s  aware o f  himself 
as a  sub jec t  and o b j e c t  i n  i t  and a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e s .  Th is  approach, 
w i t h  i t s  emphasis on pol  i t i c a l  consciousness and p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
seems a t  f i r s t  t o  be very congenial  t o  my present en te rp r i se .  Th i s  
i s  e s p e c i a l l y  so s ince  the  main purpose o f  t h e  typo logy  i s  t o  con- 
t r a s t  degrees of sub jec t i ve  competence ( t h a t  i s  t h e  c i t i z e n ' s  sense 
t h a t  he can i n f l uence  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process) w i t h  h i s  degree o f  a c t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  The assumption i s  t h a t  a  successful  democracy needs 
t o  be s t a b l e  and t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  requ i res  a  mismatch o f  a  k ind  such 
t h a t  c i t i z e n s  who perce ive  themselves s u b j e c t i v e l y  t o  be i n  a  p o l i t i c a l  
system i n  which they  could e f f e c t i v e l y  in te rvene a l s o  f e e l  s u f f i c i e n t  
t r u s t  i n  t h e  ways of i t s  workings t h a t  they  r a r e l y  do bo ther  t o  i n t e r -  
vene. P a r t i c i p a t i o n  tends t o  engender t r u s t  and t r u s t  insures  s t a b i l i t y ,  
b u t  n o t  necessar i l y .  The authors lean h e a v i l y  on l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y  
f o r  understanding how the  d i f f e r e n t  mixes have a r i s e n  and t o  e x p l a i n  
anomal ous cases. 
Reading back on t h a t  work o f  on l y  twenty hears ago, one i s  s t ruck  
w i t h  what an ambi t ious scheme i t  was and w i t h  how q u i c k l y  dated i t  became. 
It shows on every page t h e  mark o f  i t s  per iod,  t h e  heyday of f unc t i ona l  ism 
w i t h  t h e  unquestioned assumptions t h a t  balanced e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  be the  
mark o f  a  successful system and t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  i s  what every democracy 
should seek. One i s  a l s o  s t ruck  w i t h  how f a s t  t h e  f r o n t i e r  o f  knowledge 
and understanding on t h a t  sub jec t  has moved. Subsequent reappra isa l  s  have 
r a i s e d  most of t h e  issues t h a t  now seem problematical which then were 
dormant. f *nJ8~bove  a l  1  , t he  d i f f e r e n c e  made by socio-economic s ta tus  i n  
t he  a t t i t u d e s  of respondents cou ld  n o t  now be brushed under t h e  carpet,  
o r  o f  c i r c u l a r i t y  of t h e  argument,which t e s t s  t h e  sub jec t i ve  sense of 
competence aga ins t  t h e  sub jec t i ve  r e p o r t i n g  o f  p o l i t i c a l  involvement ,  
and the  sub jec t i ve  sense of p o l i t i c a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  
system. Alas, f o r  my hope t o  f i n d  here some s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  about how s o c i a l  
s t ruc tu res  f i x  perceptual  b l i n k e r s  on i n d i v i d u a l  s  . This  huge research 
e f f o r t  never t ack les  t h e  quest ion of how t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  experiences re1  a te  
t o  r e a l  l i f e ,  except h i s t o r i c a l l y .  Ev ident ly ,  once upon a  t ime, events 
impinged upon and changed people ' s  percept ion,  b u t  then subsequent events 
combined t o  f i x  t h e  angle o f  v i s i o n .  Since I want t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h i s  
process o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  v i s i o n ,  w i t h  r e g r e t  I leave as ide 
t h i s  brave exerc ise  because i t  has no th ing  t o  say on t h a t  p o i n t .  
6. Kinds o f  Decision-Making 
When we t u r n  t o  dec i s ion  ana lys i s ,  we f i n d  a  fo rmidab le  l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  
assumes t h a t  k inds  of t h i n k i n g  a re  r e l a t e d  t o  k inds  o f  o rgan iza t ion .  Be 
n o t  su rp r i sed  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  two k inds  of decision-making organ iza t ions  
genera l l y  considered. The seminal a r t i c l e  which se ts  t h e  terms f o r  t h e  
comparisons t h a t  a re  s t i l l  being made i s  Lindblom's 1959 c r i t i s m  o f  de- 
f.n.19 
c i s i o n  and o rgan iza t i on  theory.  Here he con t ras ts  Root s t y l e  of dec is ion  
making w i t h  Branch s t y l e  as fo l lows.  
I n  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  t h e  l e f t  hand column, Root, makes experts  i t s  b u t t  and 
on t h e  r i g h t  hand column t h e  o rd ina ry  bumbl i n g  o rgan iza t i on  proceeding 
l i m i t e d  comparisons and t r i a l  and e r r o r  seems t o  be t h e  good guys, t he  
f i r m  which i s  ou t  t he re  i n  t h e  market p lace,  r e c e i v i n g  advice from the  
exper ts .  I n  much subsequent research i n s p i r e d  by  t h i s  c o n t r a s t  we 
have seen two k inds  of budgeting contrasted,  comprehensive o r  Pol i c y  
Programming and Budgeting versus incremental budgeting: % t o  k inds  
Table k Model I 
Root 
-
Model I1 
Branch 
Rational-Comprehensive (Root) 
l a .  C l a r i f i c a t i o n  of values o r  
ob jec t ives  d i s t i n c t  from 
and usual ly  p re requ i s i t e  
t o  empirical  ana lys i s  of 
a l t e r n a t i v e  po l i c i e s .  
2a. Policy formulation is  
therefore  approached 
through means-end analys is :  
F i r s t  t he  ends a r e  i s o l a t e d ,  
then the  means t o  achleve them 
a r e  sought. 
3a. The t e s t  of a "good" pol icy  is 
t h a t  it can be shorn t o  be the  
most appropr ia te  means t o  
des i red  ends. 
4a. Rnalysis is comprehensive; 
every important re levant  
f ac to r  is  taken i n t o  
account. 
5a. Theory is of ten heavi ly  
r e l i e d  upon. 
Successive Limited Comparisons 
(Branch) 
lb .  Select ion of value goals 
and empirical  ana lys i s  of 
t he  needed ac t ion  a r e  not 
d i s t i n c t  f r w  one another 
but  a re  c lose ly  in ter twined.  
2b. Since means and ends a r e  
not d i s t i n c t ,  means-end 
ana lys i s  i s  o f t en  inappro- 
p r i a t e  o r  l imi ted .  
3b. The t e s t  of a "good" pol icy  
is t y p i c a l l y  t h a t  var ious  
ana lys t s  f i n d  themselves 
d i r e c t l y  agreeing on a 
pol icy  (without t h e i r  
agreeing t h a t  it is t he  most 
appropr ia te  means t o  an 
agreed o b j e c t i v e ) .  
4b. Analysis is d r a s t i c a l l y  
l imi ted:  
i) Important poss ible  
ou tcmes  a r e  
neglected. 
ii) Important a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  p o l i c i e s  a r e  
neglected. 
iii) Important a f f ec t ed  values 
a re  neglected. 
5b. A succession of comparisons 
g r e a t l y  reduces o r  e l iminates  
r e l i ance  on theory. 
This i s  copied from "The Science o f  Muddling Through" by C.E. Lindblom 
o f  po l  i c y  format ion, c o g i t a t i v e  and i n t e r a c t i v e .  ." ')he good guy 
sometimes changes from one s ide  t o  t h e  other-as f o r  example, when t h e  
l e v e l  i s  ra i sed  from government departments t o  whole na tu ra l  govern- 
mental s t y l e s .  I n  p o l i t i c s  and markets Lindblom seems t o  favo r  
h i s  Model 1, t he  i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  guided soc ie ty ,  against  h i s  Model 2, 
t he  i n t e r a c t i o n  type.  f ' n z 2  No mat ter ,  we have two types, and they s t i l l  
correspond c l o s e l y  t o  the  ancestor c u l t  (Lindblom's Model 1, w i t h  i t s  
famous founders, synopt ic  v i s i o n  of wor ld h i s t o r y  and human nature  and 
topdown formal i t i e s  of precedence f o r  organiz ing po l  i t i  ca l  behavior) 
and Model 2, t he  f i c k l e  f e t i s h  ho ld ing  market i n t e r a c t i o n ,  w i t h  i t s  
nego t ia t i ng  and coalescing f o r  s t rength  and a r r i v i n g  a t  fragmentary, 
p rac t i cab le  decis ions on a  sho r t  term basis. 
Several t h inke rs  have t r i e d  t o  propose a  t h i r d  type o f  dec is ion  
making. On c l o s e r  inspect ion ,  t h e i r  typo log ies  tend t o  reduce t o  two. 
A l l i ~ o n ~ . ~ ' ~ c ? f f e r s  th ree  models of government dec is ion  making; the  f i r s t  
i s  based on the  i n d i v i d u a l  behaving according t o  c l a s s i c a l  u t i l i t y  theory; 
t he  government i s  presented as if i t  were a  s i n g l e  r a t i o n a l  agent, able 
t o  know and rank i t s  goals and solve i t s  problems, according t o  a  r a t i o n a l  
appraisal  o f  costs and benef i ts ;  t he  second echoes Lindblom's desc r ip t i ons  
of actual  o rgan iza t iona l  muddl i n g  through, con t ra ry  t o  the  behests o f  
t h e o r i s t s .  The b i g  d i f f e r e n c e  between Model 1 and Model 2 i s  t he  
importance o f  staddard operat ing procedures i n  the  l a t t e r ,  t h e  cons t ra in ts  
on seeking in format ion ,  t he  sequential  and fragmented dea l ing  w i t h  p o l i c y  
problems. I n  Model 2 t h e  d i f f e r e n t  elements behave as a  l oosea l l i ance  
o f  semi-independent organizat ions;  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l  i c t  i s  reduced by t h e  
recourse t o  f i x e d  p lans and rout ines .  Model 1 and Model 2 correspond 
c l o s e l y  t o  Lindblom's two models c i t e d  above. A l l i s o n ' s  Model 3 i s  a  
more complicated vers ion  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  theory  used f o r  Model 1, i n  
which the  whole market o f  i n d i v i d u a l  agents are bargain ing ,compromising and 
making c o a l i t i o n s .  I f  you see Lindblom's Model 2 as a  system based on 
market i n t e r a c t i o n ,  then A1 1  ison ' s  model 3 takes i t  t o  a  f u r t h e r  stage. 
So i n  effect,  ins tead of p rov id ing  th ree d i s t i n c t  types, A1 l i s o n  i s  
working w i t h  the  usual two bas ic  models. 
s te inbruner f  wn'$!ries t o  have th ree models o f  cogn i t i on  i n  organ- 
i z a t i o n s :  a  c l a s s i c  u t i l i t y  model (which correspond roughly.  t o  
Lindblom's r a t i o n a l  comprehensive Root s t y l e  o f  p o l i c y  fo rmula t ion  and 
t o  A l l i s o n ' s  Model 1) which he c a l l s  a n a l y t i c  th ink ing ;  second, a  
pragmatic i n t e r a c t i v e  model (which roughly corresponds t o  Lindblom's 
Model 2; and a  cybernet ic  model w i t h  bu reauc ra t i ca l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  focus 
a t  a  lower l e v e l  o f  o rgan iza t ion  which has much i n  common w i t h  the  empha- 
s i s  on f i x e d  goals and rou t ines  i n  A l l i s o n ' s  Model 2 .  So the  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
t h a t  would j u s t i f y  c la iming more than two basic models are n o t  conv inc ing ly  
worked out .  Both Ste inbruner and A1 1  ison are i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the c e n t r a l  
problem t h a t  concerns us here, t h a t  i s  how the p r i o r  mental s e t  affects 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  events. But n e i t h e r  stops t o  ask where t h e  mental s e t  
and i t s  assumptions come from. They imply t h a t  t he  answer w i l l  r e f e r  t o  
na t iona l  c u l t u r e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  psychological makeup. I am arguing t h a t  
t he  k i n d  of o rgan iza t ion  i t s e l f  generates t h e  dec is ion  making and 
perceptual bias, b u t  I do n o t  ge t  enough help from typo log ies  used 
i n  d iscussing o rgan iza t i on  behavior f o r  developing my p ro jec t .  
Furthermore, g iven the  heavy use of the  idea of r a t i o n a l  
behavior i n  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  theory  o f  organizat ion,  one would expect 
the  d i f f e rences  between t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  dec is ion  take r  and the  organ- 
i z a t i o n  be f u l l y  spe l l ed  out .  A recent  survey f*n*25shows t h a t  t h e  
paradigmatic scheme o f  t he  organ iza t ion  as i f  i t  were an i n d i v i d u a l  
i s  f u l l  o f  loose ends and n o t  a t  a1 1  as we1 1  understood as one might 
expect o f  a  c e n t r a l  t o o l  i n  dec is ion  theory. The two incomplete 
models which pre.vai1 e i t h e r  t r e a t  t he  organ iza t ion  as an i n d i v i d u a l  
w i t h i n  a  market environment o r  as a  market i n  which i t s  cons t i t uen t  
pa r t s  are  i n d i v i d u a l s .  This 1  i m i t e d  v i s i o n  o f  what kinds o f  d i f f e r -  
en t  organizat ions the re  may be i s  unabte t o  provide ideas 
about i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b l  inders .  
7. Market, Bureaucracy and Yo1 untary .  Commitment 
Two swallows do n o t  make a summer. Two regimes do n o t  make a  
typology.  Search as I may i n  t h e  theory  of organizat ions,  I do no t  
f i n d  any c o n s i s t e n t l y  developed typology t h a t  does more than embroider 
upon t h e  bas ic  two models, and abso lu te l y  no th ing  t h a t  suggests how 
the  po l  i t i ~ a l  c u l t u r e  se lec ts  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms and supports them 
w i t h  b e l i e f s  about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  To make the  t r a n s f e r  between the  
an th ropo log i s t s '  m a t e r i a l s  and t h e  sub jec t  ma t te r  o f  western p o l i t i c a l  
thought I need t o  f i n d  a t  l e a s t  a th ree  p a r t  schemefsn ': a r t i c u l a t e d  
so as t o  show how blame i s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  sus ta in  d i f f e r e n t  regimes. 
One fo rmu la t i on  o f  t he  d i f f e r e n c e  between market and bureaucracy 
seems p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  adapted t o  t h i s  purpose. Th i s  i s  t he  market 
f a i l u r e s  framework, which whatever i t s  l i m i t a t i o n s  may be, takes my 
argument o u t  o f  t h e  s t a t i c  per iphery  o f  western soc ia l  thought  where 
an thropo log ica l  observat ions are  genera l l y  consigned. 
Market t ransac t i ons  a re  con t rac tua l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  va ry ing  degrees o f  
longterm comi tment .  Market f a i l u r e  i s  an a n a l y t i c  device which considers 
the  cases i n  which cos ts  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  t ransac t i ons  may be too  h i g h  f o r  
ma in ta in ing  the  cond i t i ons  o f  complete ly  con t rac tua l  market r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
W i l l  iamsonf'n'ias used t h e  idea o f  market f a i l u r e  as a conceptual frame- 
work f o r  comparing t h e  s t rengths  of markets as opposed t o  bureaucracy. 
Suppose a l l  t r ansac t i ons  can be mediated by market r e l a t i o n s ,  
then ask what cond i t i ons  w i l l  cause some o f  these market r e l a t i o n s  t o  
f a i l  and come t o  be replaced by bureaucra t ic  mediat ing forms. Th is  
argument assumes every bureaucra t ic  o rgan iza t i on  t o  be an example o f  
market f a i l u r e .  When t ransac t i on  cos ts  mount f o r  one reason o r  another, 
a  bureaucra t ic  o rgan iza t i on  of fers an employment re1  a t i o n  which can pro-  
duce t r u s t ,  develop e x p e r t i s e  and prov ide  f l e x i b l e  c o n t i n u i t y ,  and these 
combined can outweigh i t s  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s .  Ouchi has suggested a t h i r d  
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organ iza t iona l  form from w i t h i n  t h i s  conceptual scheme. He c a l l s  ' c l a n '  
a  s t r u c t u r e  which he der ives  from Durkheim's idea o f  organic s o l i d a r i t y ,  
i n  which a  t o t a l  congruence o f  goals a l lows f o r  much more i n f o r m a l i t y  
and a  l ess  e x p l i c i t  statement o f  r u l e s .  
Table 2 (copied from Ouchi , Table I1 p. 138 "Administrative Science Quarterly" 
25.1.1980) An Organizational Failures Framework 
Modes of control Normative requirements In formati ona 1 requi rements 
Market Reci oroci ty Prices 
Bureaucracy Recfprocity, legitimate Rules 
authority 
Clan Reciprocity, legitimate Traditions 
authority , comnon values 
and be1 iefs 
The d i f f i c u l t y  about t h i s  n i c e  scheme i s  t o  know how comnitment t o  
common goals a r i ses .  Ouchi sees t h e  c l a n  as emergingin response t o  
f a i  1  u re  o f  bureaucra t ic  o rgan iza t ion .  "When a  bureaucracy f a i  1  s  , then 
due t o  excess ive ly  ambiguous per fo rmanaeva lua t ion  , t h e  so le  form o f  
mediat ion remaining i s  t h e  c lan ,  which r e l i e s  on c r e a t i n g  goal con- 
gruence. " f ' n * Z 9 ~ e  c la ims t h a t  c lans do n o t  r e q u i r e  e x p l i c i t  a u d i t i n g  
and eva lua t ion ,  because of t h e  sub t l e ,  mutual mon i to r i ng  o f  i n t i m a t e  
co-workers. He may be r i g h t  i n  seeing ' c l a n s '  formed i n  the  course o f  
r e j e c t i n g  bureaucracy's r u l e s .  But h i s  enthusiasm f o r  i m p l i c i t  unmed- 
i a t e d  forms o f  communication l e t  him down. The c l a n  idea needs 
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more ana lys is .  L i k e  Rosabeth Moss Kanter, w  ose work he c i t e s  i n  
evidence, he i s  t e l l i n g  us t h a t  moral commitment t o  common goals i s  an 
independent f a c t o r .  I f  he can assume t h a t  moral commitment a r i s e s  so 
e a s i l y ,  j u s t  f rom disappointment w i t h  the  workings o f  bureaucracy, why 
can we n o t  a l s o  suppose i t  preceded market r e l a t i o n s  and then ask why 
i t  became superseded i n  t u r n ?  Ouchi sk ips  ou t  o f  t he  c e n t r a l  dilemmas 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  theory  i n  which the  issue over t he  cen tu r i es  has been how 
shared moral c o n i  tment ever  emerges and how i t  i s  sustained. The 
"c lan"  as descr ibed i s  n o t  t he  promised t h i r d  branch o f  a  typo logy  
s t a r t i n g  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l  agents t ransac t i ng  w i t h  one another 
and then avoid ing excessive t ransac t i on  costs by developing employment 
re1 a t i  ons . 
Using t h e  mechanisms o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and blame a l l o c a t i o n  as 
p r i n c i p l e  organizers of our  scheme, we may s t a r t  again w i t h  the  two 
recognized types, bureaucracy and market, tabu1 ated as fo l l ows .  
The m o r a l l y  p u n i t i v e  un iverse  i n  which ancestor power i s  an element 
can be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  bureaucra t ic  o r  h i e r a r c h i c a l  regimes and the  b e l i e f  
i n  sec re t  weaponry such as f e t i s h  power o r  charisma can be i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  market regimes. 
TABLE 2. Two forms o f  Risk Perceivinq Organization 
Hierarchy Market 
organized by ind iv idua l  -subordinatinq t o  ind iv idua l  exchange, 
group protect ive,  compartmental i r i n g  , p r o f i  t-maximizing , 
top-down p r inc ip les  o f  comnand bottom- up p r inc ip les  o f  
consul t a t i o n  and 
inf luence 
l a t e n t  goal secure i n t e rna l  s t ruc tu re  o f  preserve ind iv idua l  
au tho r i t y  freedom t o  contract  
invoke benef i ts  o f  t r a d i t i o n ,  of connections, o f  esoter ic  techniques 
o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  her i tage and and personal qua1 i t i e s  
mater ia l  symbols o f  group 
invoke dangers o f  loss o f  morale, 
1  oss o f  comnitment 
o f  personal power 
and fee l ings of 
r i v a l  i nd iv idua ls  
disasters i n t e r -  t o  support group control  over t o  magnify competition 
preted ind iv idua ls  o f  leaders 
act ion j u s t i f i e d  s t a b i l i z e  patterns o f  seumentation s h i f t s  o f  a l legiance 
l a t e n t  cosmic ancestor power, taboos i n  a 
forces  unitive universe 
f e t i s h  power, 
charisma, and equivalent 
personal weanonry 
These two cont ras ted  regimes w i t h  t h e i r  l a t e n t  cosmic fo rces  wou~ld 
seem t o  be an acceptable extension o f  p o l i t i c a l  thought t o  i n c l u d e  the  
regimes of A f r i c a  and the  anc ien t  wor ld  under t h e  same contemporary 
r u b r i c .  But they do n o t  touch upon a c e r t a i n  type of regime t h a t  
anthropology records, i n  which warning o f  h o r r i b l e ,  unprecedented 
dangers i s  the  usual recourse f o r  reso lv ing  micro-pol i t i c a l  c r i ses .  
There i s  a t h i r d  organ iza t iona l  type, q u i t e  d i s t i n c t ,  which solves i t s  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a1 leg iance n e i t h e r  by boast ing o f  c o n t r o l  of fe t ishes 
no r  by appeal t o  dead ancestra l  vengeance but  by t h r e a t  o f  being destroyed 
by e v i l  conspiracy of l i v i n g  outs iders .  For tunate ly ,  I can develop t h i s  
t h i r d  type o f  regime i n c l u d i n g  both A f r i c a n  exemplars and modern p o l i t i c a l  
ana lys is  w i t h i n  the  theo ry  o f  r a t i o n a l  choice bv drawinn upon Mancur Olson's 
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ana lys is  o f  The Loqic o f  C o l l e c t i v e  Act ion.  l a r k e t s  and h ie ra rch ies  surv ive,  
thanks t o  the  comi tmen t  of members who expect t o  en jov  s e l e c t i v e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  
themselves. Olson ind i ca tes  a t h i r d  type, t h e  vo lun ta ry  organ iza t ion  
t h a t  i s  n o t  p ro tec ted by coerc ive  power and does n o t  a f f o r d  i n d i v i d u a l  
s e l e c t i v e  bene f i t s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  a mat ter  o f  degree; the  l e s s  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l  s e l e c t i v e  benef i ts  a re  ava i l ab le ,  the  more the  organ iza t ion  
encounters grave problems of commitment, leadersh ip  and dec is ion  making . 
So much so t h a t  Mancur Olson expects i t  t o  have d i f f i c u l t j e s  i n  pro-  
ducing any c o l l e c t i v e  good a t  a l l .  
According t o  Olson, when the re  i s  no coerc ion and no s e l e c t i v e  
i n d i v i d u a l  bene f i t s ,  a group i s  going t o  be bothered by f ree - r i de r  
problems. Each member w i l l  expect t o  be ab le  t o  enjoy the  pub1 i c  
benef i ts  created by the  o thers  w i thou t  anyone n o t i c i n g  whether o r  n o t  
he puts  i n  h i s  b i t .  I f  t he re  i s  a d i f f e rence  between b i g  and small 
stake holders, t he  l a t t e r  w i l l  tend t o  blackmail  t he  former, th reaten ing 
t o  withdraw and so ga in ing  a pa ra l yz ing  veto power over the  whole group. 
Leadership i s  thwarted; even on the  p r i n c i p l e  of a hundred percent par-  
t i c i p a t i o n ,  endless bargain ing b locks the  decis ions o f  endless commit- 
tees. Such a group has a problem even t o  r a i s e  funds f o r  i t s  minimum 
organ iza t ion  cos ts  and must be judged t o  be s p e c i a l l y  f r a g i l e  and espec- 
i a l  l y  vu lnerab le .  t o  i n t e r n a l  d issension.  
The f i r s t  s tep  towards a  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h i s  k i n d  o f  o rgan iza t i on  when 
t r y i n g  t o  c o l l e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  and prevent secessions i s  t o  draw a  c l e a r  boun- 
dary around members aga ins t  t h e  ou ts ide  world, p a i n t i n g  the  l a t t e r  as a  co r rup t  
and nas ty  place. second, i t  w i l l  need t o  keep t h e  hundred per cent  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r u l e  so as t o  prevent any one member from seeming t o  reap 
more b e n e f i t s  than t h e  o thers  and so c r e a t i n g  d iscord .  We can supple- 
ment Olson by adding t h a t  t h e  o rgan iza t i on  works b e t t e r  i f  an ambit ious 
power-hungry member i s  s a i d  t o  revea l  those very  c o r r u p t  tendencies which 
make t h e  ou ts ide  wor ld  so th rea ten ing .  Being comni t t e d  by i n t e r n a l  po l  it- 
i c a l  needs t o  make a  v i r t u e  o f  e q u a l i t y ,  t h i s  o rgan iza t i on  w i l l  be l e d  t o  
associate ambi t ion w i t h  i n e q u a l i t y ,  c o r r u p t  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  and t h e  inhu-  
mane machinations o f  t h e  ou ts ide  wor ld.  So long as t h e r e  are  no i n t e r n a l  
c r i ses ,  t h i s  i s  enough o f  a  shared metaphysic t o  promote l a t e n t  i n t e n t i o n s  
t h a t  t he  o rgan iza t i on  should surv ive .  But t h i s  vo lun ta ry  o rgan iza t i on  i s  
prone t o  fac t i ona l i sm.  Fac t ion  leaders a re  a  t h r e a t ;  one way t o  con t ro l  
them i s  t o  accuse them o f  treacherous a l l i a n c e  w i t h  the  bad outs ide  world. 
The more the  i n t e r n a l  c r i s e s  heat up, t h e  more i t s u i t s  the  l a t e n t  goals 
o f  t he  o rgan iza t i on  f o r  everyone comnit ted t o  i t  t o  shade t h e i r  eyes, 
s t a r i n g  a t  t h e  hor izon,  s p o t t i n g  there  t h e  s igns o f  conspi racy and cosmic 
d i s a s t e r  which can on l y  be staved o f f  f o r  t he  wor ld  i f  everyone conver ts  
i n t o  t h e  e g a l i t a r i a n  doc t r i nes  o f  t he  sec t .  I n  a  more extreme case, t he  
d i s a s t e r s  on t h e  hor izon j u s t i f y  e x p e l l i n g  the  unpopular f a c t i o n  leader.  
I have done a  s t i n t  o f  f i e l d w o r k  i n  Centra l  A f r i c a  and am f a m i l i a r  
w i t h  i t s  p re -co lon ia l  h i s t o r y  and i t s  processes o f  adaptat ion t o  c o l o n i a l  
r u l e .  Before 1890 caravans o f  i v o r y  and s lave t r a d e r s  over t he  Nyasa 
Region brought p r o s p e r i t y  t o  some and d i s a s t e r  t o  others i n  a  count ry  
l a r g e l y  organized upon the  market type o f  r e c ~ i m e . ~ * ~ ' ~ ~  A f te r  
Pax B r i t t a n i c a  was establ ished,  the re  was an end of r a i d i n g  and a  
beginning of d i s t r i c t  t r i b u n a l s ,  taxes, cash cropping and labo r  
migra t ion ,  a1 1  poor l y  paid economic enterpr ises  compared w i t h  
what had been. The one t h i n g  t h a t  t he  c o l o n i a l  government d i d  n o t  
i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  was who l i v e d  w i t h  whom i n  what v i l l a g e .  But the  
v i l l a g e s  had no f i x e d  assets t o  a t t r a c t  a  permanant core o f  res idents .  
Over and over again, t he  anthropo log is ts  and d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r s r e p o r t e d  
the  h i g h l y  f i s s i l e  na tu re  of t h e  society;  t he  tendency o f  v i l l a g e s  no 
longer threatened by marauders t o  s p l i t  and spread; t h e  p e r i o d i c  and 
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regu la r  thwar t ing  of any l eader ' s  ambi t ion t o  ho ld  h i s  v i l l a g e  together .  
The v i l l a g e s  moved around every decade o r  so. There was no f i x e d  
t e r r i t o r y  whose boundaries the  ancestors can guard o r  centers fo r  t h e i r  
shrines. No f i x e d  land  r i g h t s  were maintained i n  the  s lash and bum 
c u l t i v a t i o n  system; endemic t s e t s e  f l y  would k i l l  l i v e s t o c k  and there  
was noth ing  t o  i n h e r i t  t h a t  would cons t ra in  the foo t loose t o  choose t o  
s tay  i n  one v i l l a g e  r a t h e r  than i n  another. The a c t i v e  young men were 
apt  t o  use the  t h r e a t  o f  withdrawal e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  g e t  forgiveness fo r  
any misdeeds. Always t h e  shared b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  i s  good t o  l i v e  i n  a  
stable,  peaceful v i l l a g e  was s t ra ined  by quar re ls  which b u r s t  i n t o  general 
conf lagra t ion  a f t e r  a  succession o f  m i  sfortunes had caused a  w i t ch  t o  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e i r  midst .  The a l leged w i t c h ' s  f r i e n d s  would f i n d  themselves 
i n  a  f a c t i o n  counterpoised aga ins t  the  accusers. The quar re l s  would 
have been f e s t e r i n g  over decades u n t i l  s o l u t i o n  by the  e x i l e  o f  t h e  w i t c h  
o r  t h e  s p l i t t i n g  o f  t he  v i l l a g e .  I n  p r a c t i c e  the  populat ions were 
remarkably s tab le ,  shedding d i s s i d e n t  elements t o  nearby areas and wel- 
coming t h e i r  of fspr ing home i n  the  nex t  generat ion. The an th ropo log is t s '  
m i c r o - p o l i t i c a l  analyses of t h i s  se l f -main ta in ing  process i s  convincing. f.n .34 
U n t i l  I read Olson, I had n o t  seen any general t h e o r e t i c a l  ana lys is  i n  
which the  c e n t r a l  Afr ican predicament and s o l u t i o n  could be inc luded.  
B u t  i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  being w i thout  s t rong selectdve b e n e f i t s  t o  i n -  
duce t h e i r  members t o  bear the  i n s u l t s  and tensions of l i v i n g  together, they 
used the  accusation of w i t c h c r a f t  and t h r e a t  o f  d i s t a n t  dangers t o  solve 
t h e i r  o rgan iza t iona l  problems. I am us ing the  term cosmic p l o t  t o  corres-  
pond t o  w i t c h c r a f t  and sorcery when they are p o l i t i c a l l y  usable ideas. 
The func t i on  of t he  w i t c h  o r  sorceror  i n  t h e  regime t h a t  sees i t s e l f  a t  
r i s k  i n  a  cosmic e v i l  p l o t  i s  d i a m e t r i c a l l y  opposed t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  ancestor 
and t o  t h a t  o f  the  f e t i s h  ho ld ing  leader. The l a t t e r  claims h i s  magic 
powers e x p l i c i t l y  and t h r i v e s  o r  f a i l s  accordi.ng t o  h i s  success i n  j u s t i -  
f y i n g  h i s  claims. The magic i s  an acce lera tor  o f  h i s  des t iny .  I f  
plague and drought s t r i k e  h i s  enemies and spare h i s  f r i ends ,  he w i l l  h imse l f  
c la im  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and he w i l l  have t o  c a r r y  t h e  blame jf h i s  f r i e n d s  
suffer. Un l i ke  f e t i s h  power, bo th  w i t c h c r a f t  and ancestra l  powers are 
a t t r i b u t e d  i n d i r e c t l y  through t h e  working o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  process. The 
ancestor i s  t oo  dead t o  c la im  c r e d i t s  h imse l f  and the  w i t c h  has t o  be a  
l i v e  person v i s i b l y  i n  t h e  t h i c k  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  scene so as t o  be the  
t a r g e t  o f  f a c t i o n a l  abuse. Un l i ke  t h e  ancestor, who mediates t h e  
moral j u s t i c e  o f  heaven o r  i t s  equ iva lent ,  the  w i t c h  i s  d i s t i n c t i v e l y  
a  t r a i t o r ,  a l l i e d  t o  a l i e n  consp i ra tors ,  p l o t t i n g  e v i l  aga ins t '  good 
c i t i z e n s .  Un l i ke  ancestor o r  f e t i s h  holder ,  the  w i t c h  i s  hard t o  i d e n t i f y ,  
masked i n  dece i t .  The idea o f  the ancestors i s  employed by the  c o l l e c t i v i t y  
t o  suppress moral deviance, b u t  t he  idea o f  witches i s  used f o r  f ac t i ona l  
f i g h t i n g .  The p o l i t i c a l  essence o f  t h e  w i t c h  i s  the  outs ide  t h r e a t  which 
he i n s i d i o u s l y  supports. The more t e r r i f y i n g  the  outs ide  th rea t ,  the  
more the  sense o f  f a c t i o n a l  s o l i d a r i t y  and oppos i t ion  i s  re in fo rced .  f .n .35 
B e l i e f s  i n  fe t i shes ,  ancestors and cosmic p l o t s  are here presented, 
each as the  i n d i r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  manipulat ion appropr ia te  t o  a  d i s t i n c t i v e  
k ind  o f  p o l i t i c a l  regime. Each regime animadverts d i f f e r e n t 1  v a t  
post  mortems, inquests and o the r  i n q u i r i e i  i n t o  d i sas te r .  F i r s t ,  t he  
f e t i s h  b e l i e f s  p o i n t  d i r e c t l y  t o  where power i s  a c t u a l l y  located.  
Power i s  n o t  v e i l e d  o r  f r u s t r a t e d  i n  such a regime and the  f e t i s h  theory  
gives i t  such l e g i t i m a t i o n  as i t  needs f o r  i t s  maintenance. Second, the  
ancestor b e l i e f s  uphold a u t h o r i t y  and help t o  channel power t o  l e g i t i -  
mate o f f i c e  holders. A t t r i b u t i n g  deaths and accidents o f  a l l  k inds 
t o  t h e  c o r r e c t i v e  su rve i l l ance  of t h e  dead removes from 1 i v e  o f f i c e -  
holders the  unpopu la r i t y  o f  meting ou t  punishment. Th i rd ,  t h e  cosmic 
p l o t  provides an id iom f o r  b r i ng ing  hidden h o s t i l i t i e s  i n t o  t h e  open. 
A t  one p o i n t  t he  t h r e a t  of being accused con t ro l s  and a t  another p o i n t  
i t  f u e l s  f a c t i o n a l  d iscord,  a l l ow ing  the  soc ia l  u n i t  t o  slough o f f  
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elements i t  cannot conta in  peacefu l ly .  'n '  I n  a1 1 these cases, d i sas te rs ,  
na tu ra l  and man-made, t r i g g e r  the  i n q u i r i e s  which t race  t h e  r e a l  d i s t r i -  
bu t i on  o f  power and i t s  chal lengers.  
Perhaps t h i s  language i s  too  dramatic t o  br idge the  gap between 
anthropological  work and t h e  cu r ren t  bemusement about percept ion o f  
r i s k .  But f e t i s h  power, ancestors and cosmic p l o t  are n o t  more dramatic 
than what we comon ly  read about impending catastrophe o r  the  v i tupera-  
t i o n s  against  t he  dece i t s  o f  t h e  tobacco indus t ry ,  adve r t i s ing  i n t e r e s t s ,  
the  i n d u s t r i a l  m i l i t a r y  complex and the  aggressive p loys o f  t he  nuclear  
i ndus t r i es .  The language o f  c i v i c  c r i t i c i s m  should be dramatic.  
Another reason why t h e  br idge i s  d i f f i c u l t  i s  t h a t  t h i s  s o r t  o f  
ana lys is  takes the  focus o f f  physical  dangers and tu rns  i t inward t o  
the  s t a t e  o f  t r u s t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  Jus t  as we are  being asked t o  
a t tend t o  t h e  phys ica l  dangers on the  horizon, t h i s  argument tu rns  t o  
the  k inds o f  p o l i t i c a l  contests i n  which they are  made t o  f i g u r e .  The 
key p o i n t  i s  t he  way t h a t  na ture  i s  p o l i t i c i z e d  and engages i n  the  l e g i -  
t ima t ion  and de leg i t ima t ion  o f  power. 
I argue t h a t  o rgan iza t ions  which a re  most keenly a l e r t  t o  low prob- 
a b i  1 i ty, h igh  consequence danger a re  re1  i g i o u s  sec ts  and communes (which 
are  n o t o r i o u s l y  .~m i l knn laT ls . t  and a p t  t o  prophecy doom) and a l s o  p o l i t i c a l  
1  obbies , new po l  i t i c a l  movements and pub1 i c  i n t e r e s t  groups. The more 
d i f f i c u l t y  they  have i n  ho ld ing  t h e i r  membership together  and g e t t i n g  
comnon dues paid, t h e  more they  a re  tempted t o  c a l l  i n  cosmic p l o t  as a 
1 ow-cost s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e i r  o rgan iza t i ona l  problems. The d i f f e r e n t  
elements i n  t h e  environmental movement show more o r  l e s s  alarm about t h e  
f u t u r e  o f  t h e  wor ld  accord ing t o  t h e  way t h e i r  o rgan iza t i on  f i t s  be- 
tween t h e  midd le  and t h e  r i g h t  hand column of Table 3. f.n.37 
Table 3 ORGAN I ZAT I ONS 
With Select ive  Benefits Without Se lect ive  Beneffts 
market bureaucracy voluntary group 
1 a tent  preserve ind iv idual  secure in te rna l  survival  of 
goa 1 freedom t o  contract  structure o f  au thor i t y  group 
disasters t o  magnify canpet i t ion t o  support group con- t o  damp d i s s i -  
in terpreted o f  1 eaders t r o l  over ind iv iduals  dence or  c l a r i f y  
fact ions 
1 a tent  secret weaponry puni t ive  universe cosmic p l o t  o r  
cosmic forces betrayal  
accusation leader has l o s t  power group has l o s t  ind iv idual  
c m i  tmen t treachery 
Now we have a r e a l  typo logy  i n  which each o f  t h r e e  l e v e l s  has been 
i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  d i s t i n c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  of moral s o l i d a r i t y  which a re  
requ i red  f o r  ma in ta in ing  t h e  t ype  o f  regime. It seems t o  fo l low t h e  pro-  
gram o f  Durkheimian ana lys i s  t o  which Ouchi 's paper r e f e r s ,  b u t  l ook ing  f o r  
s o c i a l  comnitment i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  scheme ins tead  o f  o n l y  i n  t h e  c lan.  
But i t  adds a c o r r e c t i v e  element t o  Ouchi 's idea o f  t h e  c lan,  s ince  he has 
r a t h e r  i d e a l i s t i c  no t i ons  of what i t  f e e l s  l i k e  t o  be i n  a smal l  group i n  
which a1 1 r o l e s  a r e  ambiguously def ined,  and t h i s  scheme suggests rese rva t i on  
about t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n s  o f  l i v i n g  i n  a un iverse  t h a t  i s  thought  t o  be threatened 
by cosmic p l o t .  The m e r i t  o f  t h e  typo logy  i s  t h a t  w h i l e  i t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
der ived from i n d i v i d u a l  r a t i o n a l  choice c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  i t  a l s o  adds the  c u l -  
t u r a l  dimension which i s  miss ing from approaches t o  r i s k  percept ion from t h e  
c o g n i t i v e  sciences. 
8. CONCLUSION 
To go back t o  t h e  beginning of t h i s  argument, I have now i l l u s t r a t e d  
how i n d i v i d u a l s  t r a n s f e r  t h e i r  dec i s ion  making t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  
which they  l i v e .  I have t r i e d  t o  make a  b r i dge  between o rgan iza t i ona l  
theory  and anthropology, t o  show how d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  organi.zations 
prov ide  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  percept ions o f  t h e i r  members. The 
br idge i s  very  f a u l t y  and weak, b u t  I hope j u s t  i n t e r e s t i n g  enough t o  
be worth f u r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n .  It suggests a  sad predicament. O f  t h ree  
k inds  of o rgan iza t ion ;  one i s  we11 adapted t o  p i c k  up and r e l a y  warnings 
o f  1  ow probabi 1  i t y  , h igh  consequence d i s a s t e r s  because i t s  i n t e r n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  c rea tes  problems which are  hab i tua l  l y  solved by i d e n t i f y i n g  
d i s t a n t  dangers and assoc ia t i ng  them w i t h  la rge-sca le  conspi racy 
w i t h  which one o r  o t h e r  of t h e i r  members may be charged w i t h  co1 l ud ing .  
Unfor tunate ly ,  t he  o the r  two k inds  o f  o rgan iza t ions  a re  f i t t e d  w i t h  
b l i n k e r s  and ear  mu f f l e rs  so t h a t  i t  i s  ext remely u n l i k e l y  t h a t  they 
w i l l  even hear warnings. Why t h r e e ?  Three i s  n o t  t he  l i m i t  
o r  a  magic number. Michael Thompson uses t h r e e o r  f i v e  i n  h i s  typo log ies  
o f  c u l t u r a l  b ias.  It i s  merely  t h a t  these th ree  and combinations the reo f  
have a t t r a c t e d  most o f  t he  t y p o l o g i c a l  t h i n k i n g  i n  o rgan iza t ion  theory,  
w i t h  t h e  t h i r d  l agg ing  f a r  behind the  f i r s t  two i n  t he  a t t e n t i o n  i t  has 
a t t r a c t e d .  Second, t h rae  g ives  enough t o  prov ide  a  l o t  of explanat ion.  
Each of these types of o rgan iza t i on  demands and prov ides i t s e l f  w i t h  
symbolic reinforcement.  Once i t  has produced t h e  cosmological be1 i e f s  
t h a t  can be used t o  main ta in  t h e  form o f  the  regime, t he  e x t r a  degree 
of coherence between i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  be1 i e f s  and ac t i ons  w i  11 r e i n f o r c e  
s t a b i l  i t y .  Any o the r  o rgan iza t ions  t h a t  p rov ide  f u r t h e r  examples o f  
how danger i s  used t o  s t a b i l i z e  soc ia l  systems can be added t o  develop 
the  compari son. 
h e  upshot o f  t h i s  argument i s  t h a t  accept ing r i s k s  i s  p a r t  o f  
accept ing organ iza t ions .  The r i s k  ana lys ts  and r i s k  percept ion psychol- 
o g i s t s  t r y  t o  s t r i p  t h e  idea of acceptable r i s k  f r e e  of p o l i t i c a l  adhesions, 
bu t  t h e  problems of r i s k  percept ion  are  e s s e n t i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l .  Con- 
gresses and par l iaments g i v e  away t h e i r  r i g h t f u l  t e r r i t o r y  when they  
hand over such problems t o  r i s k  exper ts .  The p u b l i c  debates about r i s k  a re  
debates about p o l i t i c s .  They should be read as a s a i l o r  reads t h e  movement 
o f  t h e  s a i l s  t o  know which qua r te r  t h e  wind i s  i n .  To read t h e  r i s k  debate 
would make e x p l i c i t  a need f o r  more t r u s t  here and more watchfulness there .  
T rea t i ng  r i s k  acceptabi 1 i t y  as a techn ica l  quest i o n  d isperses sovereignty.  
Congresses and par l iaments should repossess themselves. Through studyfng 
r i s k  percept ion  as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  e f f e c t ,  t h e  l a t e n t  purposes of t h e  
n a t i o n  as a whole can be pro tec ted .  Studying r i s k  percept ion as an 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o g n i t i v e  exerc ise  conceals t h e  a c t i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u e n t  
elements i n  t h e  na t ion ,  each s o l v i n g  t h e i r  own i n s t i t u t i o n a l  problems 
i n  t h e  name o f  dangers. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  deeper i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  essa.y have l e s s  t o  do 
w i t h  r i s k  percept ion  than w i t h  theo r ies  o f  knowledge, i s  presented 
as a l i n k  between Michael Thompson's essay on decision-making w i t h  
regard t o  dangers f rom l i q u i d  n a t u r a l  gas and James Douglas's essay on 
how a p l u r a l i t y  of op t ions  are  funnel l e d  i n t o  t h e  form of coherent 
choices through the  p o l i t i c a l  process. Parl iaments and v o t i n g  are 
c e r t a i n  k inds  of f i 1 t e r s  on pol  i t i c a l  percept ion.  Organizat ional  
s t ruc tu res  are o the r  k inds again and i t  b e f i t s  t h e  20th century  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  promises t o  reach self-consciousness f o r  us t o  be aware 
o f  these funnels and b l  inders  t h a t  we ourselves create.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent ly  C a l i f o r n i a  and t h e  United Kingdom have approved 
si tes f o r  L iquef ied  Energy G a s  (LEG) t e rmina l s .  I n  t h i s ,  and per-  
haps t h i s  a lone ,  t hey  are t h e  same. A f t e r  a long drawn-out pro- 
cess i n  which it proved imposs ib le  t o  approve any of t h e  proposed 
sites C a l i f o r n i a  f i n a l l y ,  w i th  t h e  h e l p  of a new s t a t u t e  passed 
e x p r e s s l y  f o r  t h e  purpose,  w a s  a b l e  t o  g i v e  approva l  f o r  an LEG 
f a c i l i t y  a t  t h e  r emotes t  of a l l  t h e  sites on t h e  l i s t  of  poss i -  
b les--Point  Conception. C a l i f o r n i a  S t a t e  S t a t u e  1081 r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  w i t h i n  one m i l e  of  t h e  per imenter  of t h e  si te ,  t h e  popula- 
t i o n  should n o t  exceed 10 persons  t o  t h e  square  m i l e ,  and t h a t  
w i t h i n  f o u r  m i l e s  of t h e  s i te ,  t h e  d e n s i t y  should n o t  exceed 60 
persons  t o  t h e  square  m i l e .  Moreover, t h e s e  s t i p u l a t i o n s  a l s o  
apply t o  t h e  t a n k e r s  l aden  wi th  l i q u e f i e d  gas ,  which may be con- 
ce ived  of as mobile sites c a r r y i n g  t h e i r  zones w i th  them as t hey  
make t h e i r  approach t o  t h e  t e r m i n a l  o r  s h e l t e r  o f f - sho re  wa i t i ng  
f o r  calmer weather  b e f o r e  docking. 2 
Scot land  has  a longe r  c o a s t l i n e  t han  C a l i f o r n i a  and most of 
t h e  count ry  i s  ve ry  s p a r s e l y  populated (less t han  25  persons  t o  
t h e  square  m i l e )  , and y e t  t h e  approved s i t e ,  a t  Mossmorran and 
Braefoot  Bay on t h e  F i r t h  of For th ,  l ies  w i t h i n  t h e  most dense ly  
populated p a r t  of t h e  e n t i r e  count ry  (wi th  a  popula t ion  d e n s i t y  
of between 250 and 500 persons pe r  square  m i l e ) .  Moreover, l aden  
t anke r s  w i l l  pass  w i t h i n  a m i l e  o r  s o  of Burn t i s l and  (an indus- 
t r i a l  town.) and sometimes wi th  fou r  m i l e s  of Edinburgh--the cap i -  
t a l  c i t y  of  Scot land:  I f  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  s i t i n g  cr i ter ia  ( exp l i c -  
it i n  S t a t u t e  1081) w e r e  t o  be app l i ed  t o  t h e  S c o t t i s h  case it 
would be q u i t e  impossible  t o  approve t h e  Mossmorran/Braefoot Bay 
s i te ,  and i f  t h e  United Kingdom cr i te r ia  ( i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  Moss- 
morran/Braefoot Bay approval)  w e r e  t o  be app l i ed  t o  t h e  Ca l i fo r -  
n i a n  case, any of t h e  suggested sites could be approved, which 
means t h a t  t h e  t e rmina l  would go t o  t h e  f i r s t  s i t e  t o  be sug- 
gested--Los Angeles harbor .  
What does t h i s  l i t t l e  comparison t e l l  us? It t e l l s  us  
hard ly  anyth ing  about  what t h e  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  LEG r e a l l y  
are, b u t  it t e l l s  u s  q u i t e  a  l o t  about  B r i t i s h  and American 
s o c i e t y .  What I wish t o  argue is  t h a t  w e  need n o t  be dismayed 
by t h i s .  Q u i t e  t h e  r eve r se :  it i s  t h e  s o c i a l ,  n o t  t h e  physi- 
c a l ,  unders tanding t h a t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  l e a d  u s  t o  more e f f e c t i v e  
ways of  handl ing t echno log ica l  r i sk - - e spec ia l ly  i n  t hose  in -  
s t a n c e s  where, t r y  a s  w e  may, w e  simply cannot  g a i n  t h e  physi- 
cal unders tanding w e  d e s i r e .  
THREE DIFFEAENCES BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 
The B r i t i s h  approach t o  occupat iona l  r i s k  i s  set  o u t  
i n  t h e  Heal th  and Sa fe ty  a t  Work Act. Here it i s  q u i t e  
e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  a b s o l u t e  s a f e t y  i s  u n a t t a i n a b l e  
and t h a t ,  i n e v i t a b l y ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s a f e t y  w i l l  t a k e  
p l a c e  a g a i n s t  a background of t r a d e - o f f s  between r i s k s  
and b e n e f i t s .  I n  t h e  t e x t  of t h e  act t h e  phrase  " rea-  
sonably p r a c t i c a b l e , "  though never de f ined ,  occurs  s i x  
t imes.  By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  Occupational  
S a f e t y  and Heal th  Adminis t ra t ion  (OSHA) is  charged wi th  
t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  ensur ing  "a s a f e  workplace." 
I m p l i c i t  i n  such a term of r e f e r e n c e  i s  t h e  g o a l  of 
zero  r i s k .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  approach t o  r i s k  high- 
l i g h t  a  p o l a r i t y  between compromise and n e g o t i a t i o n ,  
on t h e  one hand, and i n t r a n s i g e n c e  and s t e a d f a s t n e s s ,  
on t h e  other--a c o n t r a s t  t h a t  i s  sometimes given 
expres s ion  i n  terms of a g r o s s  c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e  
between B r i t a i n  and t h e  United S t a t e s :  Consensus 
C u l t u r e  v s  Adversary  C u l t u r e .  
B ~ t h  B r i t a i n  and t h e  United S t a t e s  have s p e c i a l i z e d  
agenc ies  charged wi th  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  s a f e  
o p e r a t i o n  of nuc l ea r  power p l a n t s .  The i r  very  names-- 
t h e  Nuclear I n s t a l l a t i o n s  I n s p e c t o r a t e  ( N I I )  i n  B r i t a i n  
and t h e  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s - -h in t  a t  a s t y l i s t i c  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  
handl ing  of t h e  r i s k s  i n  h igh  technology.  I n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  t h e  NRC l ooks  t o  see what might go wrong, 
looks  t o  see what should be done ( i n  eng inee r ing  terms) 
t o  p reven t  t h a t  from going wrong, and then  tries t o  
w r i t e  a r e g u l a t i o n  ( i n  l e g a l i s t i c  language) which w i l l  
p r even t  it from going wrong. I n  t h e  comparable N I I  
t h e  B r i t i s h  i n s p e c t o r s  go around t h e  p l a n t s  (and,  be fo re  
t h a t ,  t h e  des igns  f o r  t h e  p l a n t s )  and look t o  see what 
might go wrong. They t h e n  t a l k  ( i n  eng inee r ing  language) 
w i th  t h e  r e s i d e n t  eng inee r s  (and, be fo re  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  
d e s i g n e r s  of t h e  p l a n t s )  and work o u t  w i t h  them what 
needs t o  be done t o  p reven t  it from going wrong. Much 
of  t h i s  p roces s  i s  "off  t h e  recordt '  and no s t a t u t o r y  
r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  d r a f t e d .  So i n  B r i t a i n  t h e  p roces s  
remains p r e t t y  i n a c c e s s i b l e  t o  anybody who does n o t  
speak t h e  eng inee r ing  language. I n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
t h e  p roces s  i s  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  anyone ( o r ,  a t  leas t ,  t o  
anyone wi th  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  t i m e ,  f i n a n c i a l  r e sou rces ,  
and educa t ion )  and almost  every  r e g u l a t i o n  g e t s  cha l -  
lenged i n  t h e  c o u r t s .  The consensus c u l t u r e  i s  pre- 
pared t o  t o l e r a t e  some c l o s u r e  w h i l s t  t h e  adversary  
c u l t u r e  demands openness,  and t h i s  p o l a r i t y ,  by t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  weigh ts  it g i v e s  t o  i n s p e c t i o n  and regula -  
t i o n ,  r e s u l t s  i n  two very  d i f f e r e n t  s t y l e s  of  r i s k -  
handl ing:  t h e  C o n s u l t a t i v e  S t y l e  u s  t h e  S t a t u t o r y  
S t y l e .  3 
3.  The p o l i t i c a l  regime4--the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e a d e r  
and led- -a l so  v a r i e s  a s  w e  go from B r i t a i n  t o  t h e  
United S t a t e s  and i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  
ways t h a t  B r i t i s h e r s  and Americans ex tend  c r e d i b i l i t y  
t o  t h e i r  e x p e r t s .  When, a f t e r  due d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  t h a t  
augus t  body t h e  Royal College of  Phys ic ians  announced 
t h a t  smoking was harmful t o  h e a l t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  popu- 
l a c e ,  by and l a r g e ,  be l i eved  them. This  i s  n o t  t o  
say  t h a t  they  gave up smoking; on ly  t h a t  t hey  t r u s t e d  
t h e  e x p e r t s .  But when t h e  medical  p r o f e s s i o n  i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  made t h e  same announcement t h e  r e a c t i o n  
of many a  c i t i z e n  w a s  t h a t  t h e  d o c t o r s  had d iscovered  
y e t  another  way of screwing more money o u t  of them. 
America, it would seem, goes i n  f o r  "bottom up" l eade r -  
s h i p  i n  which a t r u c u l e n t  populace i s  f o r e v e r  blowing 
t h e  w h i s t l e  on i t s  government. B r i t a i n  (and many o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  Western Europe) goes i n  f o r  " top  down" 
l e a d e r s h i p  i n  which a  d e f e r e n t i a l  populace a l lows  govern- 
ment t o  blow t h e  w h i s t l e  on groups o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  who 
are seen a s  g e t t i n g  o u t  o f  democrat ic  l i n e .  This  cu l -  
t u r a l l y  induced d i f f e r e n c e  i n  consent--strong l i nkage  
i n  B r i t a i n  and weak l i nkage  i n  t h e  United States--places  
very  d i f f e r e n t  limits on where l e a d e r  and l e d  can go 
and s t i l l  remain l i nked  t o  one another  and it r e s u l t s  
i n  a c o n t r a s t  between two d i s t i n c t i v e  s t y l e s  of demo- 
cracy:  T o p  Down v s  Bottom Up. 
These t h r e e  examples t a k e  u s  a l l  t h e  way from c u l t u r e  o r ,  
r a t h e r ,  c u l t u r a l  b i a s e s  ( t h e  p a t t e r n s  i n  which shared  va lues  a r e  
arranged)  through i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  s t y l e s  of r i sk-handl ing  ( t h e  
way people  come t o  a c t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n  accordance wi th  t h o s e  pa t -  
t e r n s )  t o  p o l i t i c a l  regime ( t h e  s o r t  of r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
government and governed t h a t  t ends  t o  s u s t a i n  those  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  are c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  c u l t u r a l  b i a s e s  of  t h e  governed and 
t ends  t o  l e t  drop those  t h a t  are n o t ) .  Now f o r  t h e  $64,000 
ques t ion .  Why i s  B r i t i s h  c u l t u r e  consensual  and American cu l -  
t u r e  a d v e r s a r i a l ;  w h y  do t h e  B r i t i s h  f avor  a  c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e  
f o r  r i sk-handl ing  and t h e  Americans a s t a t u t o r y  one; w h y  i s  
democracy Top Down on one s i d e  of  t h e  A t l a n t i c  and Bottom Up 
on t h e  o t h e r  (see Figure  1 ) ? 
Usual ly ,  when people  stumble i n a d v e r t e n t l y  upon momentous 
q u e s t i o n s  such as t h e s e ,  they  throw up t h e i r  arms i n  h o r r o r  and 
Figure 1. Some Contrasts between British and American Society 
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scurry off to see what Durkheim, or Marx, or Freud, or Adam 
Smith have to say on the subject. My own preferred intellec- 
tual refuge, when I find myself in this sort of situation, is 
the great landscape gardener Lancelot (Capability) Brown. "Con- 
front the object," he said, "and draw high obliquely.'' As 
you turn in through the gates of a park that has been landscaped 
by Capability Brown, there, confronting you in the distance, is 
the stately home that is the object of your journey. But then 
the carriageway veers away and, losing all sight of your objec- 
tive, you are carried off through glades and valleys, past lakes 
and over bridges, until, all of a sudden, you pop up over some 
artful undulation and there it is--right beside you. So having 
confronted my object--the sorts of differences that exist between 
advanced industrialized societies--let me draw nigh by way of a 
detour so oblique as to take in the simple and largely pastoral 
peoples who long ago established themselves in the remote Hima- 
layan valleys of Nepal. 
THE OBLIQUE APPROACH 
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The Sherpas of Khumbu--the high valley below Mount Everest-- 
have long engaged in the risky business of Himalayan trade and, 
indeed, they actually moved into this previously uninhabited 
region in order to take advantage of the trading possibilities 
that it offered. They have carried on this business in an adven- 
turous and individualistic way and, in recent years, they have 
extended these same social techniques to the opportunities offered 
by the development of mountaineering and tourism. 
USA 
ADVERSARY 
STATUTORY 
BOTTOM UP 
Himalayan t r a d e  and mountaineering a r e  of i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  
s t u d e n t  of r i s k  f o r  t h r e e  reasons.  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  chee r fu l  
acceptance of a p p a l l i n g  r i s k .  The chances of being k i l l e d  i n  
high s tandard  Himalayan mountaineering a r e  c u r r e n t l y  around one 
i n  s i x  pe r  year ;  n ine  t i m e s  more dangerous, according t o  t h e  
t a b l e s  s o  ass iduous ly  compiled by o c c i d e n t a l  s t u d e n t s  of t h e  
s u b j e c t ,  t han  being p r e s i d e n t  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  Second, 
r i sk-accept ing  communities--the "adventurous t r a d e r s "  a s  they  
have been c a l l e d  - - l i ve  r i g h t  next  door t o  r i sk-averse  communi- 
t i e s - - the  "cau t ious  c u l t i v a t o r s .  "5 In  consequence, t h e  Nepal 
Himalaya provides  a ready-made l abora to ry  f o r  t h e  s tudy  of r i s k ,  
r isk-handling,  and r i sk-percept ion .  Third,  t h e  eager  acceptance 
of r i s k s  t h a t  could  e a s i l y  be avoided sugges t s  t h a t ,  f o r  t h e  
Sherpas,  r i s k  i s  oppor tuni ty .  Risk, con t ra ry  t o  t h e  assump- 
t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  b u i l t  i n t o  many a c u r r e n t  approach, i s  n o t  
always nas ty .  
Since it t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  adventurous t r a d e r s  are a l l  
Buddhists  and t h e  c a u t i o u s  c u l t i v a t o r s  a r e  a l l  Hindus, t h e  
convent ional  an thropologica l  explana t ion  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  
guided i n  t h e i r  choice  between r i sk-accept ing  and r isk-avoiding 
s t r a t e g i e s  by t h e i r  shared va lues  and b e l i e f s - - t h e i r  cu l ture- -  
copes very n i c e l y  wi th  t h e  problem of Himalayan t r a d e .  O r ,  
r a t h e r ,  it looks  a s  i f  it does. Once you s t a r t  asking ques t ions  
about change--about becoming r a t h e r  than j u s t  being--then t h e  
c racks  begin t o  appear.  Do people become adventurous t r a d e r s  o r  
c a u t i o u s  c u l t i v a t o r s  according t o  whether they  a r e  ~ u d d h i s t s  
o r  Hindus o r  do they  become Buddhists o r  Hindus according t o  
whether they a r e  adventurous t r a d e r s  o r  c a u t i o u s  c u l t i v a t o r s ?  
When Himalayan t r a d e  i t s e l f  undergoes change and evolves  t o  
inc lude  Himalayan mountaineering a s  w e l l ,  t h e  c racks  g e t  even 
worse. The European mountaineers accept  e x a c t l y  t h e  same r i s k s  
a s  do t h e  Sherpas,  and t h e i r  s t y l e - - t h e i r  way of handl ing those  
r i s k s - - i s  a l s o  t h e  same, y e t  they  a r e  n e i t h e r  Buddhists  nor  
Hindus. And, s i n c e  n o t  a l l  Europeans go i n  f o r  Himalayan moun- 
t a i n e e r i n g ,  it i s  q u i t e  easy  t o  f i n d  t h e  stay-at-home counter-  
p a r t s  t o  t h e  c a u t i o u s  c u l t i v a t o r s  and they  t o o  a r e  n e i t h e r  Bud- 
d h i s t s  and Hindus. Cu l tu re ,  f a r  from g iv ing  an explana t ion ,  
becomes a way of ducking o u t  of g iv ing  an explana t ion .  
Try, instead, the idea that both an individual's risk- 
handling style and his culture are a function of something 
else--his social context. The Sherpa lives in an atomized 
social world in which the nuclear family is the economic unit 
and in which all sorts of institutions militate against the 
formation of coercive social relationships. The equal property 
rights of men and women, for instance, result in even the rib- 
bons that tie the nuclear family together being very loosely 
knotted. His Hindu neighbor, by contrast, is a member of 
a joint family that is intricately bound together by all 
kinds of tightly knotted rights and obligations, and his most 
important resource of all--land--remains firmly in the control 
of the elderly head of that family. In such a situation there 
is little incentive, or even opportunity, for personal risk- 
taking. Even if he was able to siphon off some capital from 
the commonweal, the risk-accepting individual would be severely 
censured should his risk-taking prove unsuccessful and he lose 
what was rightfully the group's money; nor, if he was successful, 
would he finish up much better off once all his risk-avoiding 
fellows had claimed their share of his reward. In such a tightly 
bound setting the sensible way to handle risks is to avoid all 
those that can be avoided and to share those that can not. 
For the Buddhist, things, though less cozy, are much simpler. 
Since, given his individualized context, there is no one around 
for him to share his risks with he cannot go in for risk-sharing, 
and since this also means that there is no one to insist on 
sharing his rewards, he might as well go in for risk-taking 
should any potentially rewarding opportunities present them- 
selves. Hinduism, by the emphasis it places on the maintenance 
of boundaries and on the necessity of sacrifice, dovetails 
neatly with the group strategy of closing ranks against those 
external risks that can be avoided and of internalizing those 
that can not. Buddhism, on the other hand, in dissolving 
away boundaries and in preaching personal salvation, smoothes 
the way for that particular variety of economic individualism in 
which there are no economies of scale and thereby encourages per- 
sonal risk-accepkance while at the same time discouraging any 
displacement of those risks from one individual onto another. 6 
If we visualize a group dimension running from the highly 
individualized context of the Sherpa to the highly collectivized 
context of his Hindu neighbor, then we can distinguish between 
the cultural biases (such as those that distinguish Buddhists 
and Hindus, or European mountaineers and theirstay-at-home com- 
patriots) and the different styles or risk-handling that accom- 
pany those biases. This approach by way of social context 
accounts, moreover, not only for how the adventurous trader 
and the cautious cultivator are, but also tells us something 
about the sorts of disengagements and reorientations that would 
be entailed in the conversion processes--sanskritization and 
sherpaization7--by which each can become the other. 
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Figure 2. The Group Dimension of Social Context 
But this is far from being the whole story. Whilst this 
diagram may help to clarify many of the interesting things that 
go on in the mysterious East, it does not cope at all well with 
some prominent features of the familiar lest. For instance, the 
Buddhist's style of risk-taking without risk-displacement does 
not line up too well with the sort of risk-shedding that the 
classic entrepreneur can achieve through his relentless exploi- 
tation of any opportunities he can find for economies of scale. 
Nor would it be safe to assume that all bounded social groups 
act so as to internalize those risks that cannot be avoided. In 
other words, though this group dimension copes quite nicely with 
risk-acceptance and risk-avoidance, I still have to provide some 
way of accounting for the alternative modes--displacement and 
sharing--that are available for handling those risks that happen 
to be both unattractive and unavoidable. With this in mind, let 
us now leave the Himalayas and, drawing a little more nigh to 
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our object, look instead at the anti-smoking movement in Britain 
and in the United States. 
Both Britain and the United States have active anti-smoking 
movements,, but the forms they take in the two countries are very ' 
different. Since anti-smoking movements are made up of anti- 
smoking groups, this difference cannot be accounted for in terms 
of the individualized/collectivized dimension that serves to 
separate the Buddhists from the Hindus, and this suggests that 
perhaps there is another social context dimension at right 
angles, as it were, to this group dimension. 
In Britain we could find only three or four anti-smoking 
groups; in the United States we found 41 (not counting the 9 1 inde- 
pendent chapters of GASP--Group Against Smokers1 Pollution). 8 
This imbalance reflects, not a difference in the level of con- 
cern between the two countries (if anything, the concern is 
greater in Britain), but, rather, the distinction between "top 
down" and "bottom up" governance. British ASH (Action on Smoking 
and Health) is the joint creation of the Royal College of Physi- 
cians and the Health Education Council (itself an offshoot of 
the Department of Health and Social Security). United States 
ASH (whose similarity to British ASH ends with the acronym) is 
the creation of one forceful individual-John Banzaf 111-a law 
professor at George Washington University. British ASH, much 
concerned for its respectability, is careful to put a little 
distance between itself and the National Society of Non-Smokers 
(NSNS) with its rather populist approach and its line-up of non- 
conformist churchmen and aging showbiz personalities. United 
States ASH, on the other hand, is not overconcerned about its 
reputation within the government-sponsored National Interagency 
Council on Smoking and Health (NICSH) and maintains amicable and 
informal links with the charismatic (and smoke-allergic) Clara 
Gouin--founder of GASP--and all her far-flung chapters, from 
Anchorage GASP in the north to Albuquerque GASP in the south 
and from Rhode Island's Clear Air Now (CAN) in the east to the 
Fresno Non-Smokers' Liberation Front in the west.. British ASH 
sees its task as but one facet of preventive medicine (the "health 
wellness concept" as it is called in the US); American ASH focuses 
on the single issue of non-smokers' rights--"Sue the Bastards" 
reads the sign on John Banzaf 111's desk. 9 
Though the smoking that the anti-smokers are anti remains 
much the s w e  wherever you are, the anti-smoking movement does 
not. Smoke gets in your eyes wherever there is smoke, but this 
uniformity of nuisance is not reflected in the efforts that are 
directed at doing something about it. British anti-smoking is 
essentially dull--a sober-sided and carefully worded affair; 
American anti-smoking is fun--all ad hoc exuberance and righteous 
razzrnatazz. Or, to put it at its most offensive, anti-smoking 
in Britain is biased toward saving the lives of the poor unfor- 
tunate smokers; anti-smoking in America is biased toward putting 
those filthy despicable people in their place (and serve them 
right if they get cancer!). In Britain, anti-smoking is handed 
down from on high; in America, it sprouts up from the grassroots. 
How does all this fit with the idea of a second dimension to 
social context? The answer, I would argue, is that, even if an 
individual's social context is strongly grouped, the relationships 
that his group involvement provides him with can still vary; they 
can be hierarchical or they can be egalitarian. But, and this is 
the crucial part of the argument, they cannot be a mixture of the 
two. This is because the dynamics of group formation and stabi- 
lization are such that only those incipient groupings that arrange 
things so that their members' relationships are consistent--either 
all hierarchical or all egalitarian--stand much chance of cohering 
and surviving through time. To understand the successes--the 
groups that actually make it--we have to consider the failures-- 
those countless transient and only partly formed eddies in the 
stream of social life that disappear before we are even aware of 
their appearance. 
From all this, it looks as though the processes of group 
formation and group decay are crucial to any global understanding 
of anti-smoking movements. But what if we were to reverse this 
logic and try, instead, to use anti-smoking movements as just a 
means to a much more exciting end: an understanding of the birth 
and death of groups? If we do this we move from something of 
passing concern to something of lasting importance, from a rele- 
vant question to an interesting question, from a low intellectual 
r i s k  t o  a high i n t e l l e c t u a l  r i s k .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h i s  i n v e s t i -  
g a t i o n  has  reached a d e c i s i o n  po in t .  How, as t h e  say ing  goes ,  can 
you s o a r  wi th  t h e  e a g l e s  when you walk wi th  t h e  tu rkeys?  To h e l l  
with t h e  turkeys!  
A HYPOTHESIS 
Only those  groups t h a t  o rganize  themselves ( o r  are them- 
s e l v e s  organized)  s o  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  of t h e i r  members a r e  
l a r g e l y  c o n s i s t e n t - - e i t h e r  q u i t e  s t r o n g l y  b i a sed  toward e q u a l i t y  
o r  e l s e  q u i t e  s t r o n g l y  b i a sed  toward hierarchy--are  l i k e l y  t o  be 
v i a b l e .  
A c o r o l l a r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a long  t h e  e q u a l i t y /  
h i e ra rchy  dimension of  t hose  i n d i v i d u a l s  who s h a r e  a  s t r o n g l y  
p o s i t i v e  group c o n t e x t  w i l l  ( i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  case) be bi-modal. 
This  i s  because most of t hose  i n c o n s i s t e n t  (and, t h e r e f o r e ,  un- 
v i a b l e )  groups t h a t ,  i f  they  were t h e r e ,  would make t h e  d i s t r i -  
bu t ion  uni-modal cannot ,  thanks t o  t h e i r  very  s h o r t  l i fe -expec-  
t a n c i e s ,  be t h e r e .  Rather i n  t h e  way t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  are 
a b l e  t o  form around t h e  modes i n  t h e  v o t e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h a t ,  
pa radox ica l ly  seemingly, t hey  themselves c r e a t e ,  so two funda- 
menta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of groups condense around t h e s e  peaks-- 
s e c t s  around t h e  e q u a l i t y  peak and c a s t e s  around t h e  h i e ra rchy  
peak. 11 
e s  (e .g . ,  B r i t i s h  ASH) 
h i e r a r c h i c a l  
F igure  3 .  Bi-modality and t h e  V i a b i l i t y  of S o c i a l  Groups 
The essential organizational differences between sects and 
castes is that, in the sect, the overriding goal of equality pre- 
cludes any internal differentiation whilst, in the caste, the 
premise of ,inequality ensures a high level of internal differen- 
tiation. l 2  The sect's structure, therefore, has all to be con- 
centrated at its boundary--at the edge of the group--and the 
result is the setting up of a "wall of virtuen which can be seen 
as protecting the soft vulnerable "us" on the inside from the 
nasty predatory "them" on the outside. In contrast to this 
sharp cut-off--this uncompromising rejection of the outside 
world--the caste is able smoothly to transfer the same clearly 
defined patterns of rankings and interrelationships that charac- 
terize its internal organization across its boundary and onto 
the wider society of which it is a part. The members of a caste, 
therefore, do not reject the outside world; they take up a clearly 
specified and carefully negotiated position within it. In con- 
sequence, truculence--distrust of outside, lack of compromise, 
and resistance to negotiation--is built into the sect whilst 
deference--the subordination of the parts to the whole, the 
respect for proper channels and correct procedures, and nego- 
tiation aimed at clarifying rank and position--is part and 
parcel of the processes that maintain caste. 
The evidence from anti-smoking suggests that, in the United 
States, the distribution along the equality/hierarchy dimension 
is strongly skewed in the egalitarian direction and that in Bri- 
tain, it is strongly skewed in the hierarchical direction. Here, 
in the divergent forms taken by a movement :that is only a 
few years old, we see the imprint of more than two centuries of 
history. Having thrown off the hierarchical colonial yoke, the 
youthful American Republic saw to it that sectism was built into 
its Constitution. And, since that Constitution was built to 
last, this sectist bias in American life remains as strong (some 
would say stronger) today as it was then. As Hunter Thompson 
has nicely put it: Those who believe that George I11 is still 
alive and living somewhere in South America are always with us! 13 
If the process of social life, be it American social life 
or British social life, is continually throwing up both sects 
and castes, then the persistence of the American regime--the 
robustness of constitution and constituency--has to be seen as 
something quite remarkable. And the same applies to the British 
regime that has similarly persisted around its hierarchical 
skewing. How, in the midst of so much movement, have they 
managed to stay in roughly the same places? How are incipient 
sects nipped in the bud in Britain, and how are emergent castes 
knocked on the head in the United States? And how is it that as 
this happens, over and over again, there are not ever-growing 
masses of disaffected citizens resentful of being either nipped 
in the bud or knocked on the head and anxious to withdraw their 
consent from the regimes that did this to them? How, in other 
words, is the switch from sect to caste rewarded under the one 
regime and penalized under the other? And how might subtle 
changes in these patterns of reward and penalty lead to the 
transformation of one regime into the other? 
Lest all this seems a very far cry from the practical busi- 
ness of risk management, and from such real-world problems as 
LEG terminal sitings, let me now place my cards on the table. 
DESCRIPTION, PRESCRIPTION, and TRANSPLANTATION 
Even a cursory international comparison will reveal that 
the same risks get handled differently in different countries; 
that there are different institutionalized styles of risk-handling. 
But institutions are not just there; they have to be legitimated-- 
they have to be credible to the populace (or, at least, to the 
influential sectors of the populace). This means that institu- 
tionalized style can exist (and continue to exist) only if there 
is some stability--some repeatability--in the relationship between 
institution and individual. In other words, institutionalized 
styles presuppose stabilizable social regimes. 
When a government department sponsors a research project 
based upon the comparative method it has two aims in mind: 
first, to discover how things are done in other countries; 
second, to discover whether, in the light of this new understand- 
ing, it could perhaps do things better in its own country. That 
is, first there is description, then there is (or, tather, there 
should be) p r e s c r i p t i o n .  The p o i n t  I wish t o  make i s  t h a t  if 
you have n o t  g o t  a  typology of regimes,  you have n o t  g o t  any 
basks f o r  comparison and, i f  you have n o t  g o t  any way of re- 
l a t i n g  o n e ' c a s e  s tudy  t o  another ,  you cannot produce any pre- 
s c r i p t i o n s .  O r ,  r a t h e r  ( s i n c e  whoever heard of a r e s e a r c h  
p r o j e c t  n o t  g i v i n g  t h e  c l i e n t  what he asked f o r ) ,  any p re sc r ip -  
t i o n s  you do come up w i t h  w i l l  n o t  be worth t h e  paper on which 
they  are w r i t t e n .  An adequate  theory  of r i sk -hand l ing  s ty l e - -  
a theory  t h a t ,  when app l i ed ,  i s  capable  of gene ra t ing  non-arbi- 
t r a r y  p r e s c r i p t i o n s - - w i l l  have t o  go below t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
l e v e l  and t a k e  account  of s o c i a l l y  induced v a r i a t i o n s  i n  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  pe rcep t ions  o f  r i s k  and i n  i n d i v i d u a l  s t r a t e g i e s  toward 
r i s k .  And, i f  t h a t  i nvo lves  d i g r e s s i o n s  i n t o  Himalayan t r a d e  
and anti-smoking, t o o  bad. 
When w e  look a t  what goes on i n  one count ry  and a t  what goes 
on i n  another  count ry ,  and w e  see t h a t  each has  a  rather n i c e  
l i t t l e  f e a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  has  n o t ,  we t h i n k  t o  ourse lves :  
" cou ldn ' t  we  j u s t  p i ck  up t h e  c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e ,  say ,  from 
B r i t a i n  and p u t  i k  down i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ? "  o r  "cou ldn ' t  we 
t a k e  l o s e r  compensation, s ay ,  from t h e  United S t a t e s  and j u s t  
f i t  it i n t o  B r i t a i n ? "  We are looking f o r  p re sc r ip t ions - -poss ib l e  
ways of making t h i n g s  bet ter- -and t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n  i s  very  tempt- 
ing.  So t h e  b i g  q u e s t i o n  is,  " I s  t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n  p o s s i b l e ? "  
The answer is, "Sometimes it is; sometimes it i s  no t . "  The 
problem then  becomes t o  know when it i s  p o s s i b l e  and when it 
is  n o t  p o s s i b l e ,  and why. Because i f  we knew when something 
could  be t r a n s p l a n t e d  and when it could n o t ,  then and only  then  
could  we do something t o  improve matters. 
I n s t i t u t i o n s  of  a l l  k inds  become e f f e c t i v e  o r  become para- 
l yzed  according t o  whether o r  n o t  t hey  en joy  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  
of t h e  populace ( o r ,  a t  least ,  of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  
populaoe) .  So t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n  w i l l  be e f f e c t i v e  i f  t h e  i n s t i -  
t u t i o n  o r  procedure,  o r  whatever it i s  t h a t  you have picked up 
from one count ry  and want t o  p u t  down i n  another  count ry ,  s t i l l  
con t inues  t o  en joy  c r e d i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  s o i l  
i n t o  which you p u t  it. I f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  w e  p ick  o u t  something 
from B r i t a i n  and t a k e  it and p l a n t  it i n t o  t h e  social  and c u l -  
t u r a l  s o i l  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  ( o r ,  converse ly ,  from t h e  United 
S t a t e s  t o  B r i t a i n ) ,  w i l l  it t a k e  r o o t ?  Before you can answer 
t h a t  ques t ion  you w i l l  have t o  have t h e  metaphorical  e q u i v a l e n t  
of  s o i l  s c i ence  and t h a t ,  I w i l l  argue,  i s  provided by c u l t u r a l  
a n a l y s i s .  
c u l t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  does n o t  t r y  t o  e x p l a i n  v a r i a t i o n s  between 
c o u n t r i e s  i n  terms of t h e  c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  i n  t h e  sense  of 
n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e ,  between them. Its concern i s  n o t  wi th  t h o s e  
g r o s s  c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between c o u n t r i e s  bu t  more wi th  those  
d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  are t o  be found within them--within American 
s o c i e t y ,  w i t h i n  B r i t i s h  s o c i e t y .  For,  as w e l l  a s  c u l t u r a l  con- 
vergence,  t h e r e  i s  c u l t u r a l  divergence.  The former can be cap- 
t u r e d  by t h e  concept  of  national culture; t h e  l a t t e r  by t h e  
less f a m i l i a r  concept  of  cultural bias.14 One B r i t i s h e r  may b i a s  
h i s  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  i n  one d i r e c t i o n ,  another  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  
d i r e c t i o n ,  and s o  on, b u t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  i n  which t h e s e  biases 
are p o s s i b l e  remain t h e  same i n  any c u l t u r e  and t h i s  means t h a t ,  
f o r  comparative purposes ,  we must focus  on d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  
s t r e n g t h s  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e s e  p o s s i b l e  b i a s e s  as w e  go 
from one country  t o  another .  For i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  member o f  an 
e g a l i t a r i a n  group w i l l  t end  t o  b i a s  h i s  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  i n  a 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y  sectist  d i r e c t i o n  w h i l s t  t h e  member of a h i e r a r c h i -  
c a l  group w i l l  t end  t o  b i a s  t h a t  same c u l t u r e  i n  a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  
c a s t e i s t  d i r e c t i o n  (and, as w e  move away from t h e  s t r o n g l y  grouped 
c o n t e x t s  and toward t h e  more i n d i v i d u a l i z e d  ones ,  s o  w e  w i l l  come 
a c r o s s  another  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t i v e  b i a s e s ,  making f i v e  i n  a l l ) .  So 
t h e  c u l t u r a l  b i a s  approach is e s s e n t i a l l y  a comparative method f o r  
t a k i n g  account  of d i f f e r e n c e s  between n a t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  of t h e i r  
d i f f e r i n g  p a t t e r n s  of c u l t u r a l  divergence.  
Take, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  c o n s u l t a t i v e  s t y l e  i n  
t h e  management of nuc lea r  power p l a n t  r i s k .  Could you, i f  you 
thought  it w a s  good i d e a ,  t r a n s p l a n t  t h a t  i n t o  t h e  United 
S t a t e s ?  What c o n d i t i o n s  would have t o  be s a t i s f i e d  f o r  t h a t  
set of procedures-- that  i n s t i t u t i o n - - t o  f l o u r i s h  once it had 
been t r a n s p l a n t e d ?  W e l l ,  t h e r e  would have t o  be t r u s t  i n  expe r t s ,  
and t h e  American regime is  very  much c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  d i s -  
t r u s t  of e x p e r t s .  A t  t i m e s  it i s  almost as i f  be ing  an e x p e r t  
d i s q u a l i f i e s  you from having a say i n  anything.  By c o n t r a s t ,  
t h e r e  i s  i n  Western Europe,and i n  t h e  Sov ie t  Union a s  w e l l ,  a 
very general assumption that the experts are the people to 
handle these things; that you can trust the experts and that 
you must trust the experts, otherwise where would we be? It is 
this strong mutual trust, incidentally (coupled with the hier- 
archical cbdes of noblesse oblige and sacrifice), that renders 
the reverse transplant--loser compensation from the United 
States to Britain--very difficult. There would have to be a 
considerable acceptance of secrecy. The consultative style of 
risk management is not particularly open, but is conducted 
between experts and in technical engineering language, and it 
requires that a lot of talking goes on behind the scenes--a lot 
of candid interchange that if it were all on the record, simply 
would not happen. It would be difficult to make the consulta- 
tive style work in the absence of centralized governmental con- 
trol; it thrives in a climate of clear chains of command and 
well-defined areas of responsibility. l 5  And, then again 
the consultative style requires the qualitative expert use of 
quantitative analysis. Quantitative analysis must be taken with 
a large qualitative pinch of salt, used as just a rough guide to 
indicate where the weak parts of the system are likely to be. 
Otherwise there would be no room for the exercise of that mysteri- 
ous skill sound engineering judgement, and the consultative style 
is all about the exercising of that skill. 
This little (and very incomplete) catalog of favorable con- 
ditions suggests that an institutionalized style of risk-handling 
is a whole package; that it is not just an agglomeration of ele- 
ments but, as it were, a living organism capable of gathering 
itself together and of responding to its environment--absorbing 
into itself new procedures and agencies that are stylistically 
consistent (or can be subtly persuaded to become stylistically 
consistent) and vigorously rejecting those that are not. "Style," 
as Oscar Wilde once remarked, "is the only essential," and the 
decision-maker might well fare better by listening to him than to 
the sweet, but oh so styleless, reasoning of his systems analysts. 
Having reached the point where we understand that risks 
get handled differently in different countries, we need to turn 
to cultural analysis to tell us why. By providing us with a 
typology of regimes--of s t a b i l i z a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between 
government and governed--cultural  a n a l y s i s  g i v e s  us  some pre- 
s c r i p t i v e  gu ide l ines .  Transplan ts  between l i k e  regimes a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  be success fu l ;  t r a n s p l a n t s  between u n l i k e  regimes a r e  
l i k e l y  t o  be unsuccessfu l .  
Nor i s  t h a t  a l l .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  they a r e  unsuccessfu l ,  
t hese  cross-regime t r a n s p l a n t s  w i l l  be a c t i n g  s o  a s  t o  a l t e r  
t h e  s u b t l e  p a t t e r n s  of rewards and p e n a l t i e s  t h a t  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  
h o s t  regime. I n  o t h e r  words, a  s t y l i s t i c a l l y  inappropr i a t e  
t r a n s p l a n t  i s  n o t  j u s t  u s e l e s s ,  it w i l l  make t h i n g s  worse.. .  
un le s s ,  of course ,  your aim i s  n o t  t o  uphold t h e  regime b u t  t o  
t ransform it! O u l t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  (un l ike  systems a n a l y s i s ,  wi th  
its in-built b i a s  of  toadying t o  power) is ,  q u i t e  proper ly ,  s i l e n t  
on whether regimes should be upheld o r  overthrown. A l l  it does 
i s  he lp  us  avoid doing t h e  one when w e  a r e  seeking t o  do t h e  
o t h e r .  
I have gone on a t  some l e n g t h  about c u l t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  because 
of i t s  u n f a m i l i a r i t y  and because of t h e  stress it l a y s  upon two 
key concepts--s tyle  and regime. Within t h e  con tex t  of t h e  posi-  
t i v i s t i c ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  t echnica l -£  i x i n g ,  o b j e c t i v e  kind of systems 
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a n a l y s i s  t h a t  developed dur ing  1960s, " s t y l e "  i s  a  d i r t y  word ; 
and, of course ,  t h e  l a s t  t h i n g  t h e  app l i ed  systems a n a l y s t  wants 
t o  do i s  look t o o  c l o s e l y  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  regime over  
which h i s  c l i e n t  ho lds  sway. Applied systems a n a l y s i s  has ,  over  
t h e  yea r s ,  been con ten t  t o  d e f i n e  i t s  c l i e n t  a s  a  person who 
wie lds  " l e g i t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y " ;  c u l t u r a l  a n a l y s i s  goes beyond 
t h i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  dynamic b a s i s  f o r  t h t l e g i t i m a c y .  
So much f o r  t h e  deeper  impl i ca t ions  of t h i s  c u l t u r a l  ap- 
proach; l e t  m e  now conclude by o u t l i n i n g  t h e  remaining t h r e e  
b i a s e s  t h a t  complete t h e  a n a l y t i c  framework, and by g iv ing  a  
l i t t l e  example of t h e  way t h i s  framework, when app l i ed ,  g ives  
us  some kind of handle on s o c i a l  regimes. 
THE FRAMEWORK 
Not f o r  one moment do I wish t o  sugges t  t h a t  American 
s o c i e t y  i s  composed almost e n t i r e l y  of sects and B r i t i s h  so- 
c i e t y  almost e n t i r e l y  of c a s t e s .  A l l  I am saying i s  t h a t  i n  
t h o s e  r e a c h e s  o f  American and B r i t i s h  l i f e  where bounded s o c i a l  
groups predominate ,  this contrast is valid. But this still leaves 
undescribed all those reaches of both American and British life 
in which groups are not predominant. An adequate comparison 
will have to take some account of what is simultaneously going 
on in these reaches as well. So the question we have to ask is: 
"What happens to this bi-modal distribution when the strongly 
grouped condition is progressively relaxed?'' 
Relaxing the strongly grouped condition means being less 
stringent about the boundedness of the group--moving toward 
what are called "open-ended groups," for instance, or tolerating 
some borderline or, perhaps, part-time members. Such relaxa- 
tions will immediately result in a decrease in consistency in 
the kinds of relationships that the group supplies to its members. 
In other words, the bi-modality of the distribution will be 
eroded and, as the relaxation proceeds (and assuming no new 
countervailing forces intervene), so the' distribution will gra- 
dually fill in toward the middle until finally it becomes uni- 
modal. 
But somewhere along this line, other countervailing forces 
do begin to intervene. As group affiliations decay, so the oppor- 
tunities for individuals to construct persona l  ne tworks  increase. 
Unlike a bounded social group, whose membership remains the same 
no matter which individual is chosen as the initial reference 
point, a personal network is ego-focused. This means that the 
network of the rather ineffecive individual who finds himself 
indirectly related to some forceful and energetic entrepreneur 
is not at all the same as that of his successful patron (nor is 
it the same as those of the individuals through whom he estab- 
lishes his linkage to his patron). The former is a pathetic 
little thing--just himself out at one end of a long chain that 
ends at the patron; the latter is an impressive and balanced 
affair with the patron sitting at the center of a whole array 
of radiating linkages culminating in a dense encircling fringe 
of ineffectuals. Our particular ineffectual, therefore, is p e r i -  
pheral  and one among many; his patron is c e n t r a l  and u n i q u e .  17 
But this network-building process does not automatically 
cut in the moment the strongly grouped condition is relaxed. 
Personal networks can really get going only if the forceful 
individual can obtain some sort of purchase on those whom he 
wishes to make (in varying degrees) peripheral to him, and such 
a purchase is possible only when opportunities exist for econo- 
mies of scale. Once such opportunities exist, however, networks 
will proliferate throughout the individualized social fabric. 
The result is a pattern that, though generated entirely from the 
processes of network-building, has one thing in common with the 
pattern that is generated by the altogether different processes 
of group dynamics--it is bi-modal. 
It is not too easy to see what is going on in all this net- 
work proliferation. Unlike groups, which have clear boundaries 
and remain the same no matter which individual we happen to 
choose as our initial point of reference, networks interpene- 
trate one another in an apparently chaotic way and, to make 
matters worse, there is a different network for every single 
individual. The chaos is only apparent, however, and individuals 
do become sorted out according to whether they enjoy network  
c e n t r a l i t y  or network  p e r i p h e r a l i t y .  Those inconsistent cases-- 
individuals central to some networks and peripheral to others-- 
that, if present, would make the distribution uni-modal are ren- 
dered unviable by the requirement that social relationships 
must always to some extent be transitive. Again, this bi-modal 
distribution (along the central/peripheral dimension, this time) 
is best advanced as a hypothesis. Though it is possible to pro- 
vide theoretical arguments to support this hypothesis, empirical 
ones are simpler and carry more conviction. How, for instance, 
if this bi-modality was absent would we in the West have been 
able to perceive those recurrent regularities t h e  b o u r g e o i s i e  
and t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t ?  And how, on the other side of the globe, 
would the New Guinea Highlanders have been led to denominate two 
fundamental categories of social beings--Big Men and Rubbish 
Men? 
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Figure 4. Progressively Relaxing the Strongly Grouped 
Condition (the relaxation runs from right 
to left) 
But one more step is needed before we can express these con- 
sequences of relaxing the strongly grouped condition in terms of 
a second dimension of social context. At present, though the 
three different distributions in Figure 4 are laid out at right- 
angles to the individualized/group axis, each has its own dimen- 
sion. At the strongly grouped condition the bi-modality of 
castes and sects is revealed by the hierarchy/equality dimension, 
at the strongly individualized condition the bi-modality of 
ineffectuals and entrepreneurs is revealed by the peripherality/ 
centrality dimension, and at the relaxed condition the yet-to- 
be labeled uni-modality is revealed by a dimension that is still 
undefined. All these distributions, I will argue, can be mapped 
onto just one dimension--a dimension that expresses the extent 
to which an individual has the scope to open up options for him- 
self or, conversely, finds that options are closed off to him. 
For instance, at the strongly individualized condition, the 
ineffectual finds that his scope to form network relationships 
with other individuals is severely constricted. Wherever he 
turns he finds himself hemmed in by the ramifying networks of 
other, more successful, individuals. The vast personal networks 
of the Big Man result in the preemption of most of the relation- 
ships that, at first glance, appear available to the Rubbish 
Man. So it is not simply that the Big Man finds his options open 
and the Rubbish Man finds them closed; the Big Man, in his coer- 
cive exuberance, is actually opening up options for himself and, 
in the process, closing them for the Rubbish Man. So we can say 
that the Rubbish Man is subject to a high level of prescription, 
in that his freedom to form network relationships is severely 
restricted, whilst the Big Man is not just free from prescrip- 
tions but is actually prescribing. If we use prescription as 
the dimension onto which the peripherality/centrality distribu- 
tion can be mapped, then the ineffectual emerges with a strongly 
positive score, the entrepreneur with a strongly negative score, 
and the zero point on the scale (corresponding to the absence 
of both prescription and prescribing) turns out, not surprisingly 
in view of all the network-formation that is going on, to be only 
sparsely and transiently inhabited. 
At the strongly grouped condition, the hierarchy/equality 
distribution similarly maps onto the prescription axis. Within 
the egalitarian group--the sect--there is no internal differen- 
tiation and, in consequence, no obstacle to interpersonal rela- 
tionships and transactions. But this picture-in which there 
is no preemption, no closure of options--changes dramatically 
once the boundary of the group is reached. Here the members of 
the group act in concert to reject the outside world. Their 
freely proliferating relationships suddenly stop dead at this 
line, and all relationships with those beyond the wall of virtue 
are preempted. So the members of a sect are not just free from . 
prescription; they actually maintain themselves by prescribing. 
Like the entrepreneur, they score strongly negative on the pre- 
scription dimension. 
By contrast, the members of a caste voluntarily submit 
themselves to all manner of prescriptions. Rank, gradation 
separation, interrelation, and completeness are the qualities 
that have to be preserved and sharpened if any hierarchical 
arrangement of groupings is to successfully perpetuate itself. 
Whether it be the dietary observances of the Hindu silversmith 
or the tea-tray niceties of the senior British civil servant, 
there can be no doubt that it is prescription that maintains 
the caste member in his appointed station. 
One interesting consequence of mapping the results of both 
group dynamics and network formation onto this single dimension 
of prescription is that as one goes from right to left--from the 
strongly grouped condition to the strongly individualized con- 
dition--~~ the power axis is reversed. In great empires it is 
the hierarchs who wield the power and the poor little sects 
(like the early Christian church or the Mennonites) that find 
themselves persecuted. But, in those more individualized social 
reaches that generate the trade that follows the imperial flag, 
it is the entrepreneur who exercises power over his un-unionized 
"hands." To avoid the complexities of a third dimension, we can 
represent this right-to-left reversal of the power gradient by 
drawing in two diagonals on our picture--a positive diagonal 
that links the centers of power, the castes and the entrepre- 
neurs, and a negative diagonal that links the centers of impo- 
tence, the sects and the ineffectuals. 
At the crossover point these diagonals form a saddle- 
point--a flattening out at the midway position between power 
and impotence, between prescription and prescribing, and between 
the strongly grouped and strongly individualized conditions. 
And this ccossover point, with its zero scores on the power, pre- 
scription, and group axes, corresponds to the still unlabeled 
peak on the remaining--the uni-modal--distribution. We can 
now see that this single peak forms a sort of absolute zero-- 
a stationary point at which 'both the forces of group dynamics 
and the pressures of network formation are stilled. So 'this 
depicts the rather tenuous social equilibrium attained by 
those truly autonomous individuals--Himalayan hermits, New 
York taxi-drivers, British owner-driver haulage contractors-- 
who successfully resist all coercive social involvement. So, 
with this fifth cultural bias--the autonomist's--mapped onto the 
prescription axis, the analytic framework in now complete. 18 
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Figure 5. The Analytic Framework 
AN APPLICATION: TWO RISK DEBATES COMPARED 
This analytic framework is a tool for disaggregating indi- 
viduals and for interpreting a debate in terms of the pattern 
of disaggregatian. Such an interpretation allows us to uncover 
the social processes that, working sometimes towards stability 
and sometimes towards instability, cause the debate to develop 
in one way rather than in another. But, though these processes 
begin and end with individuals, they are also modified by public 
policy. Public policy is something that happens at one remove 
from the individual--it is the product of social and cultural 
institutions. More specifically, the social and cultural insti- 
tutions that we call "government" are the means by which the 
debate is modified. 
Because the debate takes place right there in the mid- 
ground, as it were, between populace and government it provides 
the key to understanding the relationship between individual and 
institution; we can identify three clear levels which, in order 
of increasing exclusiveness and control, are p o p u l a c e ,  d e b a t e ,  
and g o v e r n m e n t .  The question we want to anmr is: "When it 
comes to the matter of risk, who gets to talk about it and, 
out of those who get to talk about it, who gets to be listened 
to?" According to the democratic (or Benthamite) ideal, all 
three levels are concentric--each is a miniature version of the 
one below--and the debate is the mediating mechanism by which 
government accedes to and implements the wishes of the populace. 
In practice government, to a considerable extent, goes it own 
way--"you can fool all of the people some of the time, some of 
the people all of the time. . . 1119 
So, in practice, the three levels are not concentric. The 
composition of each is skewed from that of the one below; the 
debaters are drawn predominantly from certain social contexts 
and hardly at all from others; in turn, government, in formu- 
lating policy, pays more heed to some of these contradictory 
counsels than it does to others. The attraction of the cultural 
bias approach is that it allows us to steer a precise course 
between the Scylla of insisting that everyone is the same and the 
Charybdis of insisting that every individual must be treated as 
a special case. By enabling us to recognize five distinct kinds 
of social individual it provides us with some sort of methodolo- 
gical grip on the skewing of the three levels. 20 
To put it another way, the paradoxes of social choke, by 
their insistence that these three levels cannot be concentric, 
suggest that skewing (of one kind or another) is only to be ex- 
pected in any workable arrangement--in any realizable regime. 
So this three-tiered system, when mapped out in tenns of the 
five cultural biases, allows us to describe the different 
workable varieties of Arrow's celebrated "machine" into which 
citizens feed their preferences at one end and out of which, at 
the other end, the best social choice is produced. 21 since 
Arrow's Theorem proves that it would be impossible for the 
machine to do this if it swallowed and digested all the indi- 
vidual preferences, there will have to be some fairly well- 
disguised rejection mechanism--the machine will have to quietly 
secrete, somewhere along the line, those preference orderings 
that it is incapable of processing. The analytic framework in 
terms of cultural biases enables us to pinpoint these secretions 
and to identify different social regimes according to the dif- 
ferent ways in which those secretions are patterned. 
When we look at nuclear power debates in the United States 
we find that three cultural biases are strongly represented. 
The entrepreneurs (in the shape of the utilities, the manufac- 
turers of the reactors, and their sub-systems, and the consul- 
tants who pronounce on everything from the economics to the 
engineering to the safety aspects of it all) are well entrenched. 
But so too are the castes (among which must be included certain 
government agencies, the anti-nuclear Sierra Club, and the pro- 
nuclear Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy) and the sects 
(the Clamshell Alliance, the Abalone Alliance, and the Friends 
of the Earth, to mention a few of the anti-nuclear ones, and, 
on the other side, the pro-nuclear Fusion Energy Foundation). 22 
Much the same sort of pattern obtains in the case of the 
California LEG terminal debate and, when we look to see who out 
of these speakers in the debate gets listened to--when we look 
at the decision (or, as is more often the case, the indecision) -- 
it is fairly obvious that the sectist position carries at least 
as much weight as do the other two. Government, if it is to 
preserve an adequate measure of consent, has, somehow or other, 
to strike a complicated three-cornered balance between these 
three strongly represented positions within the debate. That 
some, at least, of those positions are themselves divided into 
pro- and anti- factions only exacerbates an already difficult 
task. 
When we look at similar debates in Britain the picture is 
remarkably different. In the debate surrounding the Braefoot 
Bay/Mossmorran siting decision, the entrepreneurial bias is well 
represented (for instance, by the initiators Shell/Esso and by 
the local Chambers of Commerce) and so too is the casteist bias 
(in the shape of the strongly anti Conservation Society and the 
Aberdour and Dalgety Bay Joint Action Group and of the cautiously 
pro Health and Safety Executive). But the sectist bias is con- 
spicuous by its absence. In all this great debate just one voice 
--that of Mr. Jamieson (a member of the ADBJAG who also registered 
as an individual objector at the Public Inquiry)--is raised 
in the name of sectism. With fine and xenophobic frenzy, Mr. 
Jamieson castigates the proposers and their allies for despoil- 
ing "tthe land that fed a thousand Scots. 1123 
When we look at the final decision we see, first, that there 
is one and, second, that it pays scant heed to poor Mr. Jamieson. 
In fact, it is a straight trade-off along the positive diagonal 
--a congenial settlement between the entrepreneurial bias in 
favor of "wealth creation," "employment opportunities," and 
that great argument-stopper "the national interest," and the 
casteist bias that insists that the decision should be reached 
in a rational and orderly way and that due consideration must 
be given to questions of safety (though, here again, weight is 
given, in the interest of order and rationality, to those parties 
who have "standing" within the debate) . 
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Figure 6. The British and American Versions of ~rrow's Kachine 
To abstract from these two machines the different patterns 
in which each se~retes*~ the individual preferences it cannot 
digest we need to look at the mismatch between the top layer-- 
government--and the bottom layer--populace. In the strongly 
different patterns of balances that each system of government 
has to strike in order to husband consent--in order to arrive 
at a social choice that looks (to the more troublesome members 
of the populace, at least) as if it might be the aggregation of 
individual values--we can see just what it is that distinguishes 
the British regime from the American regime. The iron law of 
consent--that you can't fool all of the people all of the time-- 
holds true for both sides of the Atlantic but what these pic- 
tures reveal is that, in Britain, you can fool the sects, the 
ineffectuals, and the autonomists all of the time and get away 
with it whilst, in the United States, you can only fool the 
ineffectuals and the autonomists. 
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Figure 7. The British and American Regimes 
Finally, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the two 
familiar notions of rationality--market rationality and bureau- 
cratic rationality--correspond very nicely to the entrepreneurial 
and casteist cultural biases, respectively. In consequence, 
these two notions of rationality are adequate for describing the 
British regime (but not for understanding the obstacles that,from 
time to time, it runs up against) . But, in the case of the Ameri- 
can regime, we need a third kind of rationality--a rationality of 
truculence--that is remarkably different from the two rationali- 
ties that lie at opposite ends of the positive diagonal ... but no 
less rational for that! 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Subject to clearance on seismic risk--a Californian pre- 
occupation that does not enter into the Scottish debate. 
2. Implicit in this is the assumption that residents and 
their houses are "givenw--that you cannot first remove 
them and then apply the criteria. By contrast, in the 
Soviet Union relocation of settlements is one of the 
variables and relocation costs are among the factors 
that have to be considered in what is seen as essentially 
an optimization problem. The legislation surrounding 
compulsory purchase places Britain somewhere between 
these extremes. 
3. See O.H. Critchley, "Aspects of the Historical, Philoso- 
phical, and Mathematical Background to the Statutory 
Management of Nuclear Power Plants in the United Kingdom," 
Radiation Protection in Nuclear Power Plants and the Fuel 
Qcle (London: The British Nuclear Energy Society, 1978), 
pp. 11-18. 
4. "Regimen (in the sense that it has to do with the relation- 
ship between leader and led) is certainly "p~litical'~, yet 
at the dame time it can also be seen as the arena (in the 
sense of a particular framework of social arrangements) 
within which the political action takes place. To emphasize 
the way~in which arena and action are static abstractions 
from what is a far-from-static system, I will use the terms 
"political regime" and "social regime" interchangeably. 
Christoph von ~urer-~aimendorf, Himalayan Traders (London: 
Murray, 1975) and The Sherpas of Nepal (London: Murray, 
1964). Both provide an excellent and very readable account 
of Sherpa society and its changing involvement with the 
wider world. 
6. I refer here specifically to the Nyingmapa (or "Redcap") 
variety of Lamaist Buddhism practiced by the Sherpas, 
though what follows may be valid for other varieties 
of Buddhism as well. 
Sanskritization--the process by which people on the fringe 
of the Hindu world become incorporated into it--has tended 
to be viewed as a one-way historical trend. But transitions 
in the reverse direction, though less obvious, do occur. 
Hakmendorf, for instance, describes the rather casual way 
in which all kinds of non-Sherpas become Sherpas but there 
seems to be no general description of this sort of process. 
'Sherpaization' serves as a label for the specific instance 
but I am at something of a loss when it comes to labeling 
the very general transition away from the group constraints 
of Hinduism and towards the individualized yet non-exploi- 
tive world of Tibetan Buddhism. "Modernization" would do 
nicely were it not for the economies of scale that usually 
accompany it (and the gratuitous insult to Hindus). Perhaps 
"autonomization" would be best. 
8. This was a research project carried out in 1979 by David 
Vachon, Aaron Wildvsky, and the author as staff members of 
the Institute for Policy and Management Research. 
9. British ASH is prepared to add the issue of non-smokers' 
rights to its present range of issues only if there is good 
evidence in support of the claim that passive smoking (in- 
haling the smoke produced by others) is injurious to health. 
This evidence is now emerging and British ASH is now taking 
up the issue. 
10. I am simplifying the argument a little. It is a balanced 
(or near-balanced) mixture of the two that is impossible or 
rather, I should say, uncommon. There will be some, but the 
essential point is that this middle-ground is sparsely in- 
habi ted. 
This hypothesis, if valid, will call into question some 
rather deep-seated assumptions. I use the anthropological 
terms "sect" and "caste," rather than the perhaps more 
familiar "voluntary association" and "bureaucracy," for two 
reasons. First, to establish some psychic distance from 
organizations that, because of their very familiarity, we 
have difficulty in discerning. Second, to avoid the con- 
fusions that would otherwise ensue once, thanks to this 
increased discernment, we are confronted, on one hand, by 
egalitarian groups that by imposing high exit costs on 
their members are voluntary only at a price and, on the 
other hand, by "bureaucracies without hierarchy" and "hier- 
archies without bureaucracy." 
The premise of inequality, though it pervades the entire 
casteist context, does, however, allow some scope for those 
who are lower in the hierarchy to pursue latent goals that 
are, to some extent, in conflict with the manifest goals 
that are defined toward the top of the hierarchy. Students 
of organization are familiar with the different information 
cultures that tend to crystallize out at the lower levels of 
all but the smallest of organizations. And indologists 
similarly point to the alternative strategies that can be 
adopted at different levels of the caste hierarchy without 
seriously infringing the premise itself--the all-pervasive- 
ness of rank. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus (London: 
Paladin, 1972). McKim Marriot, "Hindu Transactions: Diver- 
sity Without Dualism" in Transaction and Meaning, Bruce 
Kapferer(ed) (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of 
Human Issues, 1967). 
13. Hunter S. Thompson, Hell's Angels (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1967). 
14. As defined in Mary Douglas, "Cultural Bias," Occasional 
Papers of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 34, 1978. 
15. The contrast, perhaps, is not between "centralizedtt and 
"decentralizedtt but between sharp hierarchies--those with clear 
chains of command and well-defined areas of responsibility-- 
and fuzzy hierarchies--those with some ambiguity in dele- 
gati~n~and some overlapping of responsibilities. Though 
all four countries fall within the consensus culture cate- 
gory, France and Britain would seem to have sharper hier- 
archies than the Netherlands (with its proportional repre- 
sentation and resultant fluid coalitions) and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (with its conflicts between Federal 
and Lander spheres). Crises of rationality might be re- 
lated to failures in the fuzzy parts of the hierarchy; 
crises of legitimation to failures in the hierarchy. 
16. A point that has been well made in the context of archi- 
tecture and systems theory. See James Powell and Barry 
Russell, "Model Blindness," Cube Working Paper (Ports- 
mouth: Centre for the Utilization of the Built Environ- 
ment, Portsmouth Polytechnic School of Architecture, 1982). 
17. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael Thompson, 
"A Three-dimensional Model," in Mary Douglas (ed), Essays 
in the Sociology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1982). 
18. Complete, that is, for present purposes. For a more 
detailed discussion of how this works out in three 
dimensions, and for some suggestions about the nature 
of the possible transitions between these positions, 
see Michael Thompson, "A Three-dimensional Model." 
19. Abraham Lincoln, attributed the 8th Septefnber, 1858. 
20. A note on relativism and universalism is called for here. 
Since the cultural bias approach begins by rejecting the 
universalist hypothesis, it might appear that this places 
it firmly in the relativist camp. But this is not so. 
The relativism of its position is severely constrained, 
both by nature and by social context. It is not so con- 
strained that there is only one mode of being-in-the-world 
(universalism) nor is it so relaxed as to provide an in- 
finitude of such modes (extreme relativism) . Rather, it 
is a position of constrained relativism within which the 
considerable constraints limit us to just a small number 
(I would suggest five) modes of being-in-the-world, patterns 
of values, socially induced rationalities, or whatever. 
21 . Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Value, " (Chi- 
chester: Wiley, 1963, First Edition 1951). 
22. For further elaboration of the bases on which these groups 
are assigned to caste and sect, see Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley and Los Ange1e.s: 
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